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2. Membership of a club which is purely literary or social or scientific, and
does not own property, cannot be considered a right of property ; nor is the
right of meeting the other members a vested right of which courts can take
cognisance. Mandamus is not the proper form of remedy for a member of

such a club who is expelled. Waring v. Medical Society, 533.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See Negligence, 4-6; RAILROAD, 6–19.

1. A laborer who leaves his employer, before his time of service has ex-
pired, can recover only pro rata on the basis of the contract price. Patnote
v. Sanders, 508.

2. In the absence of an express agreement ten hours work will be considered
a day's labor. Brooks v. Cotton, 570.

3. A master is liable to other servants in the same employment, if they are
injured by any neglect of duty on his part. O'Donnell v. Alleghany R. R.,


1. Materials furnished on the credit of a building, are a sufficient considera-
tion for the owner's subsequent promise to pay. Landis v. Royer, 694.

2. Repairs and alterations which do not change the exterior of a building

into a new structure, confer no lien. Miller v. Hershey, 699.


1. An entry by a mortgagee, in the name of the whole, upon one of several
lots of wild land, conveyed by the same mortgage, and in the same county,
would give him constructive legal possession of all. Green v. Pettingill et al.

2. That a deed absolute on its face was really given as security for a debt
and intended only as a mortgage, may be shown by parol proof. Hogan v.
Jacques, 120.

3. A mortgage on a canal boat, or a copy thereof, by a statute of New
York is required to be filed in the office of the auditor of the canal department,
and within thirty days preceding a year another copy is required to be filed,
or the mortgage shall be void against creditors and subsequent bona fide mort-
gagees and purchasers. Herrick v. King and Others, 124.

4. A tenant for years who offers to pay off a mortgage-debt has the right to
redeem, and to have the mortgage delivered to him uncancelled. Hamilton
v. Dobbs, 187.

5. The date of a mortgage is the day of its delivery. Russell v. Carr, 314.
6. The law will not note fractions of a day except to prevent injustice. Id.

7. In equity a conveyance, whatever form it may assume, will be treated as
a mortgage, whenever it appears to have been taken as a security for an ex-
isting debt, or a contemporaneous loan. Hinckley v. Wheelwright, 590.

8. But on the other hand, parties capable of acting may make conditional
contracts for sale of their property, and a vendor may make an absolute con-
veyance, subject to an agreement for a reconveyance, upon the repayment of the
purchase-money, on or before a fixed day. Id.

9. Nor does the fact thut parties stand in the relation of mortgagor and
mortgagee prevent their dealing with each other as vendor and purchaser of
the equity of redemption, if the mortgagee does not make use of his encam-
brance to influence the mortgagor to part with his property at less than its
value. Id.

10. The intention of the parties is, in such cases, what the courts seek to
discover and enforce. Id.

11. As between grantor and grantee, where it appears that a conditional
sale was a mere cloak to an irredeemable mortgage, equity will let in the
grantor to redeem ; but it is a matter of grave doubt, whether, under such cir-
cumstances, it will afford the grantee a remedy for the debt against the
grantor. Id.


12. A mortgage of future-acquired chattels is valid only when the property
mortgaged may be regarded as a part of, or accretion to, property in actual or
legal possession of the mortgagor at the time of making the mortgage.

son v. Seibert, 608.

13. A mortgage of property in which the mortgagor has no present interest,
and which he must acquire, if at all, in substitution for or independently of
any property he now has, is not valid to create any lien which equity will re-

cognise or enforce. Id.

1. Neither the identity of a municipal corporation, nor its right to hold pro-
perty devised to it, is destroyed by a change of its name. Girard v. Philadel.
phia, 245.

2. Is bound to keep the pavement in front of the market stalls in repair.
City of Savannah v. Cullens, 314.

3. It is settled in Pennsylvania that the legislature may confer upon muni-
cipal corporations the power to assess the cost of local improvements upon the
property benefited. Hammett v. City of Philadelphia, 411.

4. But such local assessments can only be imposed to pay for local improve-
ments, clearly conferring special benefits on the properties assessed, and to
the extent of those benefits. They cannot be imposed when the improvement
is either expressed or appears to be for general public benefit. Id.

5. The paving of a street, changing a road into a street, and bringing the
land fronting on it into the market as building lots, is a local improvement,
with special benefits to the land fronting on it, and the cost of such paving
may be assessed on the property benefited. Id.

6. But when a street is once opened and paved, and has thus become a part of
the public highways of the city, the repaving of it, either with a new and dif-
ferent pavement, or by repairing the old one, is a part of the general duty of
the corporation, and cannot be paid for by assessments on the adjoining pro-

perties. Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See INFANT, 2; LANDLORD AND Tenant, 4; Railroad, 15.

1. It is not contributory negligence on the part of a person crossing a
county bridge, knowing it to be unsafe, in the absence of distinct notice to
him or the public not to use it. Humphreys v. The County of Armstrong, 62.

2. It is the duty of county commissioners knowing a bridge to be unsafe to
render it safe, or else to close it up, so as to prevent the public using it. Id.

3. It is not the absolute duty of a railroad company to furnish a safe engine.
Its duty is to use care and diligence to furnish such an engine. Railroad Co.
v. Thomas, 154.

4. When an injury has occurred to a servant in consequence of a defect in
an engine, the burden is on the servant to show negligence in the master, and
it is not shifted by the fact that an injury has resulted from a defect. Id.

5. Notice to the proper officers or servants of the company is notice to the
company, and will render it liable unless it uses proper diligence in repairing
the defect; but if it has made an effort by a competent servant to repair, it is
not liable. Failure to remedy the defect does not conclusively prove negli-
gence on the part of the workmen, and if it did, he is a fellow-servant of the
plaintiff, for whose negligence the company is not liable. Id.

6. The occupant of a second story is liable for the negligence of his ser-
vants in allowing a hydrant to flood the story below, and damage the goods
of the occupant of said story. Gass v. Callunry, 381.

7. Must be direct and proximate to defeat an action by the widow of the
deceased. Meyer v. People's Railway, 381.

8. The owner of a horse who allowed him to wander on the unenclosed
land of another, where he fell into a well and was killed, cannot recover
damages unless he shows that the defendant was guilty of gross negligence.
Calkins v. Mathews, 447.

9. It is negligence in a passenger, or in an employee holding the relation
of a passenger, to ride in the baggage-car. O'Donnell v. Allegheny R. R.,


10. In an action whose gravamen is negligence, it is the duty of the plain-
tiff to show a case clear of contributory negligence. Waters v. Wing, 758.

11. Negligence is always a question for the jury, where there is any doubt
as to the facts, or the inference to be drawn from them. Penna. R. R. Co.
v. Barnett, 758.

12. It is negligence for a traveller to drive on a bridge just as a train is

about to pass under it, if he has notice of its approach. Id.

Granting or refusing a new trial is always in the discretion of the court try.

ing the cause. Anthony v. Eddy, 445.

1. Unless an individual citizen is specially injured by a public nuisance, he
cannot bring a suit in his own name. Higbee v. Camden &- Amboy R. R. Co.,

2. The prosecution of a business, which renders the neighborhood uncom-
fortable, from smoke and noise, though not deleterious to health, will be re-
strained by injunction. Ross v. Butler, 252.

3. Continuance of, after notice to abate, renders party liable to indictment.
Vason v. City of Augusta, 315.

4. Landlord not liable for nuisance on the premises of his tenant. Id.

5. Every continuance is a fresh nuisance in judgment of law, and an action
for damages will lie against the continuer, without a request to abate it.
Conhocton Stone Co. v. B. f. N. Y. Railroad, 382.

6. The diversion of the waters of a navigable stream may be both a public
and a private nuisance, and a person especially injured may have an action

therefor. Yolo v. City of Sacramento, 670.


Public officers are liable in damages to all persons who may be injured

through their malfeasance, omission, or neglect. Lick v. Madden, 701.

1. Father may maintain an action for debauching his daughter under age,
though she does not live with him. Greenwood v. Greenwood, 316.

2. A minor having enlisted with his father's consent, is entitled to the
bounty paid by the town to which he was accredited. Baker v. Baker, 509.

3. A minor son enlisting in the army with his father's consent, is entitled
to recover from his father all the money he earned and sent home during

such service. Ayer v. Ayer, 636.
PARTITION. See Courts, 2.

1. Court will set aside and quash return of commissioners of partition when
made on wrong principles, or where there is great and evident inequality in
the division. Hay v. Estell, 125.

2. Parol promise by tenant in common to convey, no bar to suit for parti-
tion. Polhemus and Wife v. Hodson, 127.

3. A decree in partition, that such portions be allotted to the different ten-
ants in common as they have respectively improved, is correct. Seale v.
Soto, 509.

4. All the tenants in common should join in a partition. Sutter v. San

Francisco, 670.

1. A partner bound to account must give a clear and distinct statement of
his business, referring to particular books and the pages if necessary. Gor-
don's Adm. v. Hammell, 187.

2. A participation in the profits, to constitute a partnership, must be a gen-
eral participation in the profits as such. Hargrave v. Conroy, 253.

3. A share of the profits as compensation for services, will not constitute


a partnership, unless its gross inadequacy shows it to be a mere pretext to
avoid responsibility. Hargrare v. Conroy, 253.

4. A partner with the knowledge of his copartner converted to the use of
the firm money received by him as a United States deputy collector of
internal revenue. Held, that a bond of the firm given to indemnify the
sureries of the deputy collector was valid as a partnership obligation. Whar-
ton v. Clements, 299.

5. Such bond valid as an indemnity although executed before the sureties
had made good the defalcation, and although in form it was a bond for the
payment of money. Id.

6. When partnership property is sold under separate executions against
the partners individually, the proceeds represent the several interests of the
partners and not that of the partnership. Vandike's Appeal, 316.

7. A member of a ditch company has no general authority, by virtue of
such membership to bind the company by his contracts, like a member of a
partnership. McConnell v. Denver, 505.

8. Fraud is sufficient ground to dissolve an unexpired partnership. Cottle
v. Leitch, 509.

9. Levy on land of a partner for partnership debt, cannot be defeated by
an attachment of individual creditors. Bowker v. Sinith, 675.

10. Partner may withdraw at any sime and cause technical dissolution of
firm. Slemmer's Appeal, 637.

11. Equity will not decree dissolution and appoint a receiver unless on
good grounds. Id.

12. The joint creditors of a partnership, have an equity to prevent the trans-
fer and sale of the property of the firm, among the meinbers where the same
is fraudulent. Flack v. Charon, 670.

13. The members of a partnership are not jointly liable in an action for a
fraud committed by one of the partners. Stewart v. Levy, 601.

14. Each partner being liable in solido for the firm engagements, has a right
to have the firm assets applied in the first instance to the payment of the firm
debts. Manhattan Ins. Co. v. Webster, 757.

15. The interest of a partner is only his proportion of the capital or profits
after all the debts are paid. Id.

16. A partner has an insurable interest in the entire stock, and on the

receipt for a loss of insurance he must account to the firm. Id.

1. For chemical substances should state the component parts with clearness
and precision. Tyler v. City of Boston, 253.

2. Our Patent System, 321.

3. Where the question is on the validity of a patent the jurisdiction of the
United States courts is exclusive. H. T. Slemmer's Appeal, 637.

4. In a joint invention, each party should invent or discover something
essential to the whole result. Id.

5. A joint patent taken out on the sole invention of one, or a sole patent on

an invention of more than one, is void. Id.

1. The doctrine that bank bills are a good tender unless objected to at the
time, only applies to current bills which are redeemed at the counter of the
bank, and pass at par value in business transactions in the place where offered.

Smith, 354.
2. Payment of a check in the bills of a suspended bank, not known to the

parties to be suspended, is not a satisfaction. Id.

PLEADING. See ExecutOr and ADMINISTRATOR, 3–5 ; Lis Pendens, 2.

1. After a verdict for plaintiff, judgment will not be arrested because the
declaration alleges that the “ Inhabitants of a townwere bound to keep a

Ward v.


highway in repair, instead of alleging that the town was so bound. Flanders
v. Stewartson, 61.

2. A reversal in a court of last resort, remanding a case, cannot be set up
as a bar to a judgment in an inferior court on the same case. Aurora City v.
West, 254.

3. The rule that judgment will be given against the party who commits the
first fault in pleading does not apply to faults of mere form. Id.

4. A cause of action for false imprisonment may be joined with a cause of
action for slander, when both arise out of the same transaction. Harris v.
Avery, 437.

5. In declaring upon a special contract the entire consideration must be set
forth, and must be proved as alleged. Smith v. Webster, 445.

6. Where the cause of action in the declaration is single and indivisible,
plea of tender is an admission of the cause of action as laid. Dow v. Epping,

7. In an action by assignee of a chose in action not negotiable against the
maker, it is unnecessary to aver in the declaration the consideration of the

transfer. Smiley v. Stevens, 648.

1. In New Hampshire any one who has rights involved may be admitted to
prosecute or defend an action. Parsons v. Eureka Powder Works, 446.

2. There can be no judgment against a trustee in an attachment suit of
real estate, unless there is first a judgment against the principal defendant,
and where there is a want of service upon him, the action will be dismissed
on trustee's motion. Washburn v. Mining Co. and Allen Trustee, 634.

3. An instrument in writing agreeing to pay $150 every month for the
privilege of taking clay from certain land, is an instrument for the payment
of money within the Affidavit of Defence Law. Johnston v. Cowan, 755.

4. Filing the agreement is a copy of the claim, and no more could be

recovered than was due on it. Id.

The bona fide purchase by a neutral, of a vessel of a belligerent, even though
the same is dismantled, will not protect it from recapture by the other bellige-

rent. The Georgia, 250.


OF COLUMBIA, 129, 305.

1. Is not a writ of right. Com. ex rel. McLaughlin v. Cluley, 62.

2. The enactment that writs of quo warranto may be issued on the sugges-
tion of any person desiring to prosecute the same, means any person having

an interest to be affected. Id.


1. A charter granted by two states to a company to construct a railroad is
not only a contract with the company, but a compact between the states.
The Cleveland and Pittsburgh Railroad Co. v. Speer, 63.

2. Connecting lines of railroad may lawfully agree to divide the fares
unequally. Sussex Railroad v. Morris and Essex, 126.

3. A contract between railroad companies using the same gange, to trans-
port passengers and freight continuously over both lines, does not imply a
contract on the part of either company that it will not change the gauge of
its road. Id.

4. If a passenger is ready and willing to pay his fare when demanded, a
railroad company is bound to carry him, if there is room in the cars. Far-
hell v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., 187.

5. A railroad company in its character of master is responsible to its

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