employees for the proper construction of its road, its adjuncts and equipments,
and the selection of competent and skilful subordinates to supervise, inspect,
repair, regulate, and control its operations. If it fails in any of its duties in
these respects, and its servant thereby sustains injury, he may recover.
Warner v. Erie Railway Co., 209.
6. If, however, these obligations are once performed, and its structures are
properly made, and it employs from time to time competent and trustworthy
agents to examine and test the continued sufficiency of such structures, and
these tests are applied with the frequency and in the manner which time and
experience have sanctioned, no action will lie though its structures turn out
to be insufficient and the servant in consequence is injured. Id.
7. Where, under such circumstances, a bridge belonging to the company
fell while the plaintiff in the course of his employment was passing over it
upon a train, Held, in the absence of notice of its insufficiency, that it was
error to leave the question of negligence to the jury. Id.
8. A through ticket over three several distinct lines of passenger transpor-
tation, issued in the form of three tickets on one piece of paper, and recog-
nised by the proprietors of each line, is to be regarded as a distinct ticket for
each line. Knight v. Railroad Co., 654.
9. The rights of a passenger purchasing such a ticket, and the liabilities of
the proprietors of the several lines recognising its validity, are the same as
if the purchase had been made at the ticket office of the respective lines. Id.
10. Common carriers of passengers are not bound to insure the absolute
safety of their passengers; but they are required to exercise the strictest care
consistent with the reasonable performance of their contract of transportation.
Id.
11. To render them liable for an injury to a passenger while under their
charge, it is enough if it was caused solely by any negligence on their part,
however slight, if, by the exercise of the strictest care and precaution, rea-
sonably within their power, the injury would not have been sustained. Id.
12. Where a railroad company make a wharf subsidiary and necessary to
the proper use and enjoyment of their road, it was held, in an action to recover
for an injury on the wharf,
(1.) That the defendants are bound to exercise the same degree of care, in
making the wharf safe and convenient for their through passengers to travel
over, as is required of common carriers of passengers, although they required
them to disembark at their depot, forty rods distant from the steamboat; and,
(2.) That this liability continued until, in the ordinary course of their
passage over the wharf, they reached the point where the liability of the steam-
boat company commenced. Id.
13. The platform of a railroad company at a station is in no sense a public
highway. There is no dedication to public use as such. Gillis v. Railroad
Co., 729.
14. The platform is for the accommodation of passengers, and being unen-
closed, persons have the privilege but have not the legal right of walking over
it for other purposes. Id.
15. The owner of property is not liable to a trespasser or to one who is on
it by mere permission or sufferance, for negligence of himself or servants, or
for that which would be a nuisance in a public street or common. Id.
16. To persons who come on to a platform to meet or part with passengers,
or who stand in such relation to the company as requires care, the company is
bound to have the structure strong enough to bear all who could stand upon
it. Id.
17. The owner is bound to have the approach to his house sufficient for all
visitors on business or otherwise, but if a crowd gathers on it to witness a
passing parade, &c., and it breaks down, though not sufficient for its ordinary
use, he is not liable to one of the crowd who might be injured. Id.
18. Is bound to furnish a safe and sufficient roadway to its servants as well
as others travelling over it. O'Donnell v. Allegheny R. R., 757.
19. A carpenter working for a company, is not to be esteemed as employed
in the same general service with the hands running the trains, so as to relieve
the company from responsibility for injury to him from their negligence.
O'Donnell v. Allegheny Railroad, 757.
20. A railroad company is liable for an injury resulting from an act, lawful
in itself, but negligently performed. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Barnett,
RECEIPT. See EVIDENCE, 14; STAMPS, 1.
RECEIVER. See PARTNERSHIP, 11.
A receiver will only be appointed on bill filed for that purpose, and not
against a complainant upon defendant's application. Leddel v. Starr, 185.
RECORDS.
The records in public offices in other states, may be proved by a sworn copy,
or certificate according to the Act of Congress. Condit v. Blackwell, 188.
RELEASE. See TRESPASS, 2.
1. The right to the possession, is all that is necessary to maintain replevin.
Sprague v. Clark, 510.
2. Title to property in replevin not changed, by issuing writ and giving
bond. Keyser v. Stien, 576.
3. Surety in replevin-bond who takes possession of property, has no better
rights than plaintiff in the suit.
The estate in remainder of an infant will not be sold when the benefit is
doubtful. In the matter of Sale of Lands of Steele, 126.
RIPARIAN OWNER.
1. The common law rule of riparian ownership applies to the survey and
sale of public land (under an act of Congress), where the land borders
on a stream not navigable, but on navigable streams the title of the owner
stops at the stream, and does not come to the medium filum. Railroad Co. v.
Shurmeir, 254.
2. Slow accretions to the bank of a river become the property of the land-
owner on whose side they occur. Gerrish v. Clough, 446.
SALE. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 1; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 22; WILL, 1.
SET-OFF. See BANK, 2; EJECTMENT, 4.
1. A purchaser buying goods from a broker which are not in his posses-
sion cannot set off a claim against the broker in a suit for the purchase-money.
Dunn v. Wright, 59.
2. A debt not in judgment cannot be set off to a judgment. Thorp v.
Wegefarth, 62.
3. There is no right to tender a chose in action against the creditor in pay-
ment of a judgment or execution. Id.
SHERIFF. See ELECTION, 1; EXECUTION, 5.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See EQUITY, 14.
1. A delay of fifteen years is a strong ground for refusing a decree of
specific performance. Eyre v. Eyre, 119.
2. No decree can be made in a suit by husband and wife for specific per-
formance, where the wife dies, and her children have not been made com-
plainants. Hand v. Jacobus, 122.
1. The receipt of an express company for goods delivered to them is not
subject to a stamp. Belger v. Dinsmore, 188.
2. An internal revenue stamp is no part of a note. Hallock v. Jaudin,
3. A letter stating that a note will be paid by a creditor, does not require a
stamp. Boyd v. Hood, 317.
4. The accidental omission to stamp a note, at the time it is made, will not
invalidate it. Green v. Lowry, 317.
5. A judgment on an unstamped bond is not void. Ritter v. Brendlinger,
6. A promissory note made since the 30th day of June 1864 cannot be
stamped in open court, and then read to the jury. Wigham v. Pickett, 701.
STEAMBOAT. See COMMON CARRIER, 2.
See GUARDIAN; TRUST AND TRustee, 4-7.
1. The signing of a certificate, that certain parties have agreed to form a
bank, with the number of shares affixed to the several signatures, renders the
subscribers liable to the bank as stockholders. Cole, Receiver v. Ryan, 379.
2. A transfer of stock bona fide, renders the transferee liable for the
amount unpaid.
STREAM. See NUISANCE, 6; RIPARIAN OWNER, 1-2.
STREET. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 5-6.
1. Subrogation is purely an equitable result, and depends on facts to de-
velop its necessity, that justice may be done. Mosier's Appeal, 63.
2. Subrogation is applicable wherever a payment is made under a legiti-
mate and fair effort to protect the ascertained interests of the party paying,
and where intervening rights are not legally jeopardized or defeated. Id.
SURETY. See ESTOPPEL, 9; REPLEVIN, 3.
1. Mere forbearance by a creditor to the principal debtor, however preju-
dicial it may be to the surety, will not have the effect of discharging him
from his liability. Railroad v. Shaeffer, 110.
2. The case of the sureties of a railroad officer, charged with the receipt
and disbursement of money, is within the rule; and the company is not bound
to dismiss the officer as soon as any default becomes known, and to give notice
to the sureties that they may take measures to secure themselves by proceedings
against the principal. Id.
3. Where an officer of a corporation violates his duty, knowledge on the part
of other officers of the corporation of the default, or even connivance in it,
does not discharge the sureties. Id.
4. Two or more persons severally signing a promissory note as sureties do
not thereby incur a joint liability. Bunker v. Tufts, 188.
5. Several sureties paying the debt of their principal is no evidence of a
partnership between them. Id.
TAXATION. See COIN, 2; LEGAL TENDER NOTES, 4; VENDOR AND Pur-
CHASER, 14.
1. An assessment of a tax in St. Louis, against a lot, is not vitiated by an
error in respect to the ownership thereof. City of St. Louis v. De Nouè,
2. The income tax of 2 per cent. under the Act of February 1865, is not
in violation of the Constitution. Glasgow v. Rowse, 383.
3. A tax collector has no right to take money to pay taxes from a drawer
in a bank, without the consent of the officers. National Bank of Sandy Hill
v. Fancher, 384.
4. Certificates of indebtedness issued by the United States for supplies fur-
nished to carry on the war, are exempt from state taxation. The Banks v.
The Mayor, 447.
5. A writ of error lies from the Supreme Court of the United States, to
the decision of a state court against a right, privilege, or immunity claimed
under the Constitution. Id.
6. A town summoned as trustee cannot apply tax due by the defendant
cestui que trust, to the payment of a debt which the town owes said defendant.
Johnson v. Howard, 638.
TELEGRAPH. See BROKEr, 4.
TENANT IN COMMON. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1; PARTITION, 2-4.
A conveyance by any number of tenants in common, less than the whole,
though not void, cannot be made to prejudice the tenants not joining in the
deed. Gates v. Salmon, 510.
TENANT FOR LIFE. See EQUITY, 6.
1. Tenant for life is bound to repair the ordinary wear and tear to the pre-
mises. In the Matter of Lands of Mary E. Stull, 127.
2. The accumulated surplus or undivided earnings of an incorporated com-
pany are part of its capital, and as such belong to the remainder-man; but
an extra dividend declared out of the earnings belongs to the life tenant.
Van Doren v. Van Doren's Trustee, 189.
TENANT FOR YEARS. See MORTGAGE, 4.
TENDER. See PAYMENT, 1; SET-OFF, 3.
TIMBER. See TRESPASS, 4; WASTE.
TOWN. See ASSUMPSIT, 4; BOUNTY, 1; INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2; TAXA-
TION, 6.
1. Towns owe a statutory duty to travellers, for the breach of which the
party injured may maintain an action, to remove from the margins of their
highways objects unlawfully deposited there, which, by their frightful appear-
ance, make it unsafe to travel the road with ordinary horses. Morse v. Town
of Richmond, 81.
2. The duty of the town to remove the obstruction from the highway does
not attach until they know of it, or ought to know of it, nor while it is upon
the highway a reasonable time for the purposes of transportation over it. Id.
3. Though a town is not bound to work the whole width of the road where
the travel does not require it, yet they have a right to control the whole width
and have a corresponding duty. If they suffer objects to remain deposited on
the margin which, by their frightful appearance, make the whole road unsafe,
they will be liable for such accidents by fright as are the natural result of
their neglect. Id.
4. Towns are held to a higher responsibility with reference to removing
deposits of private property which are placed on the road without right and
obstruct public travel by their frightful appearance, than with reference to
removing equally dangerous objects which either are incident to the nature
of the soil and country, or are thrown upon the margin in process of con-
structing the road. Id.
5. The selectmen of a town may appoint an agent to build or repair roads
or bridges. Dow v. Epping, 445.
TRADE. See CONTRACT, 5; FIXTURES, 1.
1. A trade-mark having upon it a false statement which did not, and could
not produce any effect upon the purchasers of the article, is nevertheless so
tainted by the falsehood that equity refuses to protect it. Palmer v. Harris,
137.
2. A trade-mark for a brand of segars, manufactured in New York, had upon
it, in Spanish, words, which interpreted into English, mean: "Factory of
segars from the best plantations de la Vuelta Abajo, calle del Agua, Habana.”
Equity refused, on the ground of the falsehood, to enjoin a printer from coun-
terfeiting the device, and supplying the trade with his imitations. Id.
3. The complainant having first appropriated and applied the name of
"Charter Oak" to a certain pattern of stoves manufactured and sold by him,
will be protected by injunction in the exclusive use of the name as a trade-mark.
Filley v. Fassett, 402.
4. Any contrivance, design, device, name, or symbol, which points out the
true source and origin of the goods to which it is applied, or which designates
the dealer's place of business, may be employed as a trade-mark, and the right
to its exclusive use will be protected by the courts.
ld.
5. The appropriation of any prominent, essential, or vital feature of a trade-
mark by another, is an infringement. If the trade-mark is simulated in such
manner as probably to deceive customers, the piracy may be checked by in-
junction. Filley v. Fassett, 402.
6. The statute of Missouri providing for the filing of a description of any
trade-mark sought to be used, was not designed to abridge or weaken the
right to any trade-mark which may be acquired in the usual way. It does
not authorize the appropriation by one party of a trade-mark the title and
ownership of which belongs to another. Id.
1. Joint trespassers may be sued together, or any of them separately, and
the non-joinder of the others is no defence. Bailey v. Berry, 270.
2. A release to one of several joint trespassers will discharge all; but it
must be a technical release, not merely a covenant not to sue, or other instru-
ment amounting to a release by implication merely. Id.
3. An agreement with a portion of such joint trespassers to withdraw the
suit as to them, for a certain sum of money, will not discharge the others.
Id.
4. A wrong-doer cannot dispute the title of one in the possession of land
and claiming as owner, in an action against him for cutting down and carry-
ing away timber. Nelson v. Mather, 447.
5. A person resisting one specially authorized, to serve process, if cogni-
sant of the fact, is liable in an action of trespass for an assault and battery.
Leach v. Francis, 511.
6. The plaintiff was unlawfully seized by the defendants, carried thence
three miles and confined in a room several hours, and thence to a town meet-
ing, where he took an oath to support the Constitution of the United States,
and was discharged. In the trial of an action of trespass, based upon these
facts, the plaintiff claimed, (1) Actual damages resulting from his seizure and
detention; (2.) Damages for the indignity thereby suffered; and (3.) Puni-
tive damages. Held :-
7. That the plaintiff was entitled to recover full pecuniary indemnity for
the actual corporeal injury received, and for the actual damages directly re-
sulting therefrom, such as loss of time, expense of cure, and the like;
8. That the declarations of the plaintiff, made prior to the unlawful arrest
and tending to provoke the same, not being a legal justification thereof, are in-
admissible in mitigation of the actual damages; but,
9. That such declaration made on the same day, and communicated to the
defendants prior to such arrest, together with all the facts and circumstances
fairly and clearly connected with the arrest, indicative of the motives, provo-
cations, and conduct of both parties, are admissible upon the question of
damages claimed upon the other two grounds. Prentiss v. Shaw et al., 712.
TROVER.
It is no defence to an action of trover that the property sold was govern-
ment bonds payable to bearer, provided the principal was not the bona fide
purchaser. Kimball, Executor, v. Billings, 189.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See DECEDENT'S ESTATE, 2; EQUITY, 4-7 ;
PRACTICE, 2.
1. Where a deed expresses a nominal consideration never paid, no use results
to the grantor. Hogan v. Jacques, 120.
2. A trust estate cannot be sold by execution. Id.
3. The title of a bond fide purchaser from one, who bought at an illegal
sale of a trustee or executor, will not be set aside.
4. The holder of stock as trustee has prima facie no right to pledge it as
security for his private debt, and one who takes it under such circumstances
does so at his own peril. Shaw v.
6. The word "trustee" in the certificate is notice to all persons to whom
the certificate may be delivered, sufficient to put the taker on inquiry as to
the nature of the trust and the lawfulness of the pledge.
6. No usage of brokers or course of business can avail against these rules
of law, and therefore evidence of such usage is inadmissible. Id.
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