authority of the receiver has terminated, whether by removal or final discharge, he remains liable to the beneficiaries of his trust until his accounts are settled and allowed, and he has turned over all property and funds to his successor or others entitled to the possession of the same. The proper proceedings for the removal and discharge of receivers are to be ascertained by consulting the practice of the state and court where such proceeding is to be instituted. It is proper that all parties in interest should be notified of an application for the discharge, but an omission of such notice may be treated as a mere irregularity which will not justify a reversal of the order upon appeal.1 1 Coburn v. Ames, 57 Cal. 201. 891. Writ lies to correct abuse of discretion. 892. Against corporations organized to furnish commodities to cities and districts. 893. Inspection of books by creditors. 894. To compel the performance of public duties. 895. Construction of bridges and approaches to crossings. 896. To compel operation of road. § 887. When the writ will lie.-It often happens that an ordinary action for damages for breach of contract or of duty by a corporation would furnish no adequate remedy. In such cases the remedy by mandamus is usually proper and effective. It is deemed beyond the scope of this treatise to broach the subject of specific performance in equity. there being nothing peculiar in it as an equitable remedy when applied to corporations. A general discussion of this remedy, including its history and a review of changes in its use since first adopted, is not proposed.1 1 Where a statute provided that joint-stock corporations should furnish to a designated tribunal a list of stockholders with their places of residence and the amount of stock held by each, and a corporation of the class specified having § 888. To enforce performance of specific duties.-Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to enforce obedience where a specific duty is imposed by law upon a private corporation and no other adequate or specific remedy is provided by law. It is the proper remedy for enforcing the performance by canal and irrigation and other water companies of the duty of supplying those entitled to it with water for irrigating,' and other purposes.2 Whenever the corporate seal is necessary to the due execution of an instrument made by a corporation, or which it is its duty to execute, mandamus is the proper remedy to compel proper attestation.3 So the writ lies to compel the performance of their trust by the trustees of a corporation of a religious character. Thus, the trustees of a congregation, organized as a branch of a particular church or denomination were compelled to admit a minister who had been duly appointed and assigned to them by the proper authority.* But it was refused where the object sought by the writ was to compel the restoration of a pew to the petitioners by trustees of a church for the reason that full and adequate relief could be obtained by an action at law failed or refused to do so, it was held that the appropriate remedy to enforce a compliance with the obligation so imposed was by writ of mandamus. Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Mayor, etc., 23 Md. 297; State v. Wright, 10 Nev. 161. Where it was provided that if the election of directors of an incorporated company should not be duly held on a designated day, it should be the duty of the president and directors "to notify and cause an election for directors to be held within sixty days," and they refused to perform the duty so imposed upon them, a writ of mandamus was granted upon application of a stockholder to compel such performance. People v. Cummings, 72 N. Y. 433. The writ was granted to compel the officers of an incorporated Cemetery Association to permit one entitled to do so to bury a dead body in a lot owned by him within the cemetery, such refusal having been unreasonably refused. Mt. Moriah Cemetery Ass'n v. Com., 18 Pa. St. 235. 1 Price v. Riverside L. & I. Co., 56 Cal. 431. 2 People v. G. I. W. Co., 56 Hun, 76. 3 King v. University of Cambridge, 1 Black. Rep. 355; Queen v. Kendall, 1 Ad. & E. N. S. 366. People v. Steele, 2 Barb. 397; Feizel v. Trustees of First German Soc., 9 Kan. 592. against the person kept out of his rightful possession.1 The writ will lie to compel payment by a corporation out of a particular fund designated by statute of a claim against that fund.2 But it will not be granted to compel the directors to make provision for satisfying ordinary demands against the corporation, even though the party has obtained judgment and had execution issued thereon with fruitless results. He will still be left to pursue whatever the ordinary remedies provided at law.3 § 889. How far the writ will control discretion.—An important modification of the use of the remedy by mandamus is, that where, by law or agreement, a party has been vested with the right to exercise his discretion with reference to the doing of an act the writ does not lie to control the discretion. This rule is as applicable to. the officers and agents of corporations, as to other persons holding stations, trusts or offices. Accordingly, where the charter of an incorporated company vested its directors with the right to determine according to their best judgment as to the time and manner of collecting unpaid installments of stock, it was held that the writ could not be granted to compel them to collect such subscriptions at any particular time.* § 890.-Discretion must be exercised in good faith.—The mere fact that a statute has authorized an officer or board to exercise a discretion in making contracts with private parties, and to pass upon their claims for compensation for services performed under such contracts 1 Commonwealth v. Rosseter, 2 Burn. 360. 2 State v. Trustees of Wabash & Erie Canal, 4 Ind. 495. 3 Queen v. Victoria Park Co., 1 Ad. & E. N. S. 288. 4 State v. Canal & Claiborne Sts. P. R. R. Co., 23 La. Ann. 333. for the benefit of the corporation, whether public or private, which they represent, does not justify them in refusing to carry out such contracts and paying the price agreed upon.1 § 891. Writ lies to correct abuse of discretion.--Therefore it is not strictly accurate to say, that the writ will not issue to control discretion; for it is well settled that it may issue to correct an abuse of discretion if the case is otherwise proper.2 § 892. Against corporations organized to furnish commodities to cities and districts.-Gas and other companies which, by their charters or contracts with municipalities, enjoy practical monopolies, may be compelled by mandamus to furnish the commodity in reasonable 1 Raish v. Bd. of Education, 81 Cal. 542. In this case the question was fairly presented in a proceeding by mandamus under a contract with plaintiff to furnish supplies for the use of the public schools of San Francisco which had been fully performed on his part. The court said: "The argument that the board had the discretion to allow or reject the claim and that its action was final and conclusive so far as the proceeding is concerned is without weight. It is true that under the statute the board may reject any 'demand' for good cause.' But although the board is to be the sole judge of what is good cause still the rejection cannot be arbitrary or capricious. There must at least be the semblance of a cause. The board, after obtaining materials which it has ordered and needs for school purposes, cannot say: True, the materials are of the kind and quality ordered; but we have concluded not to pay for them and therefore reject the demand.' "If there was no semblance of cause then it is clear that it was the duty of the board to draw the drafts, and the writ was properly granted to compel the per formance of this duty." Citing Wood v. Strother, 76 Cal. 545, where the authorities upon the subject are very fully collated and reviewed. 2 Wood v. Strother, supra; Stockton R. R. Co. v. Stockton, 51 Cal. 339; Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall. 377; State v. Lafayette Co., 41 Mo. 226; Village of Glencoe v. The People, 78 Ill. 389; People v. Superior Court, 10 Wend. 285; Tapping on Mandamus, 14. In Wood v. Strother, supra, it was held that where 'the statute had made it the duty of the auditor of a city and county to countersign all warrants drawn upon the treasury for street work "who before countersigning it shall examine the contract, the steps taken previously thereto, and the records of assessments, and must be satisfied that the proceedings have been legal and fair," mandamus would lie to compel him to countersign a warrant drawn in a case where in fact there has been a compliance with the law. His |