to require no illustration. Yet, if an individual or corporation should engage in the business of life insurance or banking without complying with the conditions declared by statute to be necessary to vest him with authority to do so, the proceeding quo warranto would lie to oust him from its exercise and to recover the franchise so usurped to the state and for the infliction of appropriate penalties.1 1 In the case of People v. Utica Insurance Co., 15 Johns. 357 the defendant had been legally organized under a charter for the purpose, among others, of making contracts of insurance with persons generally against losses or damages to property by fire or otherwise. A proceeding by quo warranto had been instituted against it to oust it from the exercise of the privileges of carrying on the business of banking contrary to the statutes regulating that business and to perpetually enjoin it from future violation. Neither its franchise as a corporation nor of doing the business of insurance was attacked, and judgment of ouster was rendered without disturbing its corporate existence or business as an insurance company. In rendering the decision, Spencer, J., said: "Taking it for granted at present for the purpose of considering whether the remedy adopted is appropriate, that the defendants have exercised the rights of banking without authority and against the provisions of the restraining act, they have usurped a right which the legislature have enacted should only be enjoyed and exercised by authority derived from them. The right of banking since the restraining act is a privilege or immunity subsisting in the hands of citizens by grant of the legislature. The exercise of the right of banking then with us is the assertion of a grant from the legislature to exercise that privilege, and consequently it is the usurpation of a franchise unless it can be shown that the privilege has been granted by the legislature. An information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto need not show a title in the people to have the particular franchise exercised but calls on the intruder to show by what authority he claims it, and if the title set up be incomplete the people are entitled to judgment. This consideration answers the argument urged by the defendant's counsel that banking was not a royal franchise in England, and that it is not a franchise here which the people in their political capacity can enjoy." See also Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Orton, 32 F. 457. But immunity from taxation was held not to be a corporate franchise or "right and privilege" within the meaning of a statute authorizing proceedings by quo warranto, "in case any person should usurp or unlawfully hold any office or franchise." International and Gt. N. Ry. Co. v. State (Tex.), 12 S. W. 685. The right to vote with aldermen was held in Louisiana a franchise warranting a proceeding against the person claiming it. State v. Ramor, 10 La. Ann. 420; and see Putman v. Sweet, 1 Chand. (Wis.), 286. shop is not a franchise though a license be required. 621; nor is a license to practice medicine though a procurance of such license by physicians be required by law, State v. Green, 112 Ind. 462. The right to keep a dram It is therefore necessary in considering the object and purpose of this remedy to distinguish between the exercise of the franchise of being a corporation and the exercise of other franchises which though they may most frequently be the property of and the subject of abuse by corporations, yet are susceptible of usurpation and abuse by natural persons as well.1 § 962. Remedy cannot be given effect of an injunction.— This remedy is never extended to restricting or preventing any one legally possessed of an office or franchise from exercising any right, authority or privilege incident thereto. It is authorized for the purpose of investigating and determining by judicial authority the legal right to a public office or franchise, but never as an instrument or means of prohibiting or restraining a public officer or person exercising a public franchise from doing any particular act or thing the right of doing which was claimed by virtue of such office or franchise, and constituted a portion only or an integral part of the rights, powers and privileges incident thereto." 1 The proceeding has frequently been prosecuted against individuals for usurpation of the franchise of being a corporation; but the instances are rare in which it has been resorted to against individuals on account of unwarranted exercise of other franchises. State v. Ranor, 57 N. H. 498, was a quo warranto proceeding against two individuals who were the only members of a corporation which had long previously lost its organization. The action was not prosecuted to forfeit the charter of the corporation nor to oust the defendants from the franchise of being a corporation but to take away from them the franchise of collecting tolls on the Connecticut River. A demurrer was interposed on the ground that the action would not lie against them in that form and for that cause, but it was overruled in the Court below and its action in doing so sustained in the Supreme Court. In People v. Horsley, 65 Cal. 381, judgment of ouster was rendered against individuals in this form of action for usurpation of the franchise of collecting tolls upon a public highway and the judgment was affirmed in the Supreme Court. No question as to the propriety of the form of action was raised in either court. 2 Thus it was held that it would not lie at the relation of a private citizen for the protection of his private interests against threats of a corporation for the purpose of restraining it from the further use of its corporate powers or even from § 963. Statutory modifications of the remedy.—In New York the writ quo warranto and proceedings by information in the nature of quo warranto are no longer in use, having been superseded by a civil remedy, and the decisions of the supreme court in it are to be reviewed upon the principles applicable to such actions and not by those which prevail in criminal proceedings.1 In California, while they are not in express terms abolished yet an action in all its forms and features civil is provided for determining at the suit of the people" the title of any person alleged to usurp, intrude into, unlawfully hold or exercise any public office, civil or military, or any franchise.”2 It may be considered as a mode of procedure for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the courts in quo warranto conferred by the constitution.3 § 964. For what causes it will lie.—The proceeding by quo warranto is the appropriate remedy against a corporation for abuse of power, misuse of privilege, malfeasance or nonfeasance, and the state may in this usurping public franchises to which it was not entitled. Atty.-Gen. v. Consumers' Gas Co., 142 Mass. 417. See also, State v. Evans, 3 Ark. 585; Hastings v. Amherst, etc., Roe, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 596. 1 N. Y. Code Ed. 1884, § 1983; People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67. 2 Cal. Code, Civ. Proc., § 803; Const. 1879, Art. 6, § 5. 3 People v. Stanford, 77 Cal. 360, 376; State v. Merry, 2 Mo. 278. ♦ People v. Real Estate Bank, 5 Ark. 595; People v. Manhattan Co., 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 351; Com. v. James River Co., 2 Va. Cas. 190; Reed v. Cumberland, etc., Canal Corp., 65 Me. 132; People v. Thompson, 21 Wend. 235. It was held to lie against a college for establishing a branch in another place without power in the charter. People v. Geneva College, 5 Wend. (N.Y.), 211. It is the proper remedy to escheat property of a charitable institution in excess of the statutory limitation in Pennsylvania. West's Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 186. It is held in New York that a common law ground of forfeiture may be insisted upon though not embraced within the statute. People v. Bristol, etc., Co., 23 Wend. 222. A ferry franchise will not be forfeited for non-user, when it appears that the owners, during the time the ferry was not used, kept up a sufficient bridge to accommodate the public, and that for five years before the institution of proceedings against them they had properly maintained and operated the ferry. Commonwealth v. Hulings, 129 Pa. 317; 18 A. 138. form interpose its authority at any time to compel abandonment of an act of incorporation in excess of power.1 It is also the proper form of action to take against persons or bodies of persons assuming to act as a corporation without legal authority.2 A trivial excess or abuse of power conferred upon a corporation, or slight indifference to the public welfare will not justify a revocation of its charter. But when it is shown that the corporation has deliberately abandoned a salutary rule prescribed by its charter for the benefit of the public and substituted another rule for the transaction of its business in violation of the terms of its charter, a court should not hesitate to give judgment of forfeiture against it.3 Failure to build one branch within the the time limited will not work a forfeiture as to the other branches. People v. Broadway R. Co., 9 N. Y. S. 6; 56 Hun, 45. Where the charter of a railroad company (Acts N. Y, 1874, c. 585), provides that upon failure to commence or complete the road as therein provided the company "is to forfeit the rights acquired by it under this act," a cause of forfeiture does not per se divest the company of the franchise without suit brought for that purpose, and the company cannot be attacked for its default in condemnation proceedings instituted by it. Affirming, 11 N. Y. S. 161. In re Brooklyn El. Ry. Co. (N. Y.), 26 N. E. 474. In an action to dissolve a railroad company for its omission to run trains for five days, the mere allegation of such omission does not make a prima facie case for a decree of dissolution, and throw the burden of explanation and excuse on defendant corporation, under Laws N. Y., 1850, c. 140, § 36, which requires all railroad companies to 'start and run their cars for the transportation of passengers and property at regular times, to be fixed by public notice." Affirming 10 N. Y. S. 907; People v. Atlantic Ave. R. Co. (N. Y.), 26 N. Y. E. 622. 66 1 Camden & A. R. Co. v. May's L., etc., Co., 48 N. J. L. 530; 7 A. 523. 2 Parish of Bellport v. Tooker, 29 Barb. 256, per BROWN, JR.; People v. Kingston, etc., Turnp. Co., 23 Wend. 193; 21 N. Y. 267; Turnpike Co. v. State, 3 Wall. 210; Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574; Ward v. Farwell, 97 Ill. 593; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch. 43. 3 State v. Cent. Ohio Mut. Relief Assoc., 29 Ohio St. 399. In this case it was held that where a corporation had assumed franchises not granted and it appeared that the certificate of incorporation did not comply with the requirements of the statute under which it was organized, the court in the exercise of its discretion would oust it of its franchise to be a corporation. See also, State v. Standard Life Assoc., 38 Id. 281; State v. Railway Co., 40 Id. 504. A violation of the The establishment against a corporation, before a judicial tribunal, in which opportunity for defence is afforded; that its condition is such as to render its continuance in business hazardous to the public or to those who do business with it; or that it has exceeded its corporate powers; or that it has violated the rules restrictions or conditions prescribed by law, constitute sufficient reason for the state which created it to reclaim the franchises and privileges granted to it.1 And in Illinois a corporation may be dissolved by the state where its corporate character has been perverted to purposes of private gain by its officers, and its membership deprived by fraud and abuse of authority by the management of all participation in its affairs.2 law as to the sale of intoxicating liquors on the part of an incorporated club constitutes such abuse and misuse of its corporate powers and franchises as to furnish cause of forfeiture under Code Md., art. 23, §§ 255-258, prescribing the remedies for the abuse or misuse of corporate powers and franchises. State v. Easton Social, Literary and Musical Club (Md.), 20 A. 783; Same v. Farmers' Social, Literary and Musical Club, Id. 1 Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 575. It was held to be a violation of the charter of a bank and a cause of its forfeiture that the bank had abandoned the franchise of banking and allowed others to intrude upon and usurp its privileges in that respect and issue and put in circulation as money, notes, or bills in the name of the bank. State v. Com. Bank of Manchester, 33 Miss. 575. The state cannot attack an execution sale of a gravel road franchise by quo warranto on the ground that the consideration was inadequate in the absence of any complaint on the part of persons interested. State v. Hare, 121 Ind. 308; 23 N. E. 145. A mutual fire insurance company was permitted by its special charter to do business upon its capital of premium notes. On an extension of the charter, the provisions of the general act for the incorporation of fire insurance companies (Laws N. Y., 1853, c. 466), were made applicable to it. It afterwards obtained, under those provisions, another extension of its charter a change of its name, and larger powers for business; but it did not appear that the requirements of the act as to amount of capital, etc., necessary to such changes, were complied with, unless the premium notes held by the company were regarded as stock or capital notes. Thereafter the company surrendered to the makers a great part of such notes, treating them as deliverable to the makers according to the usual course of business, and the provisions of the act respecting premium notes. Held, on application of the attorney-general, that the business of the company must be closed, on the grounds of its insolvency and violation of law, unless its capital was made good according to the requirements of the act. People v. Manhattan Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 12 N. Y. S. 264. 2 The statute provides that the affairs of such associations shall be managed |