CHAPTER XXXIX. POLICE REGULATIONS. § 1068. 1069. The necessity of state control of all public interests. 1070. The legislature a state agency. 1071. The number of individuals affected by a regulation immaterial. 1072. Contracts and private rights subordinated to more important considerations. 1073. Legislative powers extend indiscriminately to individuals, copartnerships and corporations. 1074. The legislature cannot bind the state by granting away the power to make police regulations. 1075. Munn v. Illinois. 1076. The power not to be abused. 1077. General right of state control of the exercise of public fran chises. 1078. Police regulations have no extra-territorial force. 1079. When a business becomes of public concern. 1080. Police control not evaded by becoming incorporated. 1081. Laws regulating rates, labor, wages, etc. 1082. Parties interested in the fixing of rates entitled to a hearing. 1083. Interference by courts. 1084. Police regulation does not authorize confiscation. 1085. The legitimate exercise of police power unlimited. 1087. Statutes interfering with commerce among the states. 1088. What police regulations are not an interference. § 1068. The necessity of state control of all public interests. Whether justified upon the ground of being police regulations or general legislation for securing the welfare of society, it is evident that the framers of the national constitution did not by any or all of the various prohibitions intend to annihilate all legislative power, the exercise of which might collaterally affect existing contracts, or to prohibit the making of laws to protect the community from the dangers of civil conflict, from injustice and oppression, for the abatement of nuisances, and to regulate the administration of justice. A fair illustration of this principle is found in the exercise of the right to regulate charges by public carriers and the like. As the government itself cannot appropriate private property without making due compensation, it would be repugnant not only to reason but to the spirit of the constitution itself to say that a state legislature has no power to prevent persons, whether natural or artificial, from taking for private use, without adequate compensation, by means of extortion, that which the government itself cannot appropriate except upon the return of a just value.1 Therefore the power to control and regulate the rates which may be charged by quasi-public corporations has been long exercised by state governments; and by the act to regulate commerce passed at the first session of the Forty-ninth congress is now exercised by the federal government.2 1 See People v. Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co., 79 Mich. 471; 44 N. W. 934. 2 Few cases under the interstate commerce act have gone beyond the railroad commission appointed by President Cleveland so as to receive judicial construction. In Thurber v. The Railroads, which came before the commissioners in 1890, it was held that classification of freight for transportation purpose is within the terms of the act, and that there is nothing within the act to prohibit a classification of freight designating different classes for carload quantities and for less than carload quantities for transportation by the companies at a lower rate in carloads than in less than car loads. In the carload lot cases before the commissioners in 1890 (see 7 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 259), the general policy of the law and the reasonableness of its requirement was thus expounded by them: "The circumstance of many consignors to many consignees of a full carload to the same destination is too unimportant in the item of cost of handling to demand a difference in the rate. Fractional differences exist in all business, as they do under all laws imposing burdens, and in business are supposed to be equalized by average charges. For illustration, in the passenger service quantity is not considered, and passengers weighing three times as much, and with the full limit of baggage, are charged the same rate for the same journey as the lighter passengers without baggage; and a few passengers in a car pay no higher The subordination of all private interests to the purposes of good government, subject only to the condition that the object to be accomplished shall be one in which the public has an interest, is no longer an open question. In its general bearing this principle is too well settled and uniformly recognized-underlying the adjudications by courts of all cases involving constitutional provisions-to require more than a mere statement. In its application, however, the most serious difficulties and interesting controversies have frequently arisen to tax not only the ingenuity and forensic skill of counsel, but the learning and comprehensive powers of judges. § 1069. General view of the subject. By the term state, as here used, is meant the people duly organized as a community, possessing primary and absolute powers of self-government. In that capacity the state may transfer either to a foreign government or to an indivi rate than the passengers in a full car, though the earning of the two cars and the cost of service per passenger differ widely. In the case of smaller shipments to many consignees at many destinations, there is such material difference in the cost of service, in the earnings of cars, and in car detention as to justify a higher charge. A reasonable amount of difference is difficult to adjust, but it should not be prohibitory upon the business, nor unjustly disproportionate." Under rule 4, adopted by the railroad commission in Florida on September 23, 1889, requiring each railroad company to "keep posted" in each of its stations copies of rate schedules, and the rules and regulations of the board regulating the transportation of freight and passengers, it is not sufficient for the company to nail up in its stations a pamphlet of 11 printed pages containing the information required, nor is it sufficient to bind the schedules together, and leave them open to the public on a prominent desk in the waiting-room of the station, but the schedule may be printed on two cards so posted as to read as one. State v. Pensacola & A. R. Co. (Fla.), 9 So. 89. The company is not required to post special rates which it is authorized to make for temporary use for particular persons and places, nor is it required to specify in the schedules the rate per mile, no" the distances between stations, in the absence of any law or rule of the commis sion requiring it. It is not sufficient, however, for the company to send the schedules to its agents with instructions to post, but it must see that they are continuously kept posted, as required by the rule. Id. 1 See Sioux City St. Ry. Co. v. Sioux City, 78 Ia. 367, 43 N. W. 224. dual all governmental control, or it may transfer part of it and retain the balance as the states of the union have done. Of the portion retained all, or a part, may be delegated to its legislature. The states have, however, without exception circumscribed the authority of the legislative department in written constitutions. § 1070. The legislature a state agency. None of the powers which the representatives of the state may exercise are original, but are strictly delegated. They can never be equal in authority with their principal. They may make compacts for the state under which its title to property is absolutely conveyed, and they may irrevocably confer exemptions, immunities and franchises unless their powers in these respects are limited. But there are properties or attributes of the state which their legislative agency cannot convey absolutely even when constitutions are silent on the subject. These are the inherent elements of sovereignty among which may be mentioned the primary powers of eminent domain, of providing by suitable legislation for the enforcement of the laws, for the safe and efficacious administration of justice, and for the peace, order and well-being of society. These powers are as essential to the life of the state as the right of self-preservation would be to a natural principal, and never can be granted away so as to vest a title to them in another by the 1 See Stone v. Miss., 101 U. S. 814. A statute fixing the liability of railroad companies for negligence of its engineers and other employes held not to deprive the companies of their property without due process of law. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205; Minneapolis & St. R. Co. v. Herrick, Id. 210; 8 S. Ct. 1161. See also Quackenbush v. Railroad Co., 71 Wis. 472; 37 N. W. 834; holding that a statute cutting off the defence of contributory negligence in aetions for damages occasioned to persons and property for lack of a fence was valid. See also Augusta, etc., R. v. Randall, 79 Ga. 304; 4 S. E. 674. agents of the state in forms however solemn or by words however expressive. § 1071. The number of individuals affected by a regulation immaterial. The number of persons affected by a statute professing to regulate matters of public concern seems to be immaterial. It is only required that it shall apply generally in its terms to all persons and property coming within its provisions. The state reserves at all times and under all circumstances the plenary power to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may be exercised to control the use of property of corporations and individuals.1 1072. Contracts and private rights surbordinated to more important considerations. Laws passed for the common good and necessary for the protection of the public cannot be said to impair any right or the obligation of any contract, or to do any injury in the proper and legal sense of the term.2 The constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contracts has no application in regulating the exercise of franchises which are matters of public concern.3 Where the owner of prop 1 Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 526; Stone v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 108 U. S. 347; Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Illinois, 108 U. S. 541; L. R. & F. S. Ry. Co. v. Hanniford, 49 Ark. 291; 5 S. W. 294; Dow v. Bridleman, Id. 297; Georgia R. R. Co. v. Smith, 70 Ga. 694; Winona, etc., R. R. Co. v. Blake, 94 Id. 180. 2 Com. v. Intoxicating Liquors, 115 Mass. 153, per ENDICOTT, J. See Brick Presby. Church v. New York, 5 Cowen, 538; Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Id. 349. It is competent for the legislature to prescribe that loaded cars shall be transferred from one line to another without breaking bulk, unless at the expense of the company unloading them, such being reasonable regulations relative to the duties of common carriers. ROTHROCK and ROBINSON, JJ., dissenting. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co. v. Dey (Iowa), 48 N. W. 98. 8 Blake v. Winona & St. Peter R. R. Co., 19 Minn. 419; s. c. 94 U. S. 180; People v. Squire, 107 N. Y. 593; 14 N. E. 820; C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Peik v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co. Id. 165; State ex rel. etc. v. Columbus Gas Light, 34 O. St. 572; Sullivan v. Or. Ry. & Nav. Co. (Or.), 24 P. 408; Compare Or. Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Smalley (Wash.), 23 P. 1008. |