to give effect not only to legislation designed to protect public peace and safety, but also to constitutional provisions and other legal safeguards to the citizen, and to his property rights.

Accordingly, it is now held by the highest tribunal in the Union, that with respect even to those franchises that are of a public nature, involving contract rights between them and the state, private corporations have many substantial rights under the constitutional provision under consideration which legislatures are bound to respect, and cannot take away upon the plea of public health and safety.1

§ 1077. General right of state control of the exercise of public franchises.-The right of the state to regulate the mode in which railroad corporations shall transact their business is too well established to require argument in

1 In New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, it was held that a legislative grant of an exclusive right to supply gas to a municipality and its inhabitants upon the condition of the performance of the service by the grantee, after performance by the grantee, is a contract protected by the constitution of the United States against state legislation to impair it. The court said: "That there is a power, sometimes called the police power, which has never been surrendered by the states, in virtue of which they may, with no certain limits, control everything within their respective territories, and upon the proper exercise of which, under some circumstances, may depend the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, is conceded in all cases. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203. In its broadest sense, as sometimes defined, it includes all legislation and almost every function of civil government. Barbier v. Connelly, 113 U. S. 27, 31. As thus defined, we may, not improperly, refer to that power the authority of the state to create educational and charitable institutions, and provide for the establishment, maintenance, and control of public highways, turnpike roads, canals, wharves, ferries, and telegraph lines, and the draining of swamps. Definitions of the police power must, however, be taken subject to the condition that the state cannot, in its exercise, for any purpose whatever, encroach upon the powers of the general government, or rights granted or secured by the supreme law of the land. Under Const. Cal., art. 14, § 1, and act Cal., March 12, 1885, authorizing the board of supervisors to fix the rates at which water should be supplied to the general public for profit, the board of supervisors of a county have no power to fix the rate for a corporation organized to furnish water to the stockholders only. McFadden v. County of Los Angeles, 74 Cal. 571; 16 P. 397.

its support. The speed at which they may run their trains, the manner of crossing or running upon highways and turnpikes used for public travel, the protection of persons and property carried upon them or passing upon highways or other railroads crossed by them, and the compensation they may demand and receive for services, are among the matters which government may regulate and control, although the power to alter and amend the charters of such corporations has not been reserved. Such legislation within proper bounds violates no contract, takes away no property, and interferes with no vested right.'

Unless protected by their charters, or unless the interference amounts to a regulation of foreign or interstate commerce, they are subject to legislative control, their employment being public and affecting public interests.2

And where protection from a legislative regulation

1 State v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 3 Keyes, 196; Jones v. Galend R. R. Co., 16 Iowa, 6; Indianapolis R. R. Co. v. Marshall, 27 Id. 300; In re Annan, 2 N. Y. S. 275; N. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. State, 9 S. Ct. 28; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Riblet, 66 Pa. St. 164; Dow v. Bridleman. 49 Ark. 325; 5 S. W. 297; Buffalo E. S. R. Co. v. Buffalo St. Ry. Co., 111 N. Y. 132; Little Rock & F. S. R. Co. v. Hanniford, 49 Ark. 291; 5 S. W. 291; Waldron v. Rensselaer, etc., R. R. Co., 8 Barb. 390; Veazie v. Mayo, 45 Me. 560; Kansas Pac. R. R. Co. v. Mower, 16 Kan. 573; Tripp v. P. R. Co., 66 Mich. 1; C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Becker, 32 F. 849; Madison, etc., R. R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217; Horn v. Chicago. etc., R. R. Co., 38 Wis. 463; Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Southwest Pa. R. R. Co., 77 Pa. St. 173; Mobile & Ohio R. R. Co. v. State, 51 Miss. 137; Penn. Co. v. Wentz, 37 Ohio, 333; Lyman v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Cush. 288; Hoyt v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 93 Ill. 601. In Little Rock & F. S. R. Co. v. Hamiford, supra, it was held that Laws Ark. 1881, c. 59, giving a lien on buildings for labor, skill and material furnished therefor, after taking effect of said act, does not impair the obligation of contracts because it applies to buildings already under contract at the time of the taking effect of said act. See also, Dow v. Bridleman, supra, holding that taxing an attorney's fee as part of the penalty for a violation of the act is not under the act objectionable as being partial or unequal legislation.

2 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Laurel Fork, etc., R. R. Co. v. West Va. Transp. Co., 25 W. Va. 324. See Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Stone, 20 Fed. Rep. 270.

is claimed under charters, these are construed in favor of the public and against the company.1

This power belongs to each sovereignty into which a railroad enters when operated in more than one state, whether exercising corporate powers under the laws of one or several states.2 But the legislation adopted must observe the contract rights of corporations under their charters: must be confined to the exercise of the police powers, and not interfere with the vested rights of the companies in their property or franchises; must not inflict punishment or take property otherwise than by due process of law, nor without compensation; must not deny to them the equal protection of the law, and must in all respects observe the constitutional guaranties prescribed for the protection of all citizens, railroad companies being for such purposes as much citizens as natural persons.3

§ 1078. Police regulations have no extra-territorial force. -A state legislature cannot fix maximum rates except on business done exclusively within the state. State statutes undertaking to fix the compensation which railroad companies may charge for carrying freight and passengers beyond state lines, are regulations of interstate commerce and encroachments upon the constitutional powers of congress. The same power to regulate rates and charges for services rendered and

1 Camden, etc., R. R. Co. v. Briggs, 22 N. J. (2 Zab.) 623. See McAunich v. Miss., etc., R. R. Co., 20 lowa, 338.

2 Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307.

3 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. R. R. Com. of Tenn., 19 Fed. Rep. 679. Kaiser v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 5 McCrary C. C. 496; Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Beckar, 32 F. 849; Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Tenn. R. R. Com., 19 Fed. Rep. 679. A provision in the charter of a railroad corporation that the rate of transportation for each passenger should not exceed five cents per mile is not a contract by the state with the corporation that the fare should never be reduced below that rate. Dow v. Bridleman, 49 Ark. 325; 55 W. 297.

commodities supplied exists subject to the same limitations in the case of other corporations and of persons exercising public franchises for private gain. It applies to warehousemen, wharfingers, ferriers, water and gas companies, etc.1

§ 1079. When a business becomes of public concern.— On the same principle the system of instantaneous and continuous indications of the market, built up by the Chicago Board of Trade and the telegraph companies,

Munn v. Illinois, 94 Ill. 113; Spr. V. W. W. v. San Francisco, 82 Cal. 286. The L. Gas-Light Company was organized by special charter granted March 2, 1857, which authorized it to lay its pipes and vend gas in a certain portion of the city of St. L., and exempted it from Rev. St. Mo. 1855, c. 34 art. 1, § 7, providing that the charter of every corporation thereafter created should be subJect to alteration by the legislature. In 1868, the charter was amended so as to extend the rights, privileges, and franchises of the company throughout the entire corporate limits of the city. Held, that the right to make and vend gas carried with it the right to fix the price, and that it was not subject to regulation by state or city; (BARCLAY, J.), dissenting and further, that the regulation of the price of gas by the state, or by municipalities created by it, is not the exercise of a police power which cannot be abridged by contract. BARCLAY, J., dissenting. State v. Laclede Gas-Light Co. (Mo.), 14 S. W. 974.

In Michigan it is held that the fact that a higher maximum rate is allowed on the railroads of the upper peninsula than in the rest of the state does not render the act unreasonable and void, since it is matter of common knowledge, of which the court will take judicial notice, that the cost of building and running railroads there is much greater than in the lower peninsula, and this difference has long been recognized in the railroad law of the state. Wellman v. Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co. (Mich.), 47 N. W. 489. The provision of Acts 23d Gen. Assem. Iowa, c. 17, § 2, that all railway companies in the state shall, upon the demand of any person interested, establish "reasonable joint through rates" between points on their respective lines within the state, and (section 3) that in case of their failure to do so the commissioners shall establish the rate, does not compel the railway companies to enter involuntarily into contractual relations with each other, but merely imposes a duty for the non-performance of which they become liable to have the rates fixed by the commissioners, and to the consequent penalties if they refuse to give effect to the rates thus fixed, and therefore such regulation by the state of " joint through rates " is not obnoxious to any constitutional provision, either of the state or the United States. ROTHROCK and ROBINSON, JJ., dissenting. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co. v. Dey (Iowa), 48 N. W. 98. In the same case it was held that the state is precluded from denying that the traffic rates fixed by the railroad commissioners are reasonable, and the companies cannot be subjected to penalties under the Iowa "joint rate act," on the ground that the rates are unreasonable, if they charge no more than the rates thus fixed.

was held to have become affected with a public interest, and such Board of Trade cannot legally discriminate between parties, where all alike are willing to conform to reasonable rules and to pay for the information desired.1

The business of telephone companies serving such of the public as are willing to pay for the service performed by them, and the use of their instruments is vested with a public interest, and is for that reason subject to regulation and control by the state. And the fact that a statute compelling all telephone companies within the state to furnish all applicants with service at a rate not exceeding a certain sum per month provides a penalty for the violation thereof does not take away the right to compel it by mandamus to furnish such service, the penalty being merely cumulative.3

§ 1080. Police control not evaded by becoming incorporated. The mere association of a number of individuals in a corporate capacity does not confer upon them any additional privileges or impose upon them any other

1 New York & Chicago G. & S. Ex. v. B. of T. of Chicago, 127 Ill. 153. See Hockett v. State, 105 Ind. 250; State v. Tel. Co., 17 Neb. 126; Telegraph Co. v. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 9; State v. Tel. Co., 36 Ohio St. 296; Tel. Co. v. Tel. Co., 44 Am. Rep. 237; Albrecht v. Inglis, 12 East. 527. Compare Stock Exch. v. Board of Trade, 15 Fed. Rep. 847; Bryant v. Tel. Co., 17 Id. 826; Pitcher v. Bd. of Trade, 121 Ill. 412; Kierman v. Manhattan Quotation Co., 50 How. Pr. 194; Metropolitan G. & S. Exch. v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 15 Fed. Rep. 847.

2 Cent. Un. Teleph. Co. v. State, 118 Ind. 194; Hockett v. State, 105 Ind. 250; Cent. Un. Tel. Co. v. Bradbury, 106 Ind. 1; State v. Bell Tel. Co., 36 O. St. 296; State v. Am. Un. Tel. Co., 10 Cent. L. J. 438; Bell Tel. Co., of Phil. v. Com. Pa. Supr. Ct. 1886; 16 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 222 n.; Chesapeake, etc., Teleph. Co. v. B. & O. Tel. Co., 66 Md. 399.

3 Cent. Un. Teleph. Co. v. State, 118 Ind. 194. See also State v. Nev. Tel. Co., 22 N. W. Rep. 237; Vincent v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 49 Ill. 33; People v. Manhattan Gas Light Co., 45 Barb. 136. Compare City of St. Louis v. Bell Tel. Co. 96 Mo., 623; 24 Am. & Eng. L. Reg. 573: American, etc., Tel. Co. v. Conn. Teleph. Co., 49 Conn. 352; Hackett v. State, 5 N. E. Rep. 202; Telephone Co. v. State, Id. 721.