hibited by statute, the fact that the member has paid his assessments for the required length of time on the strength of it does not estop the corporation from setting up defence of ultra vires.1

§ 686. Estoppel-New agreement, etc.-Where by the terms of the policy a member who had forfeited his certificate had a right to be restored upon certain conditions, it was held that a reinstatement upon compliance with these conditions, constituted no consideration for a stipulation exacted by the society from the beneficiary that it should be liable to pay him only a part of the amount to which he would be entitled under the terms of the policy.2

A person is not estopped from claiming compensation from the railroad for an injury resulting from a collision having been previously compensated by the relief association for the injury which he then untruthfully alleged was caused by malaria, jaundice, constipation, etc., as the railroad and the association are separate corporations; and while the former guarantees all contracts of the latter, yet the association funds are sufficient to meet all liabilities likely to arise."

The by-law of a railroad relief association, requiring its members to release the railroad company from any claim for damages before applying to the association

1 Canton Masonic Mut. Ben. Soc. v. Rockhold, 26 Ill. App. 141; Rockhold v. Canton Masonic Mut. Ben. Ass'n (Ill.), 19 N. E. 710; 21 N. E. 794. Contra, Matt v. Roman Catholic Mut. Protective Soc., 70 Iowa, 455; 30 N. W. 799.

2 Davidson v. Old People's Mut. Ben. Soc., 39 Minn. 303. Where a benefit association issues a policy to one upon his own life, payable at his death to a third person, and the insured pays the premiums, which are accepted by the company, it cannot, after the death of the assured, resist payment of the policy to the beneficiary, upon the ground that he is neither a relative, heir, nor devisee of the insured, and that its charter authorizes it to pay to such person only. Bloomington Mut. Life Ben. Ass'n v. Blue, 120 Ill. 121; 11 N. E. 331. * Owens v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 35 F. 715.

for relief, is not against public policy, as it simply puts a claimant to his election whether he will look to the railroad company or the relief association for compensation.1

§ 687. Expulsion of insane member.-A member of a mutual benefit insurance association cannot be expelled. from the association so as to deprive him of his right to mortuary benefits by proceedings had while he is insane, when no notice of the proceedings has been served upon him, and the expulsion is based mainly upon his admission of the matters charged against him, made to the tribunal by which he was tried.2

§ 688. Violation of by-law-Drunkenness.—Where, in an action on a certificate issued by a temperance order, it appeared that the member died from the excessive use of liquor; that he agreed in his written application to comply with all the requirements of the order as a condition precedent to his being entitled to the benefits ; that the certificate contained a clause in substance and effect the same as the application, it was held that plaintiff could not recover.3

1 Owens v. Baitimore, etc., R. Co., 35 F. 715. As to the defence of double insurance, see Bock v. Ancient Order of United Workmen, 75 Ia. 462. As to payment by levy of assessment under peculiar by-law provisions, see Wadsworth v. Jewelers', etc., Co., 9 N. Y. Supp. 711. Where the constitution of a mutual benefit society provides that its by-laws may be amended at any time, a beneficiary in a benefit certificate, resulting from the insured's membership therein, who is not a member of the society, cannot complain that a by-law in existence at the time the certificate was issued, providing that the member may surrender the certificate, and receive a new one, with the consent of the beneficiary, was amended so as to omit the consent of the beneficiary, the beneficiary having no vested rights in such certificate, not being a party to the contract; nor can he recover on the original certificate, it having been surrendered, and a new one issued. Byrne v. Casey, 70 Tex. 247; 8 S. W. 38.

2 Supreme Lodge Ancient Order United Workmen v. Zuhkle (Ill.), 21 N. E. 789.

Hogins v. Supreme Council of Champions of Red Cross, 76 Cal. 109.

§ 689. Release.-A member of a railroad relief association whose constitution provided that the railroad's liability should be released before the benefit should be paid, had designated his mother as his beneficiary, and his death his wife and minor child, the persons upon legally entitled to damages, did not release the railroad company, but brought suit, and recovered damages by a compromise. It was held that the mother had no right of action against the relief association for the benefits.1

§ 690. No signature to application.-An application for a membership in a mutual insurance company, made a part of the certificate of membership, stated that it "must be signed by the applicant, or the certificate, if issued, will be void." An application was made by a husband for the wife, at her direction, and was signed by him with the knowledge and consent of the agent of the company. The action of the husband was afterwards approved by the wife. It was held, that the signature to the application became in law the signature of the wife, and was binding upon the insurance company.2

§ 691. Limitations-Injunctions. Where the certificate provides that all suits to recover claims under it are to be begun within six months after death of the assured, and the beneficiary is enjoined from receiving payment until the six months have expired, suit may be brought after the removal of the injunction at any time within the statute of limitation.3

1 Fuller v. Baltimore, etc., Employés, Relief Ass'n, 67 Md. 433. See also State v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 36 F. 655.

2 Somers v. Kansas Protective Union, 42 Kan. 619.

* Earnshaw v. Sun Mut. Aid. Soc., 68 Md. 465. See Kentucky Mut. Security Fund Co. v. Turner (Ky.), 13 S. W. 104.

2

§ 692. Ultra vires.-A religious society, formed under the auspices of a church, which includes a mutual life insurance scheme as one of its features, cannot defend against a suit on one of its policies upon the plea of ultra vires, when it has been receiving the assessments on his policy.

But, a charter of a fire insurance company authorizing its members to take out insurance on their property, and to provide for a lien on the same to secure assessments, does not authorize a husband to take out such policy on separate property of his wife. It is void in its inception as ultra vires and cannot be validated by an assignment to the wife.2

§ 693. Withdrawal of member.-Where the by-laws of a life insurance association provided that a member may at any time withdraw from this association by giving notice in writing of such intention to do so, and paying all assessments and dues to date, it was held in an action on his certificate after his death, that a notice of withdrawal by decedent was a bar to the action, though the company had not assented thereto, nor erased his name.3

A court of equity will not, at the instance of the minority, compel the majority of the owners of the furniture of an Odd Fellows' hall to purchase the interests of the minority therein, nor to remove and sell the same, and divide the proceeds among all the owners,

Under a clause in a policy limiting the right of action to a period of “ six months after the happening of the death on account of which the action is brought," the limitation does not begin to run until the cause of action matures, following McConnell v. Iowa Mut. Aid Ass'n, 79 Ia. 757; 43 N. W. 188; Matt v. Ia. Mut. Aid Ass'n (Ia.), 46 N. W. 857.

1 Matt v. Roman Catholic Mut. Protective Soc., 70 Ia. 455.

2 Froehly v. North St. Louis Mut. F. Ins. Co., 32 Mo. App. 302.

8 Cramer v. Masonic L. Ass'n, 9 N. Y. Supp. 356.

it appearing that the furniture is being used for the very purpose for which it was originally purchased.1

§ 694. Practice-Change from legal to equitable action.— In Iowa it is provided by statute that an error of plaintiff in the kind of proceedings adopted shall not cause an abatement or dismissal, but merely a change into proper proceedings, and a transfer to the proper docket, and that, in furtherance of justice, pleadings may be amended by the insertion of material allegations. It is then held that a petition at law for damages, on a mutual benefit certificate, may, after reversal of judgment thereon, be changed to one in equity by amendment praying that defendant be compelled to levy an assessment on its members to pay the certificate, and such amendment does not introduce a new cause of action.3

1 Robbins v. Waldo Lodge No. 12, I. O. O. F., 78 Me. 565; 7 A. 540. The minority of the members of a lodge, being outvoted upon the disposition of certain funds, brought action against its trustees, charging them with an intention to divert the funds, and, by concealing the fact of the vote, obtained an injunction, and receiver, which action the court revoked upon full information. Subsequently the grand lodge, at the instigation of the minority of the lodge, revoked the charter of the lodge in question, and the minority filed a bill in their individual names for a proportion of the funds, alleging that the lodge had ceased to exist" through no fault of theirs." Held, that the conduct of plaintiffs, who had voluntarily seceded from the lodge, and formed a separate lodge, under authority of the district grand lodge, was so unfair and inequitable as to preclude them from relief. Goodman v. Jedediah Lodge, 67 Md. 117; 9 A. 13. 2 Code Iowa, §§ 2514, 2689.

3 Newman v. Covenant Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 76 Ia. 56. In Har. 1 v. Pottawottamie Co. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 74 Ia. 39, the plaintiff was allowed, in an action on the policy, to amend his position so as to ask for a levy by mandamus.

In Miner v. Michigan Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 65 Mich. 84; 31 N. W. 763, mandamus was asked for to compel the company to make an assessment upon the members of the association sufficient to pay the judgment, and the company in defence set up that they had made an assessment and were proceeding in good faith to collect it. It was held, that the plaintiff having judgment, and the execution returned unsatisfied, no further proceeding could be taken at law, and the mandamus must be refused. Such further proceedings, if any are proper, must be had under How. St. Mich., § 8153, providing that when a judgment shall be obtained against a corporation and the execution thereon shall be returned unsatisfied, the circuit court may sequestrate the property of such corporation.