port of the poor.' This is the language of the last October number of the Edinburgh Review. It is asked, from whence came this amelioration of the condition of the peasantry in Scotland? It is attributed, by the reviewer, to 'improvements in agriculture and the arts.' 'We have the best attainable authority for saying,' he adds, that we are considerably within the mark when we affirm that the produce of the country has increased six-fold since 1770; and, as the population has not quite doubled in the interval, it follows, that, at an average, each individual is now enjoying three times more of useful and desirable articles, than were enjoyed by his ancestors, subsequently to the seven years' war.' The arts, however, have advanced as rapidly in England, as in Scotland. Nay, it is said by the Reviewer to be admitted on all hands, that the produce of wheat in England and Wales has more than trebled since 1760; and, that, of the whole population of that part of the empire, there is certainly not one eighth part that does not use wheaten bread.' The question arises, why, then, is mendicity so tremendously great in England, and so comparatively small in Scotland? Is it said, that the evil is to be ascribed to' the injudicious alteration of the poor laws in 1795,' by which the poor rates were employed to eke out the wages of the laborer. But whence came this perversion of the poor laws? From a succession of bad harvests? The seasons, indeed, in England, from 1795 to 1801, were very unfavorable to agriculture, and the wants and sufferings of the poor there were proportionally increased. But have there been no seasons in Scotland greatly unfavorable to its agriculture? What, then, has been the resort in Scotland in exigencies like

these? I answer, voluntary assessments in proportion as they were demanded by the exigency; and, when that ceased, the assessments ceased. But in a time of similar pressure in England, new modifications of the poor laws were adopted; for the question, there, of the provision to be made for a season of extraordinary distress, was not one of occasional, and temporary, and free, and sympathising charity. It was, rather, one of the adaptations of a law to the case; of a law which for centuries had been in operation, requiring annual, or more frequent assessments; and to which the poor in England had been as much accustomed to look for supplies, as those in Scotland had been to their own industry. In this single view, then, of poor-laws, their tendencies and consequences seem to me to be most manifest. When I compare the two countries in this respect, I cannot doubt whether it have been a great good to Scotland, that its charity has not been fettered by these laws; or, that they have been a cause, and a principal cause, of what some of its greatest statesmen have designated as the frightful pauperism' of England.

I cannot say that there are not other facts, and other views of this subject, which would lead to a different conclusion respecting it. I can only say, that I have looked at the facts which have come under my own observation, or within the narrow scope of my reading upon it, with a very strong impression of the magnitude of the interests which are involved in it; and that, before I undertook the agency for an examination of the actual influences of our own poor-laws, I was decidedly in favor of a modified plan for a State provision for the poor. But in the progress of that examination, I was brought to an entirely different conviction; and this con

viction has been strengthened by all my subsequent reflections upon the tendencies and bearings of the poorlaws of England. Still, I well know, I may be in error. My aim, however, is not change for the sake of change, or even for the purpose of experiment. It is truth, and truth only. There are few interests of earth and time in which I feel so deep a concern, as in the causes, the remedy, and the prevention of the prevailing pauperism of the world; and there are few subjects, if indeed there be one, for increasing light upon which I should feel so much gratitude and happiness, as upon this. If I have taken narrow views, and have been led to erroneous conclusions upon it, no one will rejoice more than I shall in an exposure of my errors, and the prevention of any evil consequences which might have resulted from them.

There is, however, another view of poor-laws, which deserves far more attention than has been given to it. I have referred to this view, in speaking of them as direct and authoritative encroachments upon the peculiar prerogative of God, - the direct inculcation of moral duties upon men. Here, indeed, I may be met by the advocate of these laws with the reply, that although they have been so called, they are not, in truth, a compulsion of charity,' or a legal requisition of charity; that, in strictness of speech, however they may have been designated, they do not touch the moral law of charity, and have nothing to do with it. They are, on the contrary, to be viewed only as provisions at once for that protection which the law owes to the poor, in their exposures to neglect, and oppression and misery; and, to those who are not poor, for defence against the dangers to which society would otherwise be exposed from an

overwhelming pauperism. My answer is, that in requiring assessments for the poor, the law has expressly and repeatedly required them, as 'charitable alms? It has therefore certainly intended to enforce charity. I have no doubt that the protection of society has also been one of the objects of poor laws. But, does any one believe that the protection of the poor was ever thought of in framing these laws? This is entirely a modern, and a very recent explanation of their design. Nor is this all. I take the ground, that provisions for the supply of the necessities of the poor are the proper objects, not of legal enactments, but of the moral law of charity. Such provisions ought to be charities, in the strictest sense of the term. Our religion is not more full, or more distinct, on any subject than on this; and the argument against poor laws, in this single view of them, is, to my mind, entirely satisfactory. They set aside the charity of religion, and substitute for it something which is not charity. Nor is this the only encroachment which law has made upon moral rights, and moral duties. In establishing a religion for the State, it has, in every instance of this daring, substituted for christianity something very different from the simplicity and freedom of the gospel. Law has never interfered even for the regulation of wages, or of industry or enterprise in any of their departments, without extending injury to a far greater number than it has been able to benefit. Above all will this be the result, when it assumes to enforce moral obligations. And provisions for the poor are, I repeat, the appropriate work of charity. So God intended that they should be. And never will they be sufficient, or what they should be, or conduce to God's purposes concerning them, till they are made exclusively the work of an enlightened christian charity.

This topic is so important, that I beg to say a few more words upon it.

It certainly would be a wise principle in legislation, never to attempt the attainment of moral objects by law, till it shall have been proved that moral means are insufficient for their attainment; and, even then, that such objects should be made the aim of law, not by assuming the power of enforcing moral obligation, but by removing, as far as they are within the fair scope of law, the impediments which are in the way of a free moral action in society; the outward and visible facilities and excitements to evil. In this way, Legislatures, for example, may do much for the cause of temperance. They may impose heavy excise duties, and require heavy costs for licenses to sell ardent spirits. They may also not only imprison the drunkard, making no distinction between the rich and the poor; but may give his property, if he have any, to trustees or to guardians, for his own support and that of his family. But, even while thousands are dying the victims of lawless appetites, it is not the province oflaw to command temperance, or, to prescribe to men what, or when, or how much they shall eat or drink. The law, too, may and should extend protection to all, whenever they may require it, in the quiet exercise and enjoyment of their religious rights. But it may not require that men should read the Bible, or pray at home, or go to church on Sunday, or on any other day. It may also, and it should, inflict exemplary punishment upon the profligate, the gambler, and the dishonest; for these are violators of the rights, disturbers of the peace, and to the extent of their influence, destroyers of the order and security of society. But if it should take into its keeping and