the asserted and denied habitancy, the purely moral considerations and principles of the case are set aside in the minds of the litigants, equally as in those of the lawyers whom they employ as the supporters of their cause. It is a contest in law between towns, not to settle a principle, the settlement of which will prevent future differences in regard to the poor, but, simply for a recovery on the one hand, and for an exemption from payment on the other, of an expense which has been incurred by a town for the relief, or support of some person, or family, which it is denied has a legal habitancy in it. Can such contests be maintained without a great sacrifice of true charity ? Is not the cost, and the loss, of moral and kindly feeling, which are incurred in these contests, incomparably a more serious consideration, do they not bring with them an incomparably greater evil to our towns, than would be the pecuniary cost of supporting those who are the objects of such contentions? Again. The very law which requires the support of the poor, of course invests the poor with a LEGAL RIGHT to this support. It thus creates a new, and supplemental right, additional to the natural and moral rights And why is this? Is the which were antecedent to it. natural right of man denied, or indeed the right of any living being, to that which is indispensable to his subsistence ? 'Men do not despise a thief, if he steal to satisfy his soul when he is hungry.' (Prov. 6. 20.) Or is the moral right, the right which is founded in the exposures and sufferings of our common nature, and in our relation as fellow beings, and I will add, even in conscience, the highest principle of our nature, is this right too undefineable, or too feeble, for the securiof a provision for the poor? However this may be ty - 2 the fact is unquestionable, that the right thus conferred by law is fully understood. There is here no obscurity. This right, too, is as strong as it is well defined. I do not mean that every Overseer of the poor must, and does, give to every applicant for public alms. But I mean, that the applicants for public alms are greatly increased in numbers, by the knowledge of this right to alms when they think that they have need of them. I am quite accustomed to hear the expressions, there is a provision made for the poor, and I have a right to it as well as others.' The right, in common cases of our home poor, may not often be openly asserted, when alms are sought of the Overseers of the poor. And yet I doubt not that they will bear me witness, that the assertion of it, even in these cases, is not an unheard of occurrence among them. It would be strange, indeed, if the knowledge of such a provision required by law, should fail to create applicants for it. The provision is virtually a fund created by the law, of which those who understand the law, and who had rather live upon the earnings of others, than by their own industry, will seek their share; not however as a charity, but as a legally allotted portion of the common stock. Nor is it to be doubted that a share of this stock is sought, and obtained by many, who, if there had been no poor laws among us, would never have asked for charity. These, however, are not the greatest of the evils of our legal system of provision for the poor. The order of the Court of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay,' to which I have referred, for determining differences about the lawful settling and providing for poor persons,' has its date in 1639. But the principle having been adopted, that legal interference was necessary to secure the exercise of the common rights of humanity toward the suffering poor, and a most arbitrary law having been passed for fixing settlements, it is not strange that the occurrence of an unforseen exigency, bearing directly upon the operation of the principle thus assumed, and of the measures taken to carry it through, should have been interpreted as a call to new legislative provisions upon the subject. Such an exigency occurred in 1675. "This court," it was then said, 'considering the inconvenience and damage which may arise to particular towns, by such as being forced from their habitations by the present calamity of the war, do repair unto them for succor, do order and declare, that such persons, being inhabitants of this jurisdiction, who are so forced from their habitations, and repair to other plantations for their relief, shall not, by virtue of their residence in such plantations they repair unto, be accounted, or respected inhabitants thereof, or imposed upon them according to law. But in such case, and where necessity requires, by reason of inability of relations, &c., they shall be paid out of the public treasury." The question arises, supposing there had been no poor laws previous to 1675, whether even the difficulties of this exigency would have been thought a call for legal interference? Had our ancestors never before enacted laws for the support of the poor, and, especially, if they had not brought with them the spirit of legal provision for this object from England, I do not believe that the difficulty and damage,' which it was apprehended, 'might arise to particular towns, by such as, being forced from their habitations by the calamity of the war, repaired unto such towns for succor,' would have been felt by these towns to have de manded legislative aid from the Public Treasury. The call was loud indeed, and imperative upon these towns, for extraordinary exertions. And had there been no poor-laws, free social charity might have received a strong excitement in behalf of the sufferers referred to, not only in the places where they were, but in other towns than those in which the destitute sought for temporary security and support. Nor can I have a doubt that the sympathy and humanity of those who were able to defend, and provide for their brethren thus 'forced from their habitations,' would have been sufficient for the exigency, great as it might have been. But, the fact is, and it is not to be forgotten, that social charity had hardly known a day of freedom within the limits of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay.' It had been bound in fetters at its very birth, and was now so crippled that it was thought at least that it could not go alone. Or, it had not been trusted, and it was therefore thought that it could not be trusted. The Legislature had taken it into its charge, and the people therefore thought that it was the proper charge of the Legislature. Here were the chief difficulties of the case. Government had undertaken to say who should, and who should not, be supported by towns. The consequence was, that towns had not only learned to measure their obligations to charity by the ordinances of government, but to look also to government for relief, either when they felt, or feared, the weight of a more than ordinary burden. It was in this exigency that recourse was had, for the first time in our annals, to the Public Treasury for the support of the poor. I am almost tempted to say, would that our fathers could but for a moment have foreseen the effects of this pre cedent! The waste of money, indeed, I account as nothing, though it has been very great, compared with the pauperism, and the waste of virtue and happiness, to which it has ministered. Suppose, then, that our poor laws should be abolished. This is a measure which is thought by some to be fraught even with far greater dangers, than are any with which these laws may threaten us. 'Repeal these laws,' it will be said, and thousands of beggars, now aided or supported by our Overseers, will at once be thrown upon the community. Repeal our poor laws, and, unharmed as may be many of our small towns, the large ones, and especially upon the sea-board, will be exposed to an inundation of poverty, from which we should soon find it necessary to pray that Legislative interposition may again be granted for our protection.' I reply, that I have no fear of this result. I have no fear that a repeal of our poor laws would leave the poor in any town in the Commonwealth exclusively to a dependence on private charity, provided that other means than private charity should be required for the charge of them. There might be, and I think there would be towns, in which, within a short time, it would be found no longer necessary to have annual assessments for the poor; because there would be found in them, as there are in many towns in Scotland, no greater number requiring charity, than could easily, and willingly, be taken in charge by private benevolence. But exigencies would probably occur even in these towns, which would require extraordinary efforts and measures effectually to meet them. And in our large towns, extraordinary efforts and measures might immediately be demanded. But for what? To aid and sup |