representations, or misconduct of the carrier who receives merchandise from a shipper seems to be so fully settled by the authorities as to leave nothing for discussion. It was the point directly involved and decided in Insurance Co. v. Railroad Co., 104 U. Š. 146; s. c., 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 260. The defendant's obligations were, therefore, those of an intermediate carrier, arising out of the implied contract, springing from receipt of the goods. These bound it for safe carriage over its own line, and for delivery or tender to the next carrier beyond, within reasonable time. The Insurance Co. v. Railroad, 104 U. S. 146; s. c., 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 260; Empire Co. v. Wallace, 68 Pa. St. 302; Myrich v. Railroad Co., 107 v. 102 U. S. s. c., 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 25; Railroad Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 16 Wallace, 318. It was entitled to the benefit of all exemptions allowed by the shipper, and bound to the terms of the bill of lading generally, as respects freight, etc. Being prepared to carry the merchandise, on its arrival at Bristol, it was the defendant's right, as well as duty, to accept it, without inquiry. Had it not been so prepared, the acceptance would have rendered it responsible as carrier while the merchandise remained in its possession, no matter how great the delay arising from this cause might have been. The defendant was not, however, responsible for the succeeding carrier's failure to accept or provide means for further transportation. If the Memphis and Charleston R. R. Co., when it received the merchandise, was aware of the deficient means of transportation from Norfolk (and that delay must consequently arise), and failed to communicate this fact to the shipper, we may assume that this company was in fault. To visit the defendant, however, with responsibility for such fault, it must appear that the latter is responsible for the former company's acts-and we have found it was not. If knowledge of this fault would entail responsibility on the defendant, through acceptance of the merchandise, such knowledge could not be inferred from anything shown. The defendant, as before stated, was bound to no inquiry, and had (so far as appears) no information on this subject. It is unimportant that the defendant knew of the embarrassments at Norfolk, when it received the merchandise at Bristol. Being then in transit the defendant's duty bound it to such reception. No probable benefit could arise to the shipper from refusing. In view of existing circumstances a refusal might have entailed serious responsibili ties. The cases relied upon by the plaintiff, the Railroad Co. v. the Manufacturing Co., 16 Wallace, 318, and Busby v. Railroad Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 330,-are inapplicable. The obligations involved were those of carriers receiving merchandise from the shipper, and either undertaking to provide means of carriage throughout, -as in the latter case, or failing to communicate knowledge (which they had) of obstacles in the way of transportation,-as in the former. The responsibility arose in the one case, out of the express undertaking, and in the other, out of the bad faith prac tised. Such being the defendant's obligations, did it discharge them? It carried the merchandise safely and expeditiously to Norfolk. When the first consignment arrived on the 23d of October, it was tendered to the Merchants' and Miners' Steamship Co., and was refused on account of accumulation of freight on its wharves; with the request or proposal, however, to place it and subsequent consignments on the wharf and in the warehouse of the defendant, (a place as convenient for loading into the steamboat company's vessels as on its own wharves), and with assurance that vessels would speedily be provided and sent there for it. This request was complied with, under a reasonable expectation that the steamship company would load and forward the cotton without unreasonable delay. Placing the subsequent consignment as proposed, was a substantial tender. The designation of this place for loading, was a virtual designation of the place for tender. To hold that the defendant should have hauled the cotton, which arrived on the 26th, to the steamship company's wharves, in view of what had occurred, would be unreasonable and unjust. The fact that insurance was procured is unimportant. Should the defendant have done more? In view of the facts it was not required to forward by any other route; nor would it have been justified in doing 80. The steamship company was the carrier contemplated by the plaintiff. Indeed, it must be regarded as having been designated by him. If not on shipment at Memphis, it certainly was on delivery to the defendant. Those so delivering represented the plaintiff. That a preceding carrier represents the shipper in forwarding by his successor on a through line (under ordinary circumstances) is settled. The plaintiff's insurance would have been jeoparded by the substitution of any other route. Besides this, as already stated, the defendant was fully justified in believing that the merchandise would be accepted and carried within a reasonable time by the steamship company, and would reach its destination more expeditiously by this route than any other. But for unforeseen circumstances, which could not be anticipated, this expectation would have been realized. Furthermore, it can hardly be said there was any other practically available route. The defendant was not, therefore, in fault. It must not be overlooked that the question here is not (as in Railroad Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 16 Wallace, 318) whether the defendant remained liable under his obligations as carrier, to the date of loss, but whether he was guilty of wilful fault, and consequently forfeited the exemptions in the bill of lading, and thus became responsible for the consequences of the fire. That he was not guilty of such fault seems reasonably clear. Judgment must therefore be entered for the defendant. Extra Terminal Liability. As to the liability of a carrier for the safe transportation of goods beyond its own line see Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. Columbia & Greenville R. R. Co. and note, supra, and Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Weaver and note, supra. As to the limitation by special contract of a carrier's liability to his own line see Berg et al. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. and note, supra. Contracts Limiting Liability Enure to Benefit of Intermediate Carrier.— Where goods are to be transported over a number of connecting lines, a contract entered into by the carrier receiving the goods stipulating for exemption from liability in general terms will enure to the benefit of all the various carriers over whose roads the goods may be carried. U. S. Express Co. v. Harris, 51 Md. 127; Levy v. Southern Express Co., 4 S. C. 234; Maghee v. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 514; Manhattan Oil Co. v. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 54 N. Y. 197; Lamb v. Camden, etc., R. R. Co., 2 Daly, 454; s. c., 46 N. Y. 271; Hall v. N. E. R. R. Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 437; Whitworth v. Erie R. Co., 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 349: Halliday v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 6 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 443; Whitehead v. Wilmington, etc., R. R. Co., 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 168. Unless, indeed, the contract expressly stipulates that the immunity shall extend only to the single company entering into it. Bancroft v. Merchants' Dispatch Trans. Co., 47 Iowa, 262; Babcock v. Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 491; Martin o. Am. Express Co., 19 Wisc. 336; Camden, etc., R. R. Co. . Forsyth, 61 Pa. St. 81; Merchants' Dispatch Trans. Co. v. Bolles, 80 Ill. 473; Railroad Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123; Ætna Ins. Co. v. Wheeler, 49 N. Y. 616. Partnership. An agreement between carriers for a through freight line does not constitute them partners so as to make one liable for the acts of the other. Watkins v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co., 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 614; Hill. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 9 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 21; Insurance Co. 1. Railroad Co., 104 U. S. 146; s. c., 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 260. LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE R. R. Co. V. MASON. (11 Lea's Tennessee Reports, 116.) In an action against a railroad company, as a common carrier, for damages to horses in transit, the measure of damages would be the value of the horses killed and the depreciation in the value of those injured, at the place of delivery, but direct testimony by the opinion of witnesses of that value or depreciation is not indispensable; it is sufficient if there is proof of these facts in the market of a neighboring State connected with the place by railroad, and a full description of the animals and their qualities, and of the character of the injuries. 16 A. & E. R. Cas.-16 Under such circumstances, it is not error to charge the jury that they may fix the amount of the plaintiff's damages, if they find for him, from the age and qualities of the stock, and the nature of the injuries as shown by the proof, although no witness has given an opinion as to the value of the stock or the amount of damages at the place of delivery. APPEAL in error from the Law Court at Humboldt. Ware & Martin for Mason. COOPER, J.-Action by Mason against the railroad company for damages in the killing of one horse and injuring two other horses by the negligence of the servants of the defendant as a common carrier, in transporting the horses from Louisville, Kentucky, to Milan, Tennessee. The jury found a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $175, and the defendant appealed in error. The plaintiff gave his own deposition, and took the deposition of one Ramsey in support of the action. These depositions were taken in Grant county, Kentucky, and are somewhat loose and meagre. On the trial, the plaintiff rested upon his own deposition, and Ramsey's deposition was read by the defendant. No other testimony was introduced. The plaintiff in error now insists that the evidence shows that the plaintiff below and Ramsey were joint owners of the horses for whose loss and injury the suit was brought, and that the verdict is otherwise unsupported by the proof. The testimony shows that two car loads of horses were shipped by the defendant's road at Louisville, Kentucky, to Milan, on the same train, the plaintiff being in charge of one of these cars, and Ramsey of the other. Each car seems to have contained twenty horses. In the loose and inartificial way in which the depositions are taken, both witnesses use language from which it might be inferred that they were joint owners of the stock. The counsel of the plaintiff seems at first to have put that construction upon the language, for he obtained leave of the court to amend and actually amended by making Ramsey a co-plaintiff. This was afterwards corrected by dismissing Ramsey from the case. The point now made was no doubt submitted to the jury upon a charge which has not been excepted to, and they have found that Mason was sole owner of the horses in controversy. The finding is warranted by the testimony. For the plaintiff, in his deposition, treats the horses as belonging to him, and the cross-examination of the railroad company takes the fact for granted in both depositions. The equivocal words are due to the fact that the shipments of each witness were made at the same time, and included the same number of horses. Both of the witnesses concur in testifying that the horses were injured in the transportation from Louisville to Milan. The plaintiff below deposes that one of them was so badly injured that he refused to receive it from the company. He added, and the statement was read without objection, that he understood the horse was dead. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, this was sufficient to warrant the jury in finding damages for the loss of one horse and for the injury to the others. The only point of real difficulty in the case is raised by the charge of the court on the measure of damages. The plaintiff testified that the horse which was killed was a red roan, blaze-faced, one glass eye, about 154 hands high, with no disease of any kind, sound as a dollar, going all the gaits well, and worth $175, adding that the animal "would have brought that amount in the market." He is then asked, "What was the market value of the horse at Milan or in the market?" His answer is, "I could have sold the horse when I shipped for $175." He further testifies that the other horses were damaged $50. The witness Ramsey says that the horse killed was between four and five years old, and a good saddle horse. He is asked if he knew the value of the horse in the markets, and replies in the affirmative. He is also asked, "What was the market value of the horse left at Milan, and what was the amount of damage to the other horses?" answer is, "I say $125, and they were damaged about $150." Both of the witnesses say, in answer to a question directed to the point, that when they speak of the market value, they mean the market in Mississippi. His Upon this testimony if his Honor, the trial judge, directed the jury, as he probably did, the record not showing the entire charge, that they must find the value of the lost horse, and the damages to the other horses, at Milan at the time when they should have been delivered by the company to the plaintiff, the verdict would have been sustained by the evidence. For the plaintiff's answer above, "I could have sold the horse when I shipped for $175," might well be considered as giving the market value at Milan, to which his attention was directed by the question. His Honor, however, upon the supposition that the jury might find that there was no evidence of the value of stock at Milan, added the following charge, which is excepted to: "If you find from the testimony that the stock of plaintiff in controversy was shipped to Milan, Tennessee, and that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for injuries done by the defendant to his stock, then the jury may assess the damages from the testimony as to the age and qualities of the horse that is claimed to have died, and from the testimony as to the nature of the injury to the other stock of plaintiff, if any of his other stock were injured, although no witness gave his opinion as to the value of the horse at Milan. that died, if either died, or gave his opinion as to the amount of damages done to the other stock at Milan, if plaintiff's other stock were injured by defendant. For the jury may fix the amount of |