was given the plaintiff not to cross, other than appears from the foregoing evidence. The north platform, except under the shelter shed, is ten feet wide. There is nothing on it between the passageway and the shelter shed, except that a lamp, upheld by a bracket fastened to the fence at the back or north side of the platform, projects over it some two feet, at the height of seven or eight feet, at a point one hundred and eighty feet east from the passageway. The roof of the shelter shed is supported by posts, which stand five feet north of the south edge of the platform, and in the neighborhood of Centre Street some shops front on the platform, and do not project over or upon it. About two thousand people live north of the railroad and west of the passageway.

On this evidence, which was all the evidence on the question of the liability of the defendant, the judge, at the request of the defendant, ruled that the action could not be maintained; and ordered a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff alleged exceptions. T. Weston, Jr. for the plaintiff.

A. L. Soule for the defendant.

COLBURN, J.-In Chaffee v. Boston & Lowell R. R., 104 Mass. 108, which was in some respects a similar case to the one at bar, the court say: "The plaintiff must show, by positive evidence, in cases of this description, that he was in the exercise of due care, and that his want of it did not contribute to the injury of which he complains. If, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the court can see that, upon all the undisputed facts, the plaintiff was not in the exercise of ordinary care, and that the injury he received was in part attributable to his want of it, the jury may be properly told, as matter of law, that he cannot recover.'

In the case at bar, the plaintiff had ample opportunity to cross from the north to the south platform, either by the highway, or on the strips of planking designed for crossings, opposite the station building. She was attempting to cross at a place not designed or adapted for crossing, at which the defendant had held out no invitation or inducement for her to cross. The most that can be contended, on the evidence, is, that the defendant had tolerated a practice, which the plaintiff and others had adopted, of crossing where she was attempting to cross, without taking any active measures to prevent it. This is far different from an inducement or invitation from the defendant to cross there.

In Chaffee v. Boston & Lowell R. R., ubi supra, the court say: "A person who attempts to cross a railroad track, under any circumstances, can hardly be said to be in the exercise of due care, unless he takes reasonable precaution to assure himself, by actual observation, that there are no approaching cars upon it. But the degree of caution he must exercise will be affected by the situation and surrounding circumstances." In that case, the plaintiff was

injured by being struck by a hand-car, with no light upon it, running at the rate of ten or twelve miles an hour, as he stepped from the platform on to the track, in a dark night.

In the case at bar, the accident happened in broad daylight, between ten and eleven o'clock in the forenoon; the track was straight for a quarter of a mile easterly from the place where the plaintiff stepped upon it; and there was nothing to obstruct her view of the track for that distance, from any point on the platform within five feet of its southern edge. The conclusion is irresistible, that the plaintiff's attention was so far occupied, by the approach of the train she was to take, that she omitted to look along the track she was to cross, and stepped directly in front of the train which struck her. Her knowledge of the rules of the defendant, that trains should not pass each other at stations, or follow each other within five minutes, did not, under the facts in this case, excuse her from taking the simple and obvious precaution of looking to see what might be coming on the track she was stepping upon.

The fact that the plaintiff held a ticket, or that the train she was about to take had arrived, did not authorize her to cross the track at an improper place, or take any less care to see that she could cross in safety.

Being of opinion that the plaintiff was wanting in due care, which contributed to her injury, both in attempting to cross where she did and in not looking for an approaching train, we have no occasion to consider the question of the negligence of the defendant.

Exceptions overruled.

Surroundings of Stations.-A railroad company is bound to use all reasonable care and precaution to have the exits and approaches to its stations safe for the convenience of passengers. Indiana, etc., R. Co. v. Hudelson, 13 Ind. 325; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Wilson, 63 Ill. 167; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Brigham, 29 Ohio St. 374; Clussman v. Long Island R. R. Co., 9 Hun (N. Y.), 618; Gordon v. Grand Street R. R. Co, 40 Barb. 546; Hulbert v. New York, etc., R. Co., 40 N. Y. 145; Knight v. Portland, etc., R. Co., 56 Me. 234; Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. Howe, 52 Miss. 202; Caswell v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 98 Mass. 194; Hartwig v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 65; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Sykes, 2 Am. &. Eng. R. R. Cas. 254; Stiles v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co., 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 195; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Hauer, 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 149.

In case of a neglect of this duty the company is liable to a person coming to or leaving the station intending to take passage on or having just left its trains; unless, of course, as in the principal case, such person has been guilty of contributory negligence. See authorities above cited.

CARTWRIGHT

v.

CHICAGO AND G. T. Ry. Co.

(Advance Case, Michigan. February 8, 1884.)

If a railroad car is stopped at a place where it would not be safe for the passengers to alight, it is the duty of the company to give assistance or warning or move the car to a more suitable place.

It is not negligence per se for a passenger to leave the car by the rear end.

The evidence as to the negligence of both plaintiff and defendant was such that it was proper to submit the whole case to the jury.

ERROR to Genesee.

H. R. Lovell for plaintiff.

E. W. Meddaugh for defendant and appellant.

COOLEY, C. J.-This is an action for personal injury, and the plaintiff recovered in the circuit court. The only questions that need to be considered are-First, whether there was any evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant to be submitted to the jury; and, second, whether the evidence conclusively showed contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

The injury occurred December 28, 1881. The plaintiff was a woman sixty years of age, and resided with her husband, who was still older and rheumatic, at Davision, a country station about nine miles west of Flint. On the day named she went to Flint with her husband, and returned on the evening train, which arrived at Davision about 9 o'clock. The train was composed of six cars, made up as follows: Mail car, express car, baggage car, smoker, way car, and sleeper. Plaintiff and her husband entered the way car, which they found full, and took the rear seat behind the door. It was a dark, cloudy and wet evening. When the train stopped at Davision the evidence tends to show that the smoker stood partially alongside the station platform, but the way car was not up to it. No light was displayed at the rear end of the way car, nor, as we conclude from the record, at the front end, but there was a light on the platform which would possibly aid in alighting there. A drunken man in one of the cars further forward appears to have had the attention of the men on the train when the train stopped, and aid was not given to the passengers in leaving the way car. The most of them went forward and alighted safely, but plaintiff and her husband got out at the rear end of the car. There is a road crossing at that place, and plaintiff was familiar with the locality. She had seen the cars stop there before, and passengers

16 A. & E. R. Cas.-21

step down into the road, and she thought the car then stood where if she stepped down she would step into the level part of the road. She therefore stepped down in the dark. She had several packages on her left arm, but her right hand was at liberty, and with that she took hold of the iron rod by the side of the steps. Instead of being over the level road as she supposed, the end of the car was over a depression at the side of the road, and when her foot left the step she went down so far that her hold of the iron was broken and she fell to the ground. Her foot slipped on the wet ground and turned under, and her leg was broken. She lay helpless until assistance could be procured. It was not until after the train had left that she was taken up and carried into the station, and medical assistance obtained. During all the time of the stop no one connected with the train or employed by the defendant was giving assistance to the plaintiff or her husband, or looking after passengers at the rear end of the car they had occupied.

It is contended on the part of the defence that the plaintiff was negligent in leaving the car where she did; that the only proper place for leaving was where there was light, and where assistance was provided, and that, if needful, she should have passed through the car in front of the way car from which, if not from the way car, she might have alighted upon the platform. It is further said that it is not expected passengers will leave the car at the rear end; their duty is to pass to the front and leave the other to passengers taking the car, who otherwise will be incommoded in getting aboard. And it is insisted the railroad company is under no obligation to station assistants at each end of every car to help passengers on and off; the burden would be an unreasonable one, and passengers have no right to demand or expect it. It would, no doubt, be better that travellers should always leave a car by the front end, and it might be competent for a railroad company to make and enforce a rule requiring it. But it is not shown that this defendant has any such rule, and it is certain that there is no general custom now observed by the public to that effect. Passengers not only do leave the cars at the rear and front indifferently, but they are suffered to do so without objection, and probably a very large portion of them all are not aware that it is desired they should do otherwise. Under such circumstances it cannot be said that it is negligence per se for a passenger to leave the car at the If there was negligence in this case it must arise from the fact of the darkness, the known fact that the rear of the car was not at the landing, and the uncertainty in respect to the ground where it stood. If the front end of the car had been at the platform, there would have been more reason for insisting that the plaintiff should have gone in that direction. But we think a woman is excusable for not desiring to pass through the smoking car, and she has a right to assume it is not expected of her. We also think

rear.

that passengers, where not notified to the contrary, may rightfully assume that it is safe to alight from the car wherever it is stopped for passengers to leave it. And if no light is given them to leave the car by, they are not to be charged with fault for leaving in the darkness.

A review of the record satisfies us that the agents and servants of the defendant were not as careful and vigilant as they should have been in providing for the safety of the passengers in leaving the train. If a car in which there were passengers was not standing where it would be safe for them to alight without assistance, it was the duty of the company to provide assistance, or give warning, or to move the car to a more suitable place. This was decided in Cockle v. London & S. E. Ry. Co., L. R. 7 C. P. 321, a case on its facts very similar to this; and the same principle has often been laid down in other cases. Nicholson v. Lancashire, etc., R. Co., 3 Hurl. & C. 534; Foy v. London, etc., R. Co., 18 C. B. (N. S.) 225; Brassell v. N. Y. Cent., etc., R. Co., 84 N. Y. 241; s. c., 3 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 380; Penn. R. Co. v. White, 88 Pa. St. 327; and Balt. & O. R. Co. v. State, Md. Ct. App. 12 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 149, are among those so holding. There was therefore evidence to go to the jury on the question of negligence in the defendant. And the peculiarity of the case is such that the same facts which tend to show negligence in the railroad company tend in the same degree to show that the plaintiff was without fault. If she had a right to assume that the landing place was safe, she was not negligent in stepping down as she did. It must be conceded that she did not exhibit a very high degree of caution, but we cannot say that it was not as much as the average passenger would have shown under like circumstances. It was very proper, we think, for the circuit judge to submit the whole case to the jury.

The judgment must be affirmed.

The other justices concurred.

Obligation of Company as to place where Passengers alight.-A railroad company is bound to take care that the place where it calls upon its passengers to alight is reasonably safe for that purpose.__ Hulbert v. New York, etc., R. Co., 40 N. Y. 145; Knight v. Portland, etc., R. Co., 56 Me. 234; McDonald v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 26 Iowa, 124; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Fillimore, 57 Ill. 267; Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. Howe, 52 Miss. 202; Dillaye v. New York, etc., R. Co., 56 Barb. 30; Seymour v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 3 Biss. 43; Weston v. New York, etc., R. Co., 10 Jones & Sp. 156; Delaware L. & W. R. Co. v. Napheys, 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 52; Hartwig v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 65; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Sykes, 2 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 254. But see Murch v. Concord, etc., R. Co., 56 Me. 234.

Contributory Negligence. Where a passenger being aware that the train is not opposite a platform of his motion endeavors to alight at a place which is dangerous and in so doing is injured, the railroad company is not liable. Taber v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 71 N. Y. 489; Central R. R. Co. v. Van Horn, 38 N. J. L. 133; Delamatyr v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 24 Wisc.