and infupportable encroachments of the crown under, James the Ild, aimed fo vifibly at the fubverfion of our conftitution, and the introduction of abfolute Monarchy; neceffity authorized the Lords and Commons (the other two powers) to have recourfe to the joint exercife of that reftraining power, which is the inherent refource of all mixed Governments. But as the exercife of this power was conducted by Patriotifm, and regulated by the above-mentioned rule, the event was the late happy Revolution; by which the power of the crown was reftrained within its proper limits, and the Government refettled upon its true bafis, as nearly as the genius of the times would admit of. But if the paffions prevail, and ambition lurks beneath the mafque of Patriotifm, the change will inevitably be for the worse. Because the reftitution of the balance of Government, which alone can authorize the exercife of the two joint powers against the third, will be only the pretext, whilst the whole weight and fury of the incenfed people will be directed folely to the ends of ambition. Thus if the regal power fhould be enabled to take the lead by gaining over the whole weight of the people, the change will terminate in abfolute Monarchy; which fo lately happened in Denmark, as it had happened before in almost all the old Gothic Governments. If the Ariftocratic power, actuated by that ambition, which, an extreme few inftances excepted, seems inseparable from the regal, fhould be able to direct the joint force of the people against the

Z

1

Crown, the change will be to an Ariftocratic Government, like the present State of Sweden, or the Government of Holland, from the death of William the IIId, to the late revolution in favor of the Stadtholder. If the power of the people impelled to action by any caufe, either real or imaginary, fhould be able to fubvert the other two, the confequence will be, that Anarchy, which Polybius terms, the 'ferine and favage dominion of the people. This will continue till fome able and daring spirit, whofe low birth or fortune precluded him from rifing to the chief dignities of the state by any other means, puts himself at the head of the populace inured to live by plunder and rapine, and drawing the whole power to himself, erects a Tyranny upon the ruins of the former Government; or till the community, tired out and impatient under their distracted situation, bring back the Government into its own channel. This is what Polybius terms the circumvolution of Governments; or the rotation of Governments within themfelves till they return to the same point. The fate of the Grecian and Roman Republics terminated in the former of these events. The diftracted ftate of Government in this nation from 1648, to the restoration of Charles the IId, ended happily, in the latter, though the nation for fome years experienced the former of these catastrophes under the Government of Cromwell.

I have here given a fhort, but plain general analysis of Government, founded upon experience drawn from hiftorical truths, and adapted to the general capacity of my countrymen. But if any one defires to be acquainted with the Philosophy of Government, and to investigate the ratio and series of all these mutations, or revolutions of Governments within themselves, I muft, with Polybius, refer him to Plato's Republic.

The plan of a good and happy Government, which Plato lays down, by the mouth of Socrates, in the former part of that work, is wholly ideal, and impoffible to be executed, unless mankind could be new-moulded. But the various revolutions of government, described above, which he treats of in the latter part, was founded upon facts, facts which he himself had been eye-witness to in the numerous Republics of Greece and Sicily, and had fatally experienced in his own country Athens. The divine Philofopher, in that part of his admirable treatise, traces all these mutations up to their first fource, "the intemperance of the human paffions," and accounts for their various progrefs, effects and confequences, from the various combinations of the fame perpetually conflicting paffions. His maxims are founded folely upon the fublimeft truths, his allufions beautiful and appofite, and his inftructions alike applicable to public or private life, equally capable of forming the statesman or the man.

Z &

CHAP. IX.

OF THE BRITISH

XENOPHO

2

CONSTITUTION.

ENOPHON observes, that if the Athenians, together with the fovereignty of the feas, had enjoyed the advantageous fituation of an island, they might with great eafe have given law to their neighbours. For the fame fleets which enabled them to ravage the fea-coafts of the continent at difcretion, could equally have protected their own country from the infults of the enemies as long as they maintained their naval fuperiority. One would imagine, fays the great Montefquieu, that Xenophon in this passage was fpeaking of the island of Britain. The judicious and glorious exertion of` our naval force under the prefent miniftry' fo ftrongly confirms Xenophon's remark, that one would imagine their measures were directed, as well as dictated by his confummate genius. We are mafters both of those natural and acquired advantages, which Xenophon required to make his countrymen invincible. We daily feel their importance more and more, and must be fenfible that our liberty, our happiness, and our very existence as a people, depend upon our naval fuperiority fupported by our military virtue and public fpirit. Nothing, humanly fpeaking, but luxury, effeminacy and corruption can ever deprive us of this envied fuperiority. What an accumulated load of Xenophon, de Republ. Athen.

Efprit des Loix, vol. 2. p. 3.

3 The first edition of this Work appeared in 1759.

guilt therefore must lie upon any future adminiftration, who, to ferve the ends of faction, should ever precipitate Britain from her present height down to the abject ftate of Athens, by encouraging these evils to blast all public virtue in their unlimited progress.

As Britain is fo confeffedly fuperior to all the maritime powers of the ancients by the advantages of fituation; fo the British conftitution, as settled at the Revolution, is demonftrably far preferable to, and better formed for duration, than any of the most celebrated Republics of antiquity. As the executive power is vested in a single person, who is deemed the first branch in the legislature; and as that power is for life and hereditary; our conftitution is neither liable to thofe frequent convul. fions, which attended the annual elections of Confuls, nor to that folecism in politics, two fupreme heads of one body for life, and hereditary, which was the great defect in the Spartan inftitution. As the house of commons, elected by, and out of the body of the people, is vefted with all the power annexed to the Tribunitial office amongst the Romans; the people enjoy every advantage which ever accrued to the Roman people by that institution, whilft the nation is fecure from all those calamitous feditions, in which every factious Tribune could involve his country at pleasure. And all our questions in parliament are decided by a majority of voices; we can never be fubject to that capital defect in the Carthaginian conftitution where the single Veto of one discontented fenator