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negligence shall consist of (1) deliberate act or deliberate failure to act; or (2) such conduct as evidences reckless indifference to safety; or (3) intoxication operating as the proximate cause of injury.” In section 2 of the New Jersey act the burden of proof is upon the employer.
In Ohio (section 25) the act provides for all injuries which have not been purposely self-inflicted.
In Connecticut (Part B, section 1) no compensation shall be paid when the injury shall have been caused by the willful and serious misconduct of the employee or by his intoxication.
In Washington (section 6) the act provides that if injury or death results to a workman from the deliberate intention of the workman himself to produce such injury or death, neither the workman nor the widow, widower, child or dependent of the workman shall receive any payment whatsoever out of the accident fund. If injury or death results to a workman from the deliberate intention of his employer to produce such injury or death, the workman, the widow, widower, child or dependent of the workman shall have the privilege to take under this act, and also have cause of action against the employer, as if this act had not been enacted, for any excess of damage over the amount received or receivable under this act.
In Minnesota (section 1) compensation is given provided the employee was himself not willfully negligent at the time of receiving such injury.
In California (section 12, paragraph 3) compensation is given where the injury is not caused by the intoxication or the willful misconduct of the injured employee; and (section 12, paragraph b) where the injury was caused by the employer's gross negligence or willful misconduct and such act or failure to act causing such injury was the personal act or failure to act on the part of the employer himself, or, if the employer be a partnership, on the part of one of the partners, or, if a corporation, on the part of an elective officer or officers thereof, and such act or failure to act indicated a willful disregard of the life, limb or bodily safety of employees, any such injured employee, may, at his option, either claim compensation under this act or maintain an action at law for damages.
RIGHTS OF WIDOWS ON REMARRYING.
In the matter of compensation continuing to widows or widowers who remarry, the following extracts from the laws of some of the States are enlightening:
For the purposes of this act the dependence of a widow or widower of a deceased employee shall be construed to terminate with remarriage. - (CONNECTICUT, section 10, Part B.)
Marriage of any dependent shall terminate all compensation of such dependent, but shall not affect compensation allowed other dependents. - (KANSAS, section 11, paragraph 4.)
Questions as to who constitute dependents and the extent of their dependency shall be determined as of the date of the accident to the employee, and their right to any death benefit shall become fixed as of such time, irrespective of any subsequent change in conditions. (MICHIGAN, section 7.)
In case of remarriage of a widow without children she shall receive a lump sum settlement equal to one-half of the amount of the compensation remaining unpaid. In case of remarriage of a widow who bas dependent children, the unpaid balance of compensation which would otherwise become due to her shall be paid to such children. (MINNESOTA, section 14, paragraph 9.)
If a widow or widower of a deceased employee shall remarry, then the compensation benefits shall become payable to the child or children of such widow or widower, if there be any such child or children; but if there be no such child or children of such dependent widow or widower, shall not be affected by such remarriage. — (NEBRASKA, section 24, paragraph d.)
Should the widow of a deceased employee remarry during such period, the right of such dependent or of such widow to compensation under this section shall cease. (NEW JERSEY, section 12.)
If the injured workman die during such period of total disability, whatever the cause of death, leaving a widow, invalid widower, or child under the age of sixteen years, the surviving widow, or invalid widower, shall receive thirty dollars ($30) per month until death or remarriage, to be increased six dollars ($6) per month for each child under the age of sixteen years until such child shall arrive at the age of sixteen years; but if such child is, or shall be, without father or mother, such child shall receive fifteen dollars ($15) per month until arriving at the age of sixteen years, provided, however, that if any child is under the age of sixteen years and over the age of fifteen years, he shall be entitled to recover such payment for the period of one year. - (OREGON, section 21, paragraph c.)
If the workman leaves a widow or invalid widower, a monthly payment of twenty dollars ($20) shall be made throughout the life of the surviving spouse, to cease at the end of the month in which remarriage shall occur; and the surviving spouse shall also receive five dollars ($5) per month for each child of the deceased under the age of sixteen years at the time of the occurrence of the injury until such minor child shall reach the
age of sixteen years, but the total monthly payment under this paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) shall not exceed thirty-five dollars ($35). Upon remarriage of a widow she shall receive, once and for all, a lump sum equal to twelve times her monthly allowance, viz., the sum of two hundred forty dollars ($240), but the monthly payment for the child or children shall continue as before. — (WASHINGTON, section 5, paragraph 1.)
If the deceased employee leave a widow or invalid widower the payment shall be twenty dollars ($20) per month until the death or remarriage of such widow or widower. — (WEST VIRGINIA, section 33, paragraph 4.)
RULINGS AND DECISIONS UNDER THE ACT.
The Work of the Board in General. — The formal hearing and decision of cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act is perhaps the most important of the many functions of the Massachusetts Industrial Accident Board. Next in importance is the adjustment of cases by mutual agreement, with a member of the Board acting informally as a mediator, or referee, and bringing the parties together on a common basis, always in accordance with the provisions of the statute. Such informal conferences have averaged well above 10 cases daily, a total of over 3,000 claims concerning which there was some ground for a misunderstanding having been adjusted in this manner during the year from July 1, 1912, to June 30, 1913, inclusive. The expenses attendant upon formal hearings have been avoided by these conferences, the members of the Board giving their entire time to the administrative work arising in connection with the act, and aiding in bringing about a speedy adjustment of all cases. The Industrial Accident Board has held at least two meetings weekly, and frequently, when the occasion required, held night meetings and additional daily sessions, for the purpose of expediting the transaction of business under the statute. Informal rulings, averaging 30 weekly, have also assisted the parties concerned in promptly adjusting claims in cases where an interpretation of the law upon a given statement of facts was requested, about 1,500 matters being thus informally ruled upon by the Board during the first year. The Board has also passed upon 499 disputed bills, referred to it as provided by section 13, Part III. of the act, in which the insurer and the physician, hospital or nurse could not agree as to what was a “reasonable fee" for services rendered in accordance with section 5, Part II., which requires the insurer to furnish reasonable medical and hospital services and medicines when needed.
Only a Small Number of Cases reach Arbitration Stage. — Only a very small proportion of the cases arising under the act reached the arbitration stage, less than 300 being heard formally by committees of arbitration during the first year, this number being increased to 584 up to Nov. 30, 1913. Of this number, 56 were heard by the Industrial Accident Board on a claim for review of the decision of the committee of arbitration, and 26 were taken up to the Supreme Judicial Court on appeal from the decision of the full Board.
Decisions which guide Board. — The Supreme Judicial Court has handed down several decisions of moment to guide the Board in its administration of the act. The court has passed upon cases which brought into question the meaning of the words “
average weekly wages,' personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment," the extra-territorial effect of the act, the rights of widows, their own children and stepchildren, and of an employee who was acting as the agent of his general employer at the time of the injury, to compensation under the statute.
Striking References to Act by Supreme Court. — The court makes many striking references to the Workmen's Compensation Act in the course of the several decisions rendered. For the accomplishment of the purposes of the statute, "a simple method is furnished operating without delay or unnecessary formality. . . . In one aspect a case under the act resembles an action at law, for it seeks ultimately the payment of money. Payments, however, in most instances are by instalments. In another aspect it is akin to the specific performance of a contract, designed to cover the whole range of misfortunes likely to arise in the course of employment in a State with many and diversified industries." (Gould case below.) In another decision, in the Gillen case, the court refers to the "broad scope of the act and its comprehensive dealing with the whole subject,” and states that “where words are used in one part of a statute in a definite sense, it may be presumed, in the absence of a plain intent to the contrary, that they are used in the same sense in other places in the same act.” In the McNicol case, below, the court says injuries are excluded " which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause, and that the provisions of the English act as to the dependents entitled to payments are wholly different from those of our own act.” The court states that “the act should be interpreted