Εικόνες σελίδας
PDF
Ηλεκτρ. έκδοση

reason of a cave-in claimed double compensation, the evidence showing that the upper crust of the sand bank was cut at regular intervals, this being the only practical way to prevent a cave-in. It appeared that it was customary to have men on hand whose duty it was to perform this work, and that only through an error in human calculation was the overhanging crust allowed to remain for a sufficient time to cause the injury. Held, that this was not an injury due to serious and willful misconduct on the part of the employer. (Devine v. Contractors Mutual Liability Insurance Company.)

Dependency where Death results from the Injury. “If death results from the injury, the association shall pay the dependents of the employee, wholly dependent upon his earnings for support at the time of the injury, a weekly compensation equal to one-half his average weekly wages, but not more than $10 nor less than $4 a week, for a period of three hundred weeks from the date of the injury. If the employee leaves dependents only partly dependent upon his earnings for support at the time of his injury, the association shall pay such dependents a weekly compensation equal to the same proportion of the weekly payments for the benefit of persons wholly dependent as the amount contributed by the employee to such partial dependents bears to the annual earnings of the deceased at the time of the injury." (Section 6, Part II.)

Conclusively presumed to be Wholly Dependent.The act expressly provides that the following persons are conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: a wife upon a husband with whom she lives at the time of his death; a husband upon a wife with whom he lives at the time of her death; a child or children under the age of eighteen years (or over said age, but physically or mentally incapacitated from earning) upon the parent with whom he is or they are living at the time of the death of such parent, there being no surviving dependent parent. In case there is more than one child thus dependent the death benefit shall be divided equally among them. .

All other Cases of Dependency." — All other cases of dependency shall be determined in accordance with the facts, as at the time of the injury. If there is more than one person wholly dependent the death benefit shall be divided equally, persons partly dependent receiving nothing; if there is no one wholly dependent and more than one person partly dependent, the death benefit shall be divided among them.

Many Total Dependency Cases reported. Many cases are reported covering awards to persons conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent.

Board not to be deducted. - The Industrial Accident Board held, in the case of Murphy v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, that the father who was a partial dependent of his son, receiving all his wages, was entitled to 100 per cent. of the minimum compensation provided by the statute; that is, to the payment of $4 a week for a period of three hundred weeks. This case has been taken to the Supreme Judicial Court, the question at issue being whether the expense of the son's maintenance should be deducted from the amount contributed by him to his father when arriving at the amount due under the act.

Totally Dependent, although receiving only Portion of Wages. — In Smith v. Massachusetts Employees Insurance Association it was held that the dependent mother, who received from her son an average weekly contribution of $5 from his average weekly wage of $13.65, was entitled to a weekly compensation of $6.83, being in fact wholly dependent upon her son for support.

Compensation awarded Widow living apart but not legally separated from Husband. He had promised to support Widow and Child. — The Board held that a widow, not living with her husband at the time of the injury, was entitled to compensation as a full dependent, under the following circumstances: she and her husband had not lived together since July, 1911, the injury occurring July 1, 1912. The evidence indicated that there had been a quarrel; that she left him; that he came and asked her to return; that he had given her money when she left for Nova Scotia, telling her he would support her and the child; that he was planning to return in September and that there had never been any talk of legal separation or divorce. (Forsell v. Massachusetts Employees Insurance Association.") Widow living apart from Husband but receiving Support. A widow living apart but receiving support from her husband at the time of his injury was awarded compensation. (Archambault v. London Guarantee and Accident Company, Ltd.)

1 Appealed to Supreme Judicial Court.

Widow not receiving Support. Child receiving Support. Child a Partial Dependent. — A widow separated from her husband and not receiving any support from him was held not to be a dependent. Their child, living with her mother, and receiving an average of $2 a week, was held to be partially dependent to the extent of this contribution by her father. (Bentley v. Massachusetts Employees Insurance Association.")

Incapacity for Work. — A number of cases are reported covering the payment of compensation under sections 9 and 10, Part II. of the act. These sections provide that the injured employee shall receive one-half his average weekly wages during his total incapacity for work, but not more than $10 nor less than $4 a week for a period not to exceed five hundred weeks, the maximum payment provided being $3,000. For partial incapacity provision is made for the payment of one-half the difference between the average weekly wages which the employee earned before the injury and the average weekly wages which he is able to earn thereafter, but not more than $10 a week for a period not to exceed three hundred weeks from the date of the injury.

Additional Compensation. - Section 11, Part II., provides that, in case of certain specified injuries, “the amounts hereinafter named shall be paid, in addition to all other compensation.” Thus, if an employee receives an injury specified in this section, he is entitled to a weekly payment on account of any incapacity which may result from this injury, and to the additional weekly payments named in said sections.

Right to postpone Payment of Compensation denied. — The right of an insurer to postpone the payment of " additional” compensation, pending the result of an operation for the restoration of the vision to an injured eye, came up in the case of Bronzetti v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., and it was held that the insurer did not have this right, compensation being ordered paid in accordance with the section

" Appealed to Supreme Judicial Court.

“ for a period of fifty weeks,” dating from the day of the injury.

Injury to Eye makes it impossible to use Correcting Lens and obtain Simultaneous Vision. — Section 11 (6), Part II., provides for the payment of an additional weekly compensation of half wages for a period of fifty weeks for “the reduction to one-tenth of normal vision in either eye with glasses.” In Latak v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., the employee received an injury which necessitated an operation for the removal of the lens of the left eye. By reason of the removal of the lens the vision became so blurred and its image out of alignment with the uninjured eye that the employee got no more vision, when wearing glasses, in the injured eye than if he were not wearing glasses. The operated eye, with a correcting glass, gave him a vision of four-tenths of normal; without a glass, three two-hundredths of normal. The weight of the medical evidence showed that this vision of four-tenths of normal was only practicable in the event of the employee losing his sound eye, and that it was impossible to wear a correcting lens and obtain simultaneous vision with the other eye. Held, that the vision of the employee, with the use of glasses in the injured eye, is three two-hundredths of the normal, and additional compensation is awarded.

Common Law or Compensation. — An employee may not claim his right of action at common law and later claim under the statute.

Independent Contractor. — In Cheevers v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland 1 it was held that an independent contractor — that is, a person who was injured while driving his own team, although working for a coal dealer - was not entitled to compensation.

Letter does not constitute an Election to proceed. ployee, through his counsel, as reported in McGaffigan v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, sent a letter to the Boston Elevated Railway Company, claiming damages on account of a personal injury caused by the negligence of one of its employees, and filed a claim for compensation with the Industrial Accident Board later. Suit was subsequently brought,

An em

" Appealed to Supreme Judicial Court.

the court dismissing the action on the ground that it had no jurisdiction. Afterwards the employee requested a hearing before a committee of arbitration to decide his claim under the statute. Held, that the letter to the Boston Elevated was not an election to proceed, and that the employee is entitled to compensation under the act.

Casual Employment claimed in case of Employment of Waiter to serve at Regular Occupation at a Banquet. — A question of “casual employment' was raised in the case of Gaynor v. Standard Accident Insurance Company. The emplovers, a firm of caterers, did not have any regular waiters in their employ, engaging men who followed that occupation regularly, as the occasion arose. While serving in his usual capacity as a waiter at a banquet the employee received a personal injury from which he died. Held, that his employment was not casual and that his widow was entitled to compensation.

Question of Casual Employment. — The same question was raised in the case of an employee who had been informed that he "might get through to-night, you might not for a week, or two or three days," and it was held that he was not a casual employee. (Grogan v. Frankfort General Insurance Company.)

Signing of Release by Employee does not deprive Widow of Right to Compensation. — The Industrial Accident Board held in the case of Cripps v. Ætna Life Insurance Company, that the right of a widow to compensation was entirely separate from that of her husband, and that the signing of a release at common law by him, prior to his death, does not operate to deprive her of her claim to compensation under the act.

Impartial Physicians assist in obtaining Necessary Medical Facts. — Impartial physicians have been called upon by the Board, as shown in many cases reported, and have been of great assistance to the members in aiding them in coming to a decision in cases where the medical facts were in dispute.

Care taken by Members of the Board to ascertain Exact Facts. — The care taken by members of the Board to ascertain the exact facts is shown in many of the cases; as, for example, in the case of Nelson v. Employers' Liability Assurance Cor

" Appealed to Supreme Judicial Court.

« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »