unobjectionable was sustained. This seems to be an Summary of the Pennsylvania Cases and Statement of the Law 319. No very clear conclusion as to the law can be drawn from these cases. The notion seems to run through the minds of most of the judges that a so-called spendthrift trust is of itself inalienable. This conception, perhaps, springs from the ambiguous nature of the term spendthrift, and overlooks not only the very clear distinction between voluntary and involuntary alienation but also the circumstance that a prohibition of one form of alienation does not prohibit the other. This notion clearly appears in Shankland's Appeal, where there was no prohibition of voluntary alienation. This case is doubtful, and may be explained on the ground that the parties intended to dispose of the legal title. Rife v. Geyer and Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Guillou 10 may also be ment. See, however, §270, n. 10, 8 9 5 At p. 144. It might have been argued that the word " "use" made it incumbent on the trustee to see that the income was not paid to a creditor, either in pursuance of a voluntary or involuntary assign ante. 7 See §173, ante. 8 47 Pa. 113 (1864), stated §313, ante. 1 explained on the ground that the controversy was over the legal title. It is beyond the power of the cestui que trust in any kind of a trust to deal with the legal title. The remarks in Mehaffey's Estate were dicta. The facts in Clemens's Estate are so meagrely given that the case is utterly valueless as a precedent. Jones's Estate clearly recognizes the right of the cestui que trust to make a voluntary alienation, although the clause against voluntary alienation is difficult to discover. It therefore appears that there is no case which decides squarely that the clause of prohibition against voluntary alienation is valid; that the notion that there can be no voluntary alienation in the case of a so-called spendthrift trust is a fallacy, and that all the cases in which the question is directly or indirectly involved can be explained on other grounds. No statement as to the law can be ventured, but in this condition of the authorities it may perhaps be said that on principle the clause is void, and there is no clear decision to the contrary in Pennsylvania. Trusts for Support and Maintenance 5 320. It has been said that a trust for the personal support, comfort and maintenance of the cestui que trust cannot be alienated. This notion may be traced to the case of Lancaster v. Dolan.1 It is submitted that such directions in a trust, if they have any effect at all, are a restraint on the use and enjoyment by the cestui que trust of his equitable life estate and have no effect on the alienability of the interest. The cestui que trust may alienate in the absence of any valid clause to the contrary, and the trustee, if the directions in the trust are valid, may use the income for the support and maintenance of the new cestui que trust. While this is probably the proper principle, it has not been recognized by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 6 1 139 Pa. 276 (1890), stated §316, ante. 2175 Pa. 110 (1896), stated §317, ante. 3 199 Pa. 143 (1901), stated §318, ante. 41 Rawle, 231 (1829). See argument of Mr. Ingersoll on p. 239 and language of Gibson, C. J., on p. 247. See this case stated $590, post. 5 See $545, post, as to this point. 6 See §162, ante. |