qualified fee has probably never probably never existed in Pennsylvania, and furnishes a fit topic only for academic discussion.' The determinable fee still remains in Pennsylvania and is freely alienable. The only objection to the determinable fee lies in the circumstance that the possibility of reverter may take effect at a period beyond that prescribed by the rule against perpetuities. 7 See $26, ante. 8 See $27, ante. As to this point see $368, post. Attributes of a contingent remainder at common law. CONTINGENT REMAINDERS: DESTRUCTIBILITY Preliminary discussion. Forfeiture. Surrender. § 48 $ 49 § 50 § 51 § 52 § 53 Merger. § 54 § 55 § 56 § 57 Summary of law in Pennsylvania as to destructibility of con Remainder to the unborn child of an unborn person.... § 66 Distinction between a contingent remainder and an executory devise.. § 80 Definition of a Future Interest 35. The logical conception of a future interest is that of an interest which is to arise at some time in the future as distinguished from an interest which exists at the present time, and the conception admits of a distinction between those interests which are certain to arise, and those which are uncertain to arise. Remainders were the only future interests in real property which were known to the common law. They did not, however, owing to certain doctrines of the early common law, square with the logical conception of a future interest. The common law forced them into a technical and artificial mold which has remained until this day. To understand this matter, it will be necessary to trace the origin of remainders and point out the doctrines which governed their creation at the early common law.1 Early Common Law Theory of Future Interests 36. The feudal law appears to have evolved no conception of a future interest. All ownership in land, whatever its nature, was present ownership or holding. All grants of land were grants for life, and when the heirs were added the notion was that the heirs of the grantee took by substitution in his place and not by way of succession. Reversion 37. A reversion was the estate or interest which was left in the feoffor after he made the grant for life. The land, as it was said, came back to the feoffor after the termination of the life estate. The reversion always arose by implication of law on a grant inter vivos, and consequently could 1 The nature of future interests has been the subject of considerable recent discussion: see article by Mr. Kales, "Several Problems of Gray's Rule Against Perpetuities, Second Edition," 20 Harv. Law Rev., 192 (1907); "Future Interests in Land," 22 Law Quar. Rev., 250, 383 (1906), and criticism thereon in 20 Harv. Law Rev., 243 (1907); Article "Future Interests in Land" by Edward Jenks, 20 Law Quar. Rev., 280 (1904); Article of Mr. Kales, 24 Law Quar. Rev., 301, 305. 2 Challis, Real Property, 2 ed. (1892), p. 68. Not the same as the reversion existing after a term of years: Challis, ubi supra, p. 70. The relation existing between landlord and tenant, is not feudal. This distinction is not taken in Pennsylvania, and seems unnecessary for practical purposes in modern law. not be created by deed. It has always been considered as having all the incidents of a fee, being devisable, assignable and heritable. Reversions exist in Pennsylvania today and are governed by the same rule as at common law. Grants for life are rare in modern times, and reversions, therefore, are of infrequent occurrence. In the case of a will, where there is a gift of a definite estate with a residuary clause, the residuary gift will be a reversion. A reversion is devisable, and there seems to be no objection to permitting it to be devised by the same will upon which it arises. In the similar case of a deed, the grant of the purported reversion is a disposition of the balance of the fee, and must take effect as a remainder. This point, perhaps, is not of much practical importance. 3 Origin of Vested Remainders 38. It was therefore said that when the feoffor limited an estate in another person after the life estate, he directed where the land should remain after that termination instead of coming back to him. This interest was consequently called a remainder. It was the interest substituted for the reversion. The first life estate created by the feoffment was called the particular estate; and the estates limited thereafter, whether for life, in tail, or in fee, were called the remainders. When the particular estate and remainders together made up the fee, there could be nothing else limited thereafter. There could not be a remainder after a fee. There are certain peculiar characteristics of a vested remainder which can only be understood by considering the common law doctrine relating to seisin. Seisin 39. Seisin meant possession, and was an always existing fact. The land was immovable, and consequently seisin could 3 Houston, J., in McCay v. Hughes, 6 Watts, 345 at 348 (1837); Kennedy, J., in Brown v. Boyd, 9 W. & S. 123 at 128 (1845); Lowrie, J., in Leah Passmore's Administrators' App., 23 Pa. 381 at 382 (1854); Gray, Rule Perp., 2 ed. (1906), §113a. 4 Pollock & Maitland, Hist. of English Law, Vol. 2, 1 ed. and 2 ed., p. 21. 5 Mr. Lewis, Lewis, Perp., p. 410, |