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restrained rapacity; and the result is seen in enormous railroad dividends. Monopolies of this character, directed to numerous pursuits, flood our State; and so corrupting is the power to create such monopolies, and so eager is the instinct of gain to procure them, that as early as the year 1811, Gov. Tompkins prorogued the Legislature, anu sent the members home for a season, in the vain hope that the sight of their constituents would arrest a corrupt combination to charter a bank. Gov. Clinton's messages to the Legislature are full of evidences that the same corrupting influence was active in his day. From his suggestions, against what is technically called legislative log-rolling, arose the rule that no bill should create or alter more than a single Corporation, lest the want of merit, which should preclude the enactment of the bills separately, might induce their respective advocates in the Legislature to club, and pass them all. And in our own time, if rumor lies not, the members of our Legislature, as they journey towards the Capitol to enter on their duties, are occasionally (when their services are needed to create some new privilege) surprised by the equivocal courtesy of receiving free railroad tickets. Nor is the corrupting power to grant special privileges, and the corrupting consciousness that special privileges are obtained by favor and friendship, seen in only the dalliance of such appliances; who cannot see it in the meritorious laws that are annually rejected, when they happen to conflict with existing monopolies; as, for instance, last winter, the railroad from Albany to NewYork, and from Utica to Binghamton ?-and who cannot see it also in the laws that are annually passed, when they happen to benefit political favorites; as, for instance, the renewal, last winter, of two bank charters, after years of denial to kindred applications? and what resisted, till the

people were weary of asking for it, the mere privilege of sending to and from Albany, by railroad, the produce and merchandise which the frozen canal cannot convey, and which, when transmitted by railroad, were to pay canal tolls? Let the tariff answer, which, last winter, the railroads established for freight, when they were at length compelled (not being quite ready to accept this additional branch of lucre) to accede to the wants of the country; but acceded by freight charges so great as "to keep the word of promise to our ears only."

In the year 1821, when our present Constitution was created, the evil of special legislation was sought to be corrected by the expedient of a two-third vote. Experience shows that this has increased the facility of obtaining charters, legislators being now, by a spirit of concession, induced to help make up a two-third vote, when, had applications depended on the vote of a mere majority, they would have exercised on every question, their personal convictions of duty. Nor, in truth, is the remedy at all adapted to the disease. The evil to be remedied is the creation of monopolies, while obstacles in the way of their creation augment the monopoly when granted, just in proportion as the obstacles prevent the creation of rival institutions. The New-York Life Insurance and Trust Company illustrates this principle. It was chartered in 1830, unlimited in duration, with a capital of a million of dollars; and it is, moreover, a close corporation, the directors being self-appointed, not elective. The magnitude and novelty of these and its other powers conform well to the novelty of the combination of great names that united in procuring the grant. Subsequent Legislatures have constantly refused to create any similar institution, deterred therefrom by the peculiarity of its powers; or, more likely, (so debased

is the character of all special legislation, and ours is among the most debased,) because no similar institution has been sought by names equally influential; consequently the Company has long enjoyed an unmolested monopoly of its peculiar functions, and its stock brings more than 60 per cent. advance on the money invested, besides paying semiannually great dividends to its stockholders, and rich salaries to its officers. And not long since, after suffering in fraud a loss about equal to a quarter of its whole capital, the loss constituted only a diminution of its surplus profits. If, then, special privileges are aggravated in their inveteracy by all restraints on their creation, short of a total prohibition, what ought to be our remedy, desiring, as we do, equality of privileges among all our citizens? It consists not in making stockholders personally liable for the debts of their respective Corporations; for, while this may render such monopolies less desirable property than at present, it still leaves us cursed with unequal legal facilities in the pursuit of wealth. Only one remedy seems practicable. The Legislature should be prohibited from granting any special privileges.* If the agency of corporate com bination is desirable in the construction of rail-roads, insurance companies, benevolent institutions, factories, or any other object, the act should be general; like the existing laws incorporating churches, public libraries, free banks, and some manufactories; so that whoever wishes may obtain the same powers. Privileges that are improper for all should be granted to none; and what are within the reach of all, will cease from being invidious. If a rail-road route shall then be deemed capable of sustaining two establishments, an opposition will be produced, and the community

*This prohibition was incorporated in the new Constitution, but it is essentially evaded.

will enjoy the benefit of competition; as now, when rival mills are erected on the same stream, or rival stage coaches on the same turnpike. Our Legislature, relieved from the corrupting power of granting special privileges, will be disburdened of more than half the business which absorbs its time, while rail-road travel, relieved from the palsy of exclusiveness, will transport us in all directions at half the present charge, and perhaps at twice the speed. When steamboats on the Hudson were a legislative monopoly, the fare was seven dollars, and the trip occupied thirty hours; while now the fare is only fifty cents, and the time of travel ten hours. We wonder at the past generation for having supported such a burthen, while still believing that they lived under a government of equal laws; and doubtless our successors will contemplate with surprise the special privileges that we tolerate. In truth, with our seventy years' apprenticeship to liberty, the time has been too short to eradicate the exclusive legislation of preceding ages. Only seven years have elapsed since men could pursue the business of auctioneering without a commission from the Executive, in whose hands such licenses were reserved to reward favorites; and they often made a sinecure of their commission by selling the use of them. Till within a year, no man, however gifted, could lawfully practise medicine without a special authorization; and even now such a practitioner is subjected, for certain offences, to penalties which are not imposed on licensed physicians, who should be equally guilty. Scarcely two years have elapsed since all our agricultural products, and nearly all our raw productions, that were designed for exportation; were compulsorily subjected to a swarm of petty monopolists, weighers, inspectors, and measurers, armed with a mass of legislative fees and penalties, expressed in full forty-nine pages of our

Revised Statutes. The imposition is happily so far mitigated, that the buyer and seller are not compelled to subject their property to the inspectors, weighers, and measurers; though certain officers only can, even as yet, perform these mechanical duties when such services are desired. Our towns and villages also have their exclusive weighers, measurers, and inspectors. In Albany, for instance, one man alone can measure stone for hire, under a penalty of ten dollars for every infringement of his monopoly. In a Government like ours, something is due to the principle of liberty; for, as we accustom ourselves to cherish its minute ramifications. the habit will be strengthened of preserving its more important ministrations. Many persons suppose that the whole system is erroneous, which superadds to the instinct of self-interest legal regulations like the foregoing.* Men are probably as seldom cheated now, in the sale and purchase of produce, as when they were compelled to pay inspectors and weighers. Men are also auctioneers without commissions, and physicians without diplomas, and no evil results from the liberty; though the latter concession to equal rights was gained, petty as it is, only after years of struggle, and the disregard of hosts of imaginary spectres. Possibly, also, could every man who pleases, (unlicensed except by his own will,) practise law, peddle goods, and even sell rum, or keep a tavern, no evil would result, despite the fears of the interested, and the shrieks of coercively-disposed philanthropists.

Improvements have been suggested also in our civil organization. Each town is a little Republic, whose powers have been steadily enlarged, till it elects its own justices, and each county its own sheriff and clerks. A disposition seems general, to extend still further both town and county

• These evils also the new Constitution abolished.

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