149 Ill. 600, 36 N. E. 948, 24 L. R. A. 152, 41 Am. St. Rep. 329, has never been questioned in this court by proper parties. It is in harmony with the decisions of courts of last resort upon similar statutes, rendered both before and since its adoption. Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 553, 30 Am. Rep. 238; State v. Fry, 81 Ind. 7; State v. Corbett, 57 Minn. 345, 59 N. W. 317, 24 L. R. A. 498; Jannin v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 51 S. W. 1126, 53 L. R. A. 349. The validity of like statutes in the state of North Carolina was recognized in State v. Clarke, 109 N. C. 739, 14 S. E. 84, and State v. Ray, 109 N. C. 736, 14 S. E. $3, 14 L. R. A. 529. But a single authoritative case has been found to the contrary (People v. Warden of City Prison, 157 N. Y. 116, 51 N. E. 1006, 43 L. R. A. 264, 68 Am. St. Rep. 763), in which Parker, C. J., rendered the opinion of the majority of the court of appeals of that state, holding the law unconstitutional, and to which three of the judges disagreed; elaborate dissenting opinions being filed by Justices Bartlett and Martin. But the act of 1875 and the correctness of our decision in Burdick v. People, supra, cannot be considered or reviewed on this record. If the constitutionality of that act should again be presented by parties not before the court in the Burdick Case, that decision will not preclude them except in so far as it is founded upon sound reasoning and authority, and will then be reaffirmed or overruled as shall appear right and proper. The act of 1897, under which plaintiff in error was convicted, is an entirely different statute, and was manifestly passed for an entirely different purpose. It is entitled, "An act to prevent buying, selling or fraudulently using passes upon railroads, steamboats or other public conveyances." The first section is divided into two clauses, the first of which embraces the subject of buying, selling, giving, bartering or transferring, in any manner, passes, etc. Instead, however, of forbidding such buying or selling unconditionally, as expressed in the title, the prohibition is limited to any pass which, "by conditions expressed thereon, is not transferable." That clause, also, not only forbids the buying or selling of passes, but also prohibits the buying or selling "any form of free transportation which, by conditions expressed thereon, is not transferable." The title of the act is to prevent buying or selling passes generally; but this clause clearly contemplates the issuing of such passes or other forms of free transportation by railroads, steamboats, and other public conveyances, and only probibits the buying, selling, giving, bartering, or transferring, in any manner, any pass or form of free transportation "which, by conditions expressed thereon, is not transferable" by other persons after it has been so "issued or given." It seems clear that this part of the section is violative of section 13 of article 4 of the constitution, which provides that "no act hereafter passed shall embrace more than

one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." This limitation requires all acts of the legislature to have but a single object, and requires that object to be clearly indicated by the title, and no act can be sustained the title of which does not fairly indicate the objects and purposes of the law. The framers of the constitution intended by it to prevent legislation which should not, by the title, clearly inform the legislature of its purpose and prevent the people from being misled thereby. "The generality of a title is therefore no objection to it, so long as it is not made a cover to legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a necessary or proper connection." Cooley, Const. Lim. 169 et seq.; People v. Institution, 71 Ill. 229. The title of the act of 1897 gives no information as to the purpose contained in the first clause of the first section.

But that clause is unconstitutional for the further reason that while the title of the act is "to prevent buying, selling or fraudulently using passes upon railroads," etc., this clause empowers these very companies to make such buying, selling, etc., lawful by withholding any condition expressed upon such passes making them nontransferable. There is no requirement of law compelling such companies to indorse a condition of that kind upon passes, and hence they may, by merely indorsing such a condition, make the buying or selling of them criminal or not, as they see fit. In other words, they are delegated the power by this statute, contrary to the title of the act, to make the buying or selling of passes issued by them criminal or innocent by merely placing thereon "transferable" or declining to do so. This manifestly grants to such companies and associations special privileges, and is violative of section 22 of article 4 of the constitution.

In Jannin v. State, supra, the act under consideration by the court contained the proviso "that the provisions of this act shall not apply to any person holding a ticket upon which is not plainly printed that it is a penal offense for him or her to sell, barter or transfer said ticket for a consideration." After sustaining the law generally, it is said: "It would have been a very easy matter for the legislature to have confined the sale of passage tickets to the agents of the railroad companies without any requirement as to the form of the ticket. But this course was not pursued. As it is, every railroad company has the option to issue a passage ticket with this proviso or not, as it may see proper. If it issues a ticket without this proviso it is not a penal offense, and in every such case scalpers and all others may deal in such passage tickets without any violation of the law. We accordingly hold that because the legislature left it optional with the railroad companies whether or not, in the issuance of tickets, they would create a penal offense, the act of the legislature is without authority of law;

is violative of the law, in that it does not define with certainty an offense; does not itself create an offense, but delegates its authority to another agency to make the sale of railroad tickets a violation of the law." And so, under this statute, it is left to the companies named in the act to create an offense or not, as they shall see proper. It is difficult to see what purpose the legislature had in the passage of this statute unless it was to protect transportation companies against the violation of conditions expressed in passes issued by them,-in other words, to enact a criminal law for the sole purpose of enforcing a civil agreement. Railroad and steamboat passes are of different kinds. Some are purely gratuitous; others, such as drovers' and employés' passes or free transportation, are issued upon a good consideration. When issued in the name of a particular person they are generally held not to be transferable, and may doubtless be dishonored and taken up when presented by a person other than the one named. But that is a very different thing from making the act of buying, selling or transferring them a crime or misdemeanor. Counsel for the people do not seriously contend that the first clause of the first section is valid, but they insist that the second clause, under which they say this conviction was had, is entirely separate and distinct from the first, and therefore the latter may be sustained although the former is held to be unconstitutional. The second clause makes it unlawful "for any person to use or attempt to use for the purpose of being transported upon any railroad, steamboat or other public conveyance in this state, any pass or any form of free transportation issued in the name of any person other than the one so using or attempting to use such pass or form of free transportation,”—which, it is said, is without the objectionable qualification "which, by conditions expressed thereon, is not transferable;" and it is insisted that under this clause the crime consists in the use or attempt to use, for the purpose of being transported, any pass or form of free transportation issued in the name of another, and is in no way connected with or dependent upon the first clause. We concede that where the provisions of a statute are so distinct and separate from each other as that one part in no way depends upon another, and where one part is violative of some provision of the constitution and the other is not, the latter may be sustained even though in the same section; provided, however, that the court can see that the legislature would have passed the valid part of the law without reference to the invalid. We do not agree with counsel that these clauses or sentences of the first section should be so construed. The statute is penal and must be strictly construed, one part with another, so as to give effect to the whole, if that can be done. The legislature was here dealing with the sale and use, or attempted use, of nontransferable

passes or free transportation, and it cannot be said that it would have passed the last clause without reference to the first. But it seems to us that the argument of counsel inevitably leads to the destruction of the whole law. If their position is correct and if the title to the act embraces the two objections, that is, the one named in the first clause, independent of and separate from that enacted in the second clause,-then it is clearly void because it "embraces more than one subject." "If the title to the act actually indicates, and the act itself actually embraces, two distinct objects when the constitution says it shall embrace but one, the whole act must be treated as void from the manifest impossibility in the court choosing between the two and holding the act valid as to one and void as to the other." Cooley, Const. Lim. 177. As said in the note to this text, "all the cases recognize this doctrine." We hold, then, that the act under which plaintiff in error was convicted is unconstitutional and void.

We also think there is foree in the contention of counsel for plaintiff in error that the pass upon which the defendant attempted to ride is not, "by the conditions expressed thereon, not transferable." As we have already said, the statute is to be strictly construed, and to justify a conviction under its provisions the party charged must be brought clearly within its provisions. The language is "which, by conditions expressed thereon, is not transferable." It is not and cannot be claimed that the pass copied in the indictment contained any such express condition. It is true, it shows by the condition on the back of it that it was not to be used by any person other than the one named therein, because if presented by any other person the conductor was required to take it up and collect the fare; but it is only nontransferable by inference or by construction, and not by the express terms indorsed thereon.

We are therefore, for the two reasons stated, of the opinion that the judgment of the criminal court should be reversed, and as the law upon which the conviction is based is invalid the case will not be remanded. Judgment reversed.

(197 III. 523)

LAW et al. v. SANITARY DIST. OF CHICAGO.

(Supreme Court of Illinois. June 19, 1902.) CONDEMNATION PROCEEDING - CORRECTION OF VERDICT-PRESUMPTION AS TO SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-INTENTION OF JURY -SEPARATION OF DAMAGES.

1. Where the petition in a condemnation proceeding described the property as a whole and also two parts of it separately, a formal verdict, agreed to by counsel of both parties, which conclusively showed that the damages awarded therein were intended for both pieces of the land, although it failed to describe one piece, was properly corrected by the court in entering judgment by inserting the omitted description.

lot 1 in block 14 lying southeasterly of the line in question, whereas the judgment describes both the part of lot 1 in block 14 lying southeasterly of said line and also the part of lot 2 in block 14 lying southeasterly of said line. The motion made by plaintiffs in error was a motion to correct the judgment by striking out so much of it as described the part of lot 2 lying southeasterly of the line in question. If this were done, it would make the judgment of condemnation a judgment which condemns only a part of the property of the plaintiffs in error described in the petition, to wit, that part of lot 1 in block 14 which lies southeasterly of the line in question; and the compensation of $20,875.23 would be awarded for the taking of the part of lot 1 above mentioned, and no compensation would be awarded for the taking of the part of lot 2 above referred to. The judgment entered by the court as above set forth may be regarded as an amendment of the verdict or as a construction of the verdict. Harvey v. Head, 68 Ga. 250. A verdict may be amended by the court or construed by reference to the pleadings and the evidence in the record, and in some instances from the notes of the judge, when the intention of the jury is apparent from the pleadings and the evidence. Courts adhere strictly to the rule that "when the intention of the jury is manifest the court will set right matter of form." Harvey v. Head, supra; Hawks v. Crofton, 2 Burrow, 698; Petrie v. Hannay, 3 Term R. 659; Clark v. Lamb, 8 Pick. 415, 19 Am. Dec. 332. "In considering the verdict itself, with a view to its sufficiency, the first object is to ascertain what the jury intended to find; and this is to be done by construing the verdict liberally, with the sole view of ascertaining the meaning of the jury, and not under the technical rules of construction which are applicable to pleadings. If the meaning of the jury can be ascertained, and a verdict on the point in issue can be made out, the court will mould it into form and make it serve.' * * According to the nature of the thing, this rule must be considered as applicable to special, as well as to general, verdicts." Miller v. Shackleford, 4 Dana, 271; Mays v. Lewis, 4 Tex. 38.

In the case at bar the verdict of the jury reads as follows: "We, the jury, find and report that the just compensation to be paid to the owners and each owner of the property described in the petition filed herein, as follows: that part of lot 1, in block 14, in canal trustees' subdivision, etc., * * *lying southeasterly of a line drawn from a point in the north line of said lot 1, 238 feet east of the northwest corner of said lot 1 to a point on the dividing line between lots 2 and 3, in said block 14, 190.5 feet southeasterly of the northwest corner of said lot 3, measured along said dividing line, excepting from the above-described land that part recently purchased by the United States

government for the purpose of widening the south branch of the Chicago river; situated in the city of Chicago, county of Cook and state of Illinois, containing 17,041 square feet, to be taken by the petitioners herein, to be the sum of $20,875.23." Here, the westerly or northwesterly line of the tract described in the verdict is the westerly, or northwesterly, boundary line, not only of the part of lot 1, but also of the part of lot 2, in block 14 to be taken for the purpose of the improvement. This westerly or northwesterly line, as described in the verdict, is 294.37 feet long. If it had been the intention of the jury that only the part of lot 1 lying southeasterly of this line should be condemned, the line on the westerly or northwesterly side of the tract to be condemned would have been described as a line only 143.28 feet long; that is to say, that part of the northwesterly line which lies northwesterly of the part of lot 1 sought to be taken would have been described, and not a line northwesterly of both the part of lot 1 and the part of lot 2 sought to be taken. In other words, the use of the whole of the northwesterly boundary line of both pieces of property belonging to the plaintiffs in error is mentioned by the jury in the description of the property referred to in their verdict. This tends to show that the compensation to be awarded was to be for the whole of the property, and not for a part of it. But there is another fact even more significant, as indicating the intention of the jury, than the length of the boundary line on the west or northwesterly side of the property. The jury described in their verdict a tract of land "containing 17,041 square feet." Seventeen thousand and forty-one square feet constitute the contents and extent of both tracts belonging to plaintiffs in error, both the part of lot 1 in block 14, and the part of lot 2 in block 14, lying southeasterly of the line in question. Seventeen thousand and forty-one square feet is the exact total of 5,907.5 square feet lying in the part of lot 1 sought to be taken, and 11,133.50 square feet lying in the part of lot 2 sought to be taken. The jury thus, by the use of this language in their verdict, evidently had in their minds a tract of land containing the number of square feet in both of the tracts belonging to the plaintiffs in error, and not the number of square feet in one tract only. In addition to what has already been said, one of the affidavits filed upon the motion of plaintiffs in error to vacate and correct the judgment states that, after the court had read its instructions to the jury, the attorneys for the respective parties, the plaintiffs in error and the sanitary district of Chicago, dictated a form of verdict to a stenographer, who was by them instructed to write out his notes on the typewriter and bring them back to the court as soon as possible; that the petition in the case was handed to the stenographer as a reference for greater cer

tainty; that all the parties then left the court room, except the affiant, who remained until the stenographer returned with the form of the verdict, which was thereupon immediately handed to the judge, and sent by him to the jury. According to the English practice, "the minutes of a special verdict, intended to be found, ought to be signed by one of the counsel for each party, and should be approved by the judge; it being his province to take care that the question of law be fairly stated; and they ought to be delivered to the jury before they find a verdict. If all the counsel of one party refuse to sign the minutes, the judge may direct the jury to find a verdict from the minutes as signed by the counsel of the other party. And if the verdict be defective, so that the court cannot give judgment thereon, they will amend it, if possible, by the notes of the counsel or the memory of the judge who tried the cause." Miller v. Shackleford, supra. In the latter case of Miller v. Shackleford, supra, it was said by the court: "Making all due allowance for the difference in the practice and organization of the courts in this country and in England, we think these references fully justify the course pursued in the preparation of this verdict. A jury is not expected to be able (especially in a complicated case) to draw up a special verdict without assist

ance.

The facts are to be found upon their own convictions and responsibility; the form of the finding, and its sufficiency as to the extent of the facts embraced, must be looked to by the court." It thus appears that, in this case, a form of verdict was drawn up by the counsel of both parties and agreed upon by them. Evidently the form thus drawn up contained the words which appeared in the verdict of the jury as rendered by them, to wit, "containing 17,041 square feet." The conclusion is irresistible that the attorneys of the plaintiffs in error consented to a form of verdict, to be submitted to the jury, which required them to find the value of, or the amount of compensation to be paid for, a tract of land containing 17,041 square feet, and not a tract of land containing only 5,907.5 square feet. It is evident that the stenographer, in copying the description from the petition which, according to the affidavit, was handed to him, copied the description of one of the tracts of land instead of copying the full description of both tracts, but the mention of the full contents, or whole number of square feet, of both tracts, shows clearly to our minds the intention of the jury to award a sum for the condemnation of both tracts.

In this case there is no bill of exceptions which sets forth the evidence taken upon the trial of the cause or the instructions of the court or the grounds upon which a new trial was asked. It is well settled by the decisions of this court that, where the record contains no bill of exceptions showing the

evidence heard on the trial of a cause, it will be presumed that the evidence was ample to sustain the judgment of the court below. It always devolves upon a party alleging error to make it appear. Miller v. Glass, 118 Ill. 443, 8 N. E. 833. Every presumption is in favor of the correctness of the judgment entered by the trial court unless the contrary is made to appear. Lee v. Town of Mound Station, 118 Ill. 304, 8 N. E. 759. In the case at bar the court entered the judgment of condemnation with all the evidence introduced upon the trial fresh in its mind. The presumption is that the construction given by the court to the verdict of the jury in the judgment rendered by it was sustained by the evidence. If the evidence showed that both of the tracts belonging to the plaintiffs in error contained 17,041 square feet and were of the value of $20,875.23, the court had a right to conclude from the evidence that when the jury in their verdict referred to a tract containing 17,041 square feet they intended to award compensation for both of the tracts, or all of the property belonging to the plaintiffs in error, as described in the petition. In the absence of a bill of exceptions showing what the testimony was, we are unable to say that the trial court erred in its construction of the verdict of the jury.

We agree with counsel for plaintiffs in error that the words, "so much of the soutneast quarter as lies west of the south branch of the Chicago river," were a part of the description of the subdivision in which block 14 lay. But we are of the opinion that, when the jury in their verdict used the words, "the just compensation to be paid to the owners and each owner of the property described in the petition filed herein," they did not intend to award to each one of the plaintiffs in error the sum of $20,875.23 as compensation for the part of the property belonging to such plaintiff in error alone, but that it was their intention to award the sum to all of the plaintiffs in error for the whole of the property; and it was the duty of the court afterwards to require the sum to be paid out to the plaintiffs in error in proportion to their respective interests. In the form of the verdict framed by counsel, and submitted by the court to the jury for their use, a part of the language of the oath to be taken by the jury, as prescribed by section 8 of the eminent domain act, was embodied in the verdict. That language is as follows: "You and each of you do solemnly swear that you will well and truly ascertain and report just compensation to the owner (and each owner) of the property which it is sought to take or damage in this case," etc. 2 Starr & C. Ann. St. (2d Ed.) p. 1770. The use, however, of the words, "and each owner," as they thus appear in the oath prescribed and in the verdict rendered, does not necessarily indicate that the whole sum mentioned in the verdict