firming such judgment or final order, shall not issue execution in causes that are so brought before it on error, on which it pronounces judgment as aforesaid, but shall send a special mandate to the court below, as the case may require, for execution thereon, and the court to which such special mandate is sent shall proceed in the same manner as if such judgment or final order had been rendered therein," etc.

The question is not without difficulty. Much may be said, and well said, perhaps, on either side, and authorities are in apparent conflict. We do not enter into a discussion of it here, but content ourselves with the announcement that, considering all the statutes bearing upon the question, and especially having in mind the general policy of our legislation in the direction of entrusting the enforcement of all final judgments and decrees of reviewing courts to the court of general jurisdiction, to wit, the common pleas, this court is of opinion that the better view is that it is the purpose of the statute to vest in that court power to enforce decrees remanded to it of this character by all appropriate process and proceeding, and that, therefore, the proceeding in contempt was in this case properly instituted in the common pleas. See Hulett v. Fairbanks, 41 Ohio St. 401. Grounds other than those assigned by the circuit court are urged by counsel for defendant in error as justifying the reversal of the judgment of the common pleas. We have considered the points presented, but are unable to agree that they afford sufficient ground for reversal. It follows that the judgment of the circuit court will be reversed, and that of the common pleas affirmed.

COUNTY OFFICERS-SPECIAL ACT. 1. County officers are not local officers, but are a part of the permanent organization of the government of the state, and the subject of compensation to county officers is not local in its nature, and an act of the general assembly upon that subject is a law of a general nature, which must operate uniformly throughout the state. Pearson v. Stephens, 46 N. E. 511, 56 Ohio St. 126, overruled.

2. The "act relating to the duties and compensation of certain county officers in Pickaway county," passed April 22, 1896 (92 Ohio Laws, p. 597), and the act amending sections 1, 2, and 5 thereof, passed March 29, 1898 (93 Ohio Laws, p. 507), are unconstitutional, being in conflict with the first clause of section 26, art. 2, of the constitution.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to circuit court, Pickaway county. Petition by the state, on the relation of W. D. Guilbert, auditor, for writ of mandamus

against Benjamin F. Yates, auditor of Pickaway county. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed.

A petition in mandamus was filed in the circuit court of Pickaway county, praying that a writ of mandamus may issue commanding the defendant, as auditor of Pickaway county, that he proceed according to law and collect for his fees, compensation, and salary those provided for under the following sections of the Revised Statutes, to wit: 1070-1078, 1365, 2775, 2774, 2785, 2888, 2908, 4903, 6909, 7382, 7387, and that he cease to draw from the treasury any salary, fees, or compensation or perquisites provided for in the act passed April 22, 1896 (92 Ohio Laws. p. 597), and the act passed March 29, 1898 (93 Ohio Laws, p. 507), and to treat such acts as nullities, and to observe the forms prescribed by the auditor of state, and to observe the instructions and constructions of the general statutes of the state named, and to report to the auditor of state by certified statement of the amount of fees and moneys received or due the county treasurer, recorder, sheriff, prosecuting attorney, probate judge, commissioners, and clerk of the court of common pleas, etc. The judgment of the circuit court was in favor of the defendant in error.

J. M. Sheets, Atty. Gen., J. P. Bradbury, and F. S. Monnett, for plaintiff in error. Irvin F. Snyder and Charles Gerhardt, for defendant in error.

DAVIS, J. (after stating the facts). These acts are undeniably special; and, to us at least, it seems almost as manifest that their subject-matter is of a general nature, and that neither of them contains the attributes of legitimate local legislation. They are special, because they are in terms restricted in their operation to Pickaway county. They are of a general nature, because the subject of legislation is a matter of general concern to the state, and to every county in the state, and to the inhabitants thereof. Kelley v. State, 6 Ohio St. 272. They are not legitimate local bills, because the subject-matter is not peculiar to the localities named, and it does not appear that there was any necessity for such legislation either in time, place, or circumstance. Having said this, we have said in substance all that needs to be said to dispose of this case, but in deference to the authority which is urged in support of the contention of the defendant in error we will be more explicit.

It should be premised that we do not feel bound by previous decisions of this court when they do not commend themselves to us by essential soundness; and this is especially so when constitutional limitations are involved. No amount of wrong adjudication can justify a practical abrogation of the constitution. We may well pause and consider carefully when we find our views to be in

There is abundant food for study for both lawyers and legislators in the statistics shown in this table; but we linger over it only long enough to remark that: (1) Already more than half the counties of Ohio have special laws regulating the compensation of county officers by salary, while the other half compensate by fees. (2) In the counties compensating by salary neither the officers provided for nor the salaries are uniform. (3) In many counties-for example Pickaway-some of the county officers are compensated by salary and others by fees. Whether the inequalities which appear here can be totally eradicated by general legislation we are not called upon to determine. Perhaps it might be accomplished, as suggested arguendo by Judge Ranney in Cricket v. State, by compensation graduated upon population, or perhaps by compensation graduated upon the income of the office, or again through the medium of a

formity in the rate of compensation,-that is, that the same compensation shall be paid for the same service. So that it would seem that the suggestion in the opinion in Pearson v. Stephens, 56 Ohio St. 131, 46 N. E. 513, that general legislation upon this subject would result in "as many different rules upon the subject as there are counties within the state," and that it would end in the evil which the provision against local legislation was designed to prevent, is unsound. How. ever, whether the discrimination against special or local legislation in the constitution is ineffective or not does not concern us in the present discussion. That is a problem to be worked out by the general assembly. We are satisfied at all events that the loose construction of the constitution in which this court has heretofore indulged is in part responsible for the abnormal condition of things shown above, and we feel disposed to dis

Surveyor.

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tinctly and finally repudiate it now. The case of Hart v. Murray, 48 Ohio St. 605, 29 N. E. 576, is merely an affirmation of the theory stated by Judge White in Cricket v. State and State v. Judges of Court of Common Pleas of First Judicial Dist., which we have already considered.

We come now to Pearson v. Stephens, 56 Ohio St. 126, 46 N. E. 511. Counsel for the defendant in error are at some pains to emphasize the inconsistency between the opinion of this court in that case and one of the arguments for plaintiff in error here, the opinion and argument being the production of the same person. We concede that the opinion in Pearson v. Stephens states the case for the defendant in error here as strongly as it may be put; but after full consideration we prefer the judgment of Philip in his latter condition. The brief of the eminent counsel makes it entirely clear-if, indeed, any comment was needed to make it clear-that in its final analysis the decision in Pearson v. Stephens rests altogether on the observation of White, J., in Cricket v. State. He also makes it clear that the court, as then constituted, entertained doubts concerning the question whether this was a subject which must be regulated by general law operating uniformly throughout the state, and that, therefore, the problem was resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the statute. A majority of the court considering this case entertain no such doubt, and, while freely admitting that the future may possibly develop conditions which may demonstrate that the conclusions now reached are erroneous, yet with all the light which we now have, we are constrained to, and do unhesitatingly, overrule the case of Pearson v. Stephens, because the doctrine therein declared that local legislation on the subject of the compensation of county officers is constitutional is exactly the opposite of our deliberately formed convictions.

The judgment of the circuit court is reversed.

1. The act "to_limit the compensation of county officers in Holmes county," passed April 26, 1898 (93 Ohio Laws, p. 660), is a law of a general nature, which does not operate uniformly throughout the state; and it is therefore in violation of Const. art. 2, § 26. State V. Yates, 64 N. E. 570, approved and followed. 2. An act of the general assembly not coming within the exceptions stated in Const. art. 2,826, which is passed to take effect and be in force when a majority of the voters at an election shall declare in favor of a salary law,

and, if a majority of the voters do not so declare, to be void, is passed to take effect upon the approval of authority other than the general assembly, and it is therefore unconstitutional and void.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to circuit court, Holmes county.

Petition by the state, on the relation of Theodore Allison, for writ of mandamus against William F. Garver and others, and action by the state on the relation of Theodore Allison to enjoin Morgan C. Mackey and others. The first-named case is a petition for a writ of mandamus against the defendants commanding them to perform the duties imposed upon them by law, namely, that the defendant Garver, as prosecuting attorney, shall examine and certify, and the defendant Tanneyhill, as probate judge, shall examine and approve, the itemized statement of account of the relator for per diem, mileage, and expenses, as the relator avers he is entitled to, and for all proper relief. The petition set out the act 93 Ohio Laws, p. 660, and alleged that it is in violation of this constitution (article 2, § 26). The second case named is an action in the name of the state, by Theodore Allison, as a citizen and taxpayer of Holmes county, to enjoin the defendants from receiving and paying money under an act entitled "An act to limit compensation for county officers in Holmes county," passed April 26, 1898 (93 Ohio Laws, p. 660). Both the court of common pleas and the circuit court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants in error. Reversed.

W. Stilwell, for plaintiff in error. Wm. F. Garver, for defendants in error.

DAVIS, J. The statute "to limit the compensation of county officers in Holmes county" (93 Ohio Laws, p. 660), which is drawn in question in these cases, is in conflict with the first clause of section 26, art. 2, of the constitution. For the reasons for our conclusion on this point we refer to State v. Yates, 64 N. E. 570, which reasons need not be repeated here. This act is unconstitutional also because it is conditioned to take effect only upon the result of an election by the people. Const. art. 2, § 26, cl. 2. Section 13 of the act provides for a vote upon the proposition, "For the county salary law. Against the county salary law," and then provides that, if a majority of the votes cast on said proposition shall be in favor of a salary law, the act "shall take effect and be in force" from and after a day named; otherwise that the act should be void. The act cannot take effect under Rev. St. § 77, because it contains a provision as to the time when it shall take effect and be in force, if at all. Hence the taking effect, as well as the enforcement of the statute, is made to depend on the approval of another authority than the general assembly, namely, the will of a majority of the electors. The entire legislative power of the state is vested in the general assembly (Const. art. 2, § 1), and even without the lim

itation contained in section 26, art. 2, it could not be delegated. It was held in Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Clinton Co. Com'rs, 1 Ohio St. 77, 87,-which was a case under the constitution of 1802,-that the power of the general assembly to pass laws could not be delegated by them to any other body or to the people, and this proposition is abundantly sustained by numerous authorities cited, in the brief of the plaintiff in error. The cases of State v. Perry Co. Com'rs, 5 Ohio St. 497, Noble v. Baker, 5 Ohio St. 524, Peck v. Weddell, 17 Ohio St. 271, and Newton v. Commissioners, 26 Ohio St. 618, were all cases in which it was required by the constitution (article 2, § 30) before the taking effect of the laws that they should be submitted to the electors of the counties to be affected thereby and adopted by a majority of the electors voting at such election. In each of those cases the question was whether some other thing than the voting was necessary before the law could "take effect," and the court held that the acts became laws when adopted by a majority of the electors of the county, but that the legislative intention was that the law should not be enforced until the condition precedent should be performed. In Trustees of Weaver v. Cherry, 8 Ohio St. 564, the court held that the vote which was required was a condition precedent to make an assessment to pay for the grounds which the trustees were authorized by the act to purchase. In Gordon v. State, 46 Ohio St. 607, 23 N. E. 63, 6 L. R. A. 749, the act in question provided that it should take effect and be in force from and after its passage, but the question was whether the local option provision contained in the act rendered it unconstitutional. The court held that the act "was a complete law when it had passed through the several stages of legislative enactment, and derived none of its validity from the vote of the people. In all its parts it is an expression of the will of the legislative department of the state." Our conclusion is that there is nothing either in principle or the decisions of this court contravening the view which we have expressed concerning the effect of section 13 of the act (93 Ohio Laws, p. 660). It affects the whole act, and the act is as if it never had been passed.

Judgment of the circuit court and of the court of common pleas reversed.

BURKET, SHAUCK, and PRICE, JJ., concur. SPEAR, J., concurs in the judgment of reversal and in the second proposition of the syllabus.

(66 Ohio St. 621)

SLINGLUFF et al. v. WEAVER et al. (Supreme Court of Ohio. June 26, 1902.) SUPREME COURT-JURISDICTION IN ERRORSTATUTES-CONSTRUCTION-REVIEWABLE JUDGMENTS.

1. The object of judicial investigation in the construction of a statute is to ascertain and

give effect to the intent of the lawmaking body which enacted it; and, where its provisions are ambiguous and its meaning doubtful, the history of legislation on the subject and the consequences of a literal interpretation of the language may be considered, punctuation may be changed or disregarded, words transposed, or those necessary to a clear understanding, and, as shown by the context, manifestly intended, inserted.

2. But the intent of the lawmakers is to be sought first of all in the language employed. and if the words be free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly, and distinctly the sense of the lawmaking body. there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. The question is not what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact. That body should be held to mean what it has plainly expressed, and hence no room is left for construction.

3. The language of the act of May 12, 1902, entitled "An act to amend sec. 6710 (as amended 93 Ohio Laws, p. 255) of the Revised Statutes," is plain and free from doubt; and effect must be given to its clear import, without regard to the consequences which may result. Its effect is to deprive this court of jurisdiction to review any case in error where the judgment of the lower court has been or may be rendered since the passage of the act, and not coming within its terms.

4. This court is without jurisdiction to review a judgment of the circuit court rendered June 6, 1902, in a cause in injunction commenced in the court of common pleas June 2, 1902.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to circuit court, Tuscarawas county. Action by Edward Slingluff and others against Clitus Weaver and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs bring error. Dismissed.

The action below was brought June 3, 1902, by plaintiffs in error, residents and taxpayers of the village of Dover, Tuscarawas county, to enjoin the mayor and council of said village from granting a franchise to certain persons for the use of an electric railway company, to build its track and operate an electric railway upon and over a certain bridge across the Tuscarawas river and the Ohio Canal in said village. A demurrer to the petition was sustained by the common pleas and the petition dismissed. The cause being appealed to the circuit court, that court, June 6, 1902, made a like holding and entered a like judgment. The proceeding in this court is to obtain a reversal. The motion now submitted by the defendants in error is to dismiss the cause and strike it from the docket upon the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to review the judgment of the circuit court.

Amos Ruff, Joseph H. Mitchell, Welty & Albaugh, and George B. Akey, for the motion. Wilkin & Wilkin, A. T. Brewer, Samuel Hambleton, W. B. Sanders, and C. T. Brooks, opposed.

SPEAR, J. (after stating the facts). The proposition of the counsel appearing for the motion is that by force of the act of May 12, 1902, amending section 6710 of the Revised