ment of this rule [6] is that the full name of the parties shall be stated." See, also, to the same effect, Garside v. Wolf, 135 Ind. 42, 34 N. E. 810; Gourley v. Embree, 137 Ind. 82, 36 N. E. 846; Hutts v. Martin, 141 Ind. 701, 41 N. E. 329; Association v. Olcott, 146 Ind. 176, 45 N. E. 64; McClure v. Coal Co., 147 Ind. 119, 46 N. E. 349; Barnett v. Manufacturing Co., 149 Ind. 606, 49 N. E. 160; Loucheim v. Seeley, 151 Ind. 665, 43 N. E. 646; Smith v. Fairfield, 157 Ind. 491, 61 N. E. 560; Elliott, App. Proc. §§ 186322; Ewbank, Ind. App. Proc. § 226. Section 5623, Burns' Rev. St. 1901, relating to drainage, provides that the petition shall be sufficient to give the court jurisdiction and power to fix liens if the lands are described as belonging to the persons who appear by the last tax duplicate to be the owners; and it was held by us in Goodrich v. Stangland, 155 Ind. 279, 58 N. E. 148, which was a drainage case, that, when the initials of the Christian names of certain appellees were given in the assignment of errors just as they were given by the persons themselves in their own pleadings in the case, it would not render the assignment sufficiently defective to entitle them to a dismissal of the appeal. But this is not a drainage case, and there is to be found nowhere in the statute under which this proceeding is had any warrant for a departure from the well-established rule; and as relates to Henry N. Gunn, O. A. House, and W. A. Rich, who appear as appellants and join in the assignment of errors, it is clear that we are not justified in assuming that they are the same persons as Henry N. Gwinn, Obed A. House, and William O. Rich, against whom the judg ment was rendered. The appeal should be dismissed. Appeal dismissed. (159 Ind. 566) MARTIN et al. v. BERRY. * (Supreme Court of Indiana. Oct. 16, 1902.) MECHANICS' LIENS ENFORCEMENT-LIMITATIONS-MORTGAGEES AS PARTIESJUDGMENT LIEN. 1. Under Burns' Rev. St. 1901, § 7259, providing that a person having a mechanic's lien may enforce it by suit within a year, and if it be not enforced within that time it shall be null and void, mortgagees, who are necessary parties, not having been made parties to the action to enforce the lien, may, the year for suit having expired, enjoin sale under the decree foreclosing the lien. 2. Plaintiff in a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien, though not making the mortgagee a party, so that such lien, after the year for enforcing it, is void against the mortgagee, obtains a lien on the mortgagor's equity of redemption through its personal judgment against him in the lien foreclosure suit. Appeal from circuit court, Huntington county; James C. Branyan, Judge. Action by William A. Berry against Mar ¶ 1. See Mechanics' Liens, vol. 34, Cent. Dig. § 439. *Rehearing denied. quis D. L. Martin and others. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants appeal. Transferred under the act of March 13, 1901. Affirmed. James M. Hatfield and John T. Alexander, for appellants. JORDAN, J. This action was instituted on January 28, 1899, by appellee to enjoin appellants Marquis D. L. and Elmer B. Martin, together with Alonzo A. Crandal, sheriff of Huntington county, Ind., from selling the north half of lot No. 62 in the city of Huntington, county aforesaid, under a decree foreclosing a lien created under the mechanic's lien law for material furnished. A trial resulted in appellants being perpetually enJoined from selling said premises under the said decree. To reverse this judgment, this appeal is prosecuted. The facts material to the cardinal question involved herein, as the same are disclosed by the complaint, and under the special finding, are, in substance, as follows: In February, 1878, Jacob Wintrode, the owner thereof, sold and conveyed lot No. 62 in the original plat of the city of Huntington to Elizabeth Hullibarger, Roxana Helser, and Mary E. Helser. Roxana and Mary E. Helser, under the provisions of the deed of conveyance, were invested with the fee simple of the said premises, and the said Elizabeth Hullibarger with the use thereof so long as she remained a widow. At the time of this conveyance by Wintrode, said grantees executed to him an indemnifying mortgage on the premises to save him harmless against any liability arising out of a certain mortgage. This latter mortgage was subsequently foreclosed, and Wintrode was compelled to pay the judgment rendered on the foreclosure proceedings, to the amount of $262. On April 11, 1878, Roxana and Mary E. Helser, together with Andrew W. Helser, husband of Roxana, mortgaged said lot to John Skiles to secure the payment of a note of $100. This note and mortgage were subsequently assigned for value to one B. M. Cobb. In the summer of 1885 Roxana and Mary E. Helser, the owners in fee of said lot, made improvements on a house situated on the north half thereof; and in making the same they purchased material to the amount of $103.69 from appellants Martin & Martin, and within 60 days after furnishing said material the latter filed a notice in the recorder's office of Huntington county, Ind., of their intention to hold a lien on the north half of said lot for the amount of material so furnished, and on November 5, 1886, five days before the expiration of the year allowed by law for foreclosing said lien, Martin & Martin instituted an action in the Huntington circuit court against Roxana Helser and her said husband, Andrew W. Helser, Elizabeth Hullibarger, and Mary E. Helser, who were the sole defendants in the action, to foreclose said lien, and on April 6, 1891, such proceedings were had therein that they recovered a personal judgment against Roxana and Mary E. Helser for $135.80, together with costs, and a decree of foreclosure as against all of the defendants except Mrs. Hullibarger, who had died after the commencement of the action, and before the rendition of the final decree. This judgment has not been satisfied. On April 4, 1892, appellee, being the holder of each of the aforesaid mortgages, by virtue of assignments, commenced an action in the Huntington circuit court to foreclose the mortgage liens; making Roxana Helser, together with her husband, and Mary E. Helser, defendants to said action. Martin & Martin were not made parties thereto. The Helsers appeared in court, and filed an answer admitting the averments of the complaint; and such proceedings were had therein as resulted, on the said 4th day of April, in appellee recovering a judgment for $974 against the Helsers, and a foreclosure of the mortgages against lot 62. On May 7, 1892, said premises under the latter foreclosure proceedings were sold at sheriff's sale to appellee for $900. Previous to April 4, 1892, the mortgaged premises had been sold for delinquent taxes; and appellee, by virtue of the tax certificates issued under the said sales, and assigned to him, procured the auditor of Huntington county to execute to him a tax deed for the lot in question, and at and prior to the commencement of this action he had taken possession thereof, and continued to hold the same. Before the beginning of this suit, appellants Martin & Martin procured a certified copy of the judgment and decree rendered in the action wherein their mechanic's lien had been foreclosed, and caused said copy to be delivered to their coappellant, Crandal, sheriff of said county; and he, as such sheriff, advertised the north half of said lot 62 to be sold at sheriff's sale under and by virtue of said decree to satisfy the judgment rendered in favor of Martin & Martin, and would have proceeded to sell the premises in controversy under said decree, had he not been prevented by the restraining order in this action. The court concluded, upon the facts found, that appellee was entitled to the injunction demanded, and rendered judgment accordingly. The question presented under the law applicable to the facts, is, was this judgment a correct result? Section 7259, Burns' Rev. St. 1901, relating to mechanics' and materialmen's liens, provides that any person having such lien may enforce the same within one year from the time the notice of the lien was filed for record, or, if a credit be given, within a like period from the expiration of such credit. If not enforced, or, in other words, if an action to foreclose the lien is not commenced, within the time prescribed by the statute, then in that event the law declares that the lien shall be null and void. A person holding a mortgage lien on the premises upon which there is a mechanic's lien must be made a party to the action to enforce the latter; otherwise his rights under his mortgage will not be affected 64 N.E.-58 by the judgment rendered therein. DemingColburn Lumber Co. v. Union Nat. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 151 Ind. 463, 51 N. E. 936; Stoermer v. Bank, 152 Ind. 104, 52 N. E. 606; Association v. Helberg, 152 Ind. 139, 51 N. E. 916. The facts disclose that the person or persons holding the mortgages under which appellee claims were not made parties by appellants Martin & Martin in their action to enforce their lien, nor were said appellants made parties by appellee to his foreclosure proceedings. Consequently, under the circumstances, neither of said parties was affected by the judgment rendered in the proceedings of the other. As the period of time prescribed for the enforcement of appellants' lien expired in November, 1886, such lien could not thereafter be enforced against any one, for, under the positive provisions of the statute, it was declared null and void. In Association v. Helberg, 152 Ind. 139, 51 N. E. 916, it was held that this provision of the statute declaring the lien under such circumstances to be null and void is available in favor of all interested persons against whom proceedings have not been instituted within the limited period. Under the law applicable to the facts, we are compelled to hold that appellants' attempt to procure a sale by the sheriff of the premises in dispute under and by virtue of the order of sale obtained in their proceedings foreclosing their lien against the owners only was illegal; hence the proposed sale was properly enjoined. As shown, appellants in their action foreclosing their lien recovered a personal judgment against Roxana and Mary E. Helser, the owners of the equity of redemption in and to the premises in controversy. This judgment itself created a lien on their equity of redemption, and, inasmuch as appellants were not parties to appellee's action to foreclose his mortgage, this judgment lien was not cut off or barred by the decree rendered therein. If appellants Martin & Martin at the commencement of the action herein had any enforceable right against appellee, it could be nothing more than the right to redeem the premises from the sale under and through which appellee claims to hold the realty, but in respect to this question we do not decide. See, however, Association v. Helberg, 152 Ind. 139, 51 N. E. 916, and cases cited; Holmes v. Bybee, 34 Ind. 262; Gaskell v. Viquesney, 122 Ind. 244, 23 N. E. 791, 17 Am. St. Rep. 364. In fact, counsel for appellee say: "Martin & Martin may bring a suit to redeem, but before they can maintain such a lien they must pay the claims represented by the mortgages of Wintrode and Skiles, and the $130 due for taxes, with interest at the rate the claims would legally draw to the date of redemption." Other rulings of the trial court are assailed as erroneous, but, even if this contention were true, the judgment of court, under the facts, is clearly right; hence such intervening errors, if any, may be dismissed as harmless. The judgment is affirmed. (159 Ind. 330) PITTSBURG, C., C. & ST. L. RY. CO. v. ING-BURDEN OF PROOF-EVIDENCE-RUL- 1. Plaintiff, seeking to enjoin the abatement of stockpens as a public nuisance, alleging that defendants had no authority to abate them, must, on the rule of clean hands, allege that they were not a public nuisance. 2. After plaintiff in a suit to enjoin abatement of stockpens as a nuisance had given all its evidence in chief, except that on the question of nuisance, its counsel stated to the court that he contended the burden of proof on the question of nuisance was on defendants, and that they contended it was on plaintiff, and he moved the court to rule the burden was on them. Held, that the contrary ruling furnished plaintiff no ground for exception, there being nothing before the court for decision. 3. Plaintiff in a suit to enjoin abatement of stockpens as a nuisance, alleging that they, as maintained and used, the manner of which was set out, were not a nuisance, and the answer being only a general denial, has the burden of proof on the question of nuisance. 4. Plaintiff in a suit to enjoin abatement of its stockpens as a nuisance may not prove the existence of hogpens in the immediate vicinity, and that they were kept in such a manner that stenches arose therefrom; it being no justification or excuse that others were maintaining similar nuisances, or that the nuisance was caused by plaintiff and others acting together or independently. 5. Plaintiff cannot come into equity to have abatement of its stockpens as a nuisance enjoined, they being shown to be a public nuisance, though defendants have no authority to abate them. Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county; T. B. Buskirk, Judge. Action by the Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company against the town of Crothersville and others. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. S. Stansifer and M. Z. Stannard, for appellant. J. A. Cox and C. H. Montgomery, for appellees. MONKS, J. It appears from the record that appellees, the town of Crothersville, its board of health and marshal, were taking steps and threatening to remove appellant's stockpens in said town, on the ground that bey were a public nuisance, and that this suit was brought to enjoin them from doing So. The complaint was in three paragraphs, the second and third of which were held by the court insufficient on demurrer for want of facts. Appellees filed a general denial to the first paragraph. The court heard the case, made a special finding of facts, stated conclusions of law thereon in favor of appellees, and rendered final judgment against appellant. It is first insisted by appellant that the court erred in sustaining appellee's demurrer to the second and third paragraphs of complaint. Appellant's second paragraph of complaint proceeded upon the theory that, as there was a vacancy in the board of trustees of the town of Crothersville, the acts of the remaining trustees, acting as a board of health, in declaring appellant's stockpens in said town, as maintained and used, a public nuisance, and in ordering the abatement of the same, were void, and that for this reason they could be enjoined from abating them, even if they were a public nuisance. The theory of the third paragraph was that there was no power delegated to the board of trustees of a town, as such, or as a board of health, to declare that said stockpens were a public nuisance, and order the abatement thereof, or, if delegated, that such a law was in violation of the constitution, and that therefore they could be enjoined, although the stockpens, as maintained and used, were a public nuisance. It was shown in each of said paragraphs that it was claimed by appellees that said stockpens, as maintained and used, were a public nuisance, and that the board of trustees of said town, claiming to act as a board of health, had so declared and ordered, and were threatening their removal for that reason. The rule is that one who comes into equity must come with clean hands, or, as sometimes expressed, "He that hath committed iniquity shall not have equity." Fet. Eq. pp. 37-40; Bisp. Eq. pp. 61– 63; 11 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) pp. 162, 163. To comply with this rule, in addition to the allegations in each of said paragraphs, facts showing that said stockpens, as maintained and used, were not a public nuisance, should have been averred. 10 Enc. Pl. & Prac. pp. 931, 932. With the facts already averred in said paragraphs, such allegations were necessary to show that appellant was not in fault; that it came with clean hands. One of the causes assigned by the appellant for a new trial was that the court erred in ruling that "the burden of proof was upon appellant to prove that the stockpens were not a public nuisance." It was alleged in the first paragraph of complaint upon which the trial was had, among other things, that the stockpens, as maintained and used by appellant, were not a public nuisance, and the manner in which the same were maintained and used was specifically set forth. A general denial was the only answer filed by appellees. After all of appellant's evidence in chief, except that in support of the allegation that the stockpens were not a public nuisance, had been given, counsel for appellant stated to the court that he claimed "that the burden of proof on the question of whether or not the stockpens were a public nuisance rested upon appellees, while appellees contended that it was upon appellant; and thereupon counsel for appellant moved the court to rule that the burden was upon the appellees, which motion the court overruled" on the ground that the burden of proof on the question of whether the stockpens were or were not a public nuisance was upon appellant, after which appellant introduced its evidence in chief in support of the allegation in the complaint that the stockpens were not a public nuisance. This ruling of the court furnished appellant no ground for an exception, for the reason that there was nothing before the court for decision. If counsel for appellant was correct in his contention that appellant's case was made out without any evidence in support of the allegation in the complaint that the stockpens were not a public nuisance, and that the same was a matter of defense, appellees could not have given any evidence to show that they were a public nuisance, because no such defense was pleaded. In such case it would seem that neither party was entitled to give any evidence on the question of nuisance. If, however, counsel for appellant was correct in his contention that the question of whether or not the stockpens were a public nuisance was an issue in the case, and the burden of proof as to such issue was on appellees, then he should have rested his case in chief without giving any evidence on that question; and, if appellees introduced any evidence on that issue, he should, after appellees had closed their evidence, have offered evidence to show that the same were not a public nuisance. If the court refused to admit such evidence on the ground that the burden as to that question was upon appellant, and that the same was necessary to make out appellant's case, and should have been given in chief, an exception to such ruling, and the assignment of the same as a cause for a new trial, would have saved the question. If this had been done, an assignment of error that the court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial would have presented the question in this court. By the procedure adopted, appellant's counsel obtained the opinion of the court on the question, after which he acted in conformity therewith, instead of adhering to his own theory. The ruling of the court was the mere expression of an opinion, which could properly have been refused, and was in reference to a question not then before the court for decision. It is the opinion of the court, however, that, under the issues joined in the cause, the burden was upon appellant to prove that the stockpens as used and maintained by it were not a public nuisance. During the progress of the trial the court refused to permit appellant to prove "the existence of hogpens in the immediate vicinity of the stockpens, and that they were kept in such a manner that stenches arose therefrom." There was no error in this ruling of the court. The fact that other persons were at the time maintaining similar nuisances in that vicinity, or that the nuisance was caused by appellant and others acting together or independently of each other, was not a matter of justification or excuse. The acts of several persons acting together or independently of each other may constitute a nuisance, though the injury occasioned by the acts of any one would not have amounted to a nuisance. Gillett, Cr. Law (2d Ed.) § 643; 21 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 690 (7), 719 (10); 28 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (1st Ed.) 970, 971, note 1; 1 Wood, Nuis. (3d Ed.) §§ 168, 169, 448, 449, 558, and notes; Paper Co. v. Pope, 155 Ind. 394, 402, 57 N. E. 719, 56 L. R. A. 899; Dennis v. State, 91 Ind. 291; City of Valparaiso v. Moffitt, 12 Ind. App. 250, 39 N. E. 909, 54 Am. St. Rep. 522; City of New Albany v. Slider, 21 Ind. App. 392, 395, 52 N. E. 626; Rex v. Trafford 1 Barn, & Adol. 874; Rex v. Neil, 2 Car. & P. 485, 12 E. C. L. 690; Thorpe v. Brumfitt, 8 Ch. App. 650; Blair v. Deakin, 57 Law Times (N. S.) 522; Crossley v. Lightowler, 2 Ch. App. 478; Hill v. Smith, 32 Cal. 166; Barrett v. Association, 159 Ill. 385, 42 N. E. 891, 31 L. R. A. 109, 50 Am. St. Rep. 168; Lockwood Co. v. Lawrence, 77 Me. 297, 52 Am. Rep. 763; Seely v. Alden, 61 Pa. 306, 100 Am. Dec. 642; Coal Co. v. Richards' Adm'r, 57 Pa. 142, 98 Am. Dec. 211; Chipman v. Palmer, 77 N. Y. 51, 33 Am. Rep. 566; Sullivan v. McManus, 19 App. Div. 167, 45 N. Y. Supp. 1079; Comminge v. Stevenson, 76 Tex. 642, 13 S. W. 556; Harley v. Brick Co., 83 Iowa, 73, 48 N. W. 1000; Euler v. Sullivan, 75 Md. 616, 23 Atl. 845, 32 Am. St. Rep. 420, 423; Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 73 Md. 268, 20 Atl. 900, 9 L. R. A. 737, 25 Am. Rep. 595; Hurlbut v. McKone, 55 Conn. 31, 10 Atl. 164, 3 Am. St. Rep. 17; Robinson v. Baugh, 31 Mich. 290; Meigs v. Lister, 23 N. J. Eq. 199; Iron Co. v. Barnes (Tenn. Sup.) 60 S. W. 593; Douglass v. State, 4 Wis. 387. It appears from the special finding: That, for more than 35 years prior to 1901, appellant and those under whom it claimed had maintained and kept stockpens near the railroad track on real estate now included within the corporate limits of the town of Crothersville, which town was incorporated in 1892. That said stockpens have been used by appellant and those under whom it claims for confining stock brought in by shippers for transportation over said railroad, and for loading and unloading said stock. At the time said pens were built, there were no residences near the same on the west, and only a few houses on the east. That since said pens were built, twelve dwelling houses and one church have been erected in the neighborhood of said pens. The affairs of said town of Crothers. ville were administered by a body of three trustees. On October 10, 1900, there were only two members of said board of trustees; and they, acting as the board of health of said town, duly passed a resolution declaring the maintenance of said stockpens by appellant to be a public nuisance, endangering the public health and life, and ordered and required appellant to abate and remove the same on or before December 1, 1900. A copy of said resolution was duly certified and served upon appellant. On November 23, 1900, the state board of health approved said resolution. At the time of the commencement of this ac tion, appellees were threatening to remove said pens on the ground that they were a public nuisance. The court stated its conclusions of law: (1) That "the maintenance of said stockpens by appellant, in the manner and under the circumstances, created and caused the continuance of a public nuisance; (2) that appellant could take nothing in this action." We have not stated the facts found as to the place, surroundings, and the manner in which the stockpens were kept by appellant; but it is sufficient to say that they clearly show that when this suit was commenced, and for three years or more prior to that time, the same were a public nuisance. Appellant insists (1) that the two trustees had no power to act as a board of trustees or board of health until they appointed a trustee to fill the vacancy, as required by section 4334, Burns' Rev. St. 1901 (section 3312, Rev. St. 1881), and that the act of the two trustees in adopting the resolution served upon appellant was void; (2) that "no power, either expressly or by fair implication, is delegated to the board of trustees of a town, as such, as a board of health, to declare as in the resolution, or, if delegated, is in violation of the federal constitution." The view we take of this case renders it unnecessary for us to determine either of these contentions of appellant. It is a well-settled maxim that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Here appellant, under the facts found, seeks the aid of equity to enjoin the appellees from abating a public nuisance maintained by it, on the ground that they have no right to abate it. To grant such relief to appellant, who is maintaining the public nuisance, would be contrary to the well-settled principles of equity. Fet. Eq. pp. 37-40; Bisp. Eq. (6th Ed.) pp. 61-63; 1 Spell. Inj. & Extr. Rem. § 26; 11 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) pp. 162, 163; Albertson v. Laughlin, 173 Pa. 525, 34 Atl. 216, 51 Am. St. Rep. 777; Unckles v. Colgate, 148 N. Y. 529, 43 N. E. 59; Cassady v. Cavenor, 37 Iowa, 300; Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 25 Fed. 1; Floral Co. v. Bradbury (C. C.) 89 Fed. 393; Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. O'Dell Commission Co. (C. C.) 115 Fed. 574. To grant appellant the relief prayed for under the facts found would be to aid it in maintaining a public nuisance,-a crime under the laws of this state. It follows that, even if appellant's contention that appellees had no authority to abate said public nuisance is correct,-a question we need not and do not decide,-the conclusions of law are not erroneous. Judgment affirmed. (159 Ind. 313) DEANE v. STATE. (Supreme Court of Indiana. Oct. 14, 1902.) APPEAL-MISDEMEANOR-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE. 1. Acts 1901, p. 565, § 7, denies the right of appeal in cases of misdemeanor which do not fall within any of the exceptions of section 8, which contains a provision that every case which contains a properly presented question for "the proper construction of a statute" shall be appealable to the supreme court. Burns' Rev. St. 1901, § 7283c, provides that, on a day when liquor selling is illegal, the permitting of any one not a member of the family within a room where liquor is sold "by virtue of a license" shall be a misdemeanor. An indictment charged that persons were so illegally permitted to be within a room where liquor was sold "by virtue of the laws of the state of Indiana." etc. A motion was made to quash the indictment, in that it did not charge that the room was one where liquor was sold "by virtue of a license." Held, that such motion did not present a question of a statutory construction, but, rather, of pleading, and that therefore an appeal seeking to have reviewed an order overruling the motion would be dismissed. Appeal from circuit court, White county; W. S. Bushnell, Special Judge. William Deane was convicted of allowing persons to come on a forbidden day within a room where liquor was sold, and he appeals. Appeal dismissed. Reynolds, Sills & Reynolds, for appellant. W. L. Taylor, Atty. Gen., Merrill Moores, and C. C. Hadley, for the State. JORDAN, J. Appellant was indicted for and convicted of violating the provisions of section 3 of the liquor law of 1895 (section 7283c, Burns' Rev. St. 1901), by permitting persons other than members of his family, on the 4th day of July, 1900, to enter his place of business, wherein he was engaged in the sale of intoxicating liquors to be used and drunk as a beverage. From the judg ment of conviction he has appealed directly to this court, and the only error assigned is that the lower court erred in overruling his motion to quash the indictment. As the crime of which appellant was convicted is only a misdemeanor, the right of appeal is denied, under section 7 of the act approved March 12, 1901 (Acts 1901, p. 565), unless the case can be said to fall within some of the exceptions embraced in section 8 of that act. Section 3 of the liquor law of 1895, commonly known as the "Nicholson Law," is as follows: "Any room where spirituous, vinous, malt or other intoxicating liquors are sold by virtue of a license under the laws of the state of Indiana, shall be so arranged that the same may be securely closed and locked, and admission thereto prevented, and the same shall be securely locked and all persons excluded therefrom on all days and hours upon which the sale of such liquors is prohibited by law. It is hereby made unlawful for the proprietor of such a place and the business herein contemplated of selling intoxicating liquors, to permit any person or persons other than himself and family to go into such room and place where intoxicating liquors are so sold upon such days and hours when the sale of such liquors is prohibited by law. The indictment under which the appellant was convicted, omitting the formal parts, reads |