SECTION IV.

The Constitution of the American States, compared with the Constitution of the American Bank.

THAT the Roman constitution was formed upon the most prudent principles, was fully, though indirectly, acknowledged by the American legislators, when forming a constitution for their Bank. That transaction therefore deserves particular notice.

THE same men, who were leaders in the convention which formed a constitution for the supreme government of America, in the year 1787, called the congress, were also leaders in congress in the year 1791, when a constitution was formed for a considerable number of individuals, who were to be engaged in a joint undertaking, called a bank. As there was to be twenty-five thousand shares of Bank Stock, and it was to be expected that there would be always many thousand proprietors, and a

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great majority of them very ignorant about the banking business; if the principles, therefore,

upon which these American legislators had formed the national constitution were just and prudent, it might have been expected, that the managers of the bank would have been allowed at least as great power over the property of the bank, as they had taken to themselves over the property of the nation.

By the national constitution the president of congress holds his office four years, the senators six years, and those members called re

presentatives two years.

dependent of the people

All of them are in

during these respect

ive periods. But by the constitution which was formed for the bank, the directors are not only elected annually, but they are liable to be superseded at any time by their constituents, and each director is liable individually, for every act which he has not protested against which the members of congress are not. Yet notwithstanding these different circumstances

in which these two sets of rulers were placed, which made it incomparably safer to trust the directors with power over the property of the bank, than to trust the congress with power over the property of the nation; yet the American legislators did not think it prudent to allow the directors of the bank any absolute power whatever.

THEY had taken full power to themselves to enact such laws, to lay on such taxes, and to create such offices, as they might think proper, without any concurrence of the people; yet they thought it prudent totally to restrain the directors of the bank from enacting any law whatever. The majority of the proprietors of bank stock, have the sole power of enacting laws. The directors are not allowed even a negative, and they are restrained by a particular clause from taking any salary, except what is given by the proprietors, although the sixth section of the first article of the national constitution begins thus: "The senators and repre

sentatives shall recive a compensation for their "services, to be ascertained by law, and paid "out of the treasury of the United States."

As the senators and representatives are the makers of the laws, it would have appeared more candid, if they had openly declared, that they were to take such wages as they themselves might from time to time think proper.

THIS is a power which none of these legislators would allow their own agents or servants; but as they had taken such a liberty with the purse of the nation, it is surprising that they were not ashamed to refuse the directors the same liberty with the purse of the bank. The difference between the powers which these legislators took to themselves over the property of the nation, and the powers which they thought necessary and prudent to trust to the directors over the property of the bank, forms a striking contrast, especially when it is kept in view, that there is sufficient power to com