In an action by an administrator upon a bill of
exchange, payable to the intestate, but
accepted after his death, it was held, that the
statute of limitations begins to run from the
time of granting the letters of administration,
and not from the time the bills became due,
there being no cause of action until there is
a party capable of suing.

An agent having money in his hands be-
longing to his principal, purchases with it a
bill of exchange, which he endorses specially
to his principal; the latter, at the time of the
endorsement, was dead, but that fact was not
known to the agent: Held, that the property
in the bill passed to the administrator of the
principal, and that he might, therefore, sue
upon the bill in that character: Held, also,
that the administrator was only entitled to
recover interest upon bills accepted after the
death of the testator from the time of demand
of payment made by the administrator, &c.,
not from the time the bills became due.

Where the declaration stated the drawing
of certain bills of exchange, and their ac-
ceptance after the death of the intestate, the
granting of the letters of administration to
the plaintiff, the defendants' liability, &c.;
and the defendants pleaded that the cause
of action did not accrue within six years,
to which the plaintiff replied generally,|

that it did accrue within six years: It was
held that the replication was good. Mur-
ray, Administrator, v. The East India Com-
204
pany, M. 2 G. 4,

ADVOWSON.

A bond was conditioned for the resignation of
a living, which the defendant, when requested,
had refused to resign: Held, that he being a
wrongdoer, the jury were not bound, in as-
sessing the damages, to confine themselves to
the diminution of the value of the advowson
to the plaintiff by the defendant's life-inter-
est; nor in estimating the annual proceeds,
to deduct the curate's stipend. Lord Sondes
835
v. Fletcher, T. 3 G. 4,

AMENDMENT.
See PRACTICE, 41.

ANNUITY.

1. By a public act the Waterloo Bridge Com-
pany were authorized to raise money for the
purpose of completing their undertaking,
either among themselves or by the admission
of new members, or by granting annuities
for a term of years or for life. The act did
not contain any provision that the annuities
should or should not be redeemable. The
Company however, in the original grant,
reserved to themselves a power of redemp-
tion Held, under these circumstances, that
an auctioneer putting up to sale one of these
annuities, was bound in his particulars of
sale to describe it as a redeemable annuity.
Coverley v. Burrell, M. 2 G. 4,

2.

257

By the 53 G. 3, c. 141, the memorial of an
annuity must contain the description and
place of residence of the witnesses to the
annuity deed.

A mere surety who charges with the pay-
ment of an annuity his estate in fee simple,
of which he was seised in possession at the

(525)

time of granting the annuity, and which was
of greater annual value than the annuity, is
a grantor within the meaning of the 13 G. 3,
c. 26, s. 8, and therefore in such a case no
memorial is required. Darwin v. Lincoln
and Another, H. 2 and 3 G. 4,
444
3. Under the 53 G. 3, c. 141, s. 2, it is requisite
that the memorial of an annuity should con-
tain the names and places of abode of the
witnesses to a warrant of attorney, given as
a collateral security; and, therefore, where
it was thus stated, A. B., clerk to J. S. of D.
Street, in the county of M., gent.: Held, that
this was not sufficient, it appearing that A.
B. did not reside, but only attended at the
office there at the time. Smith v. Pritchard,
E. 3 G. 4,
717

But see statute 3 Geo. 4, c. 92.
4. The condition of a bond recited that the ob-
ligor had cohabited with a woman for several
years, and had by her two children therein
named, and that she being desirous to put an
end to the connexion, had applied to the
obligor to make a provision for herself and
children, which he had agreed to do: and for
that purpose the obligor entered into the bond
in question, which was conditioned to pay to
the mother yearly, during the joint natural
lives of herself and two children, a certain
sum therein mentioned; the annuity to be
applied to the maintenance and education of
the children as well as of herself; or in case
of the death of the two children therein
specifically named, then the same annuity
was to be payable to her during her life.
One of the children died during the life-
time of the mother: Held, that the annuity
was payable to her during her life, at all
events. James and Wife v. Tallent, T. 3 G. 4,
889

APOTHECARIES.

By the 55 G. 3, c. 194, s. 14, it is enacted, "that.
from and after the first day of August, 1815,
it shall not be lawful for any person (except
persons already in practice as such) to prac-
tise as an apothecary, unless he takes out a
certificate, &c. By section 20, "if any per-
son (except such as are then actually prac-
tising as such) shall, after the said 1st day
of August, 1815, act or practise as an apo-
thecary without having obtained such certi-
ficate, every person so offending shall forfeit
207. Held, in an action for the penalty, that
it was not sufficient for the defendant, in order
to bring himself within the exception, to show
that previously to and on the 12th of July,
1815, (when the act received the royal assent,)
he was practising as an apothecary, but that
it was necessary to show that he was so
The
practising on the 1st of August, 1815.
Apothecaries' Company v. Roby, T. 3 G. 4,

APPEAL.

949

1. An order of removal was dated the 1st of
August, 1814, and an order of suspension
endorsed thereon, in consequence of the sick-
ness of the pauper; and a copy of such order
and endorsement was, in 1814, served upon
the appellants, but the original order not pro-

3.

4.

1.

2.

duced at the time of serving such copy: and
subsequently, in 1815, another part of the
order and endorsement, executed by the same
justices, but bearing date in August, 1814,
was served upon the appellants. The pauper
was not removed till 1819, when an appeal
was duly entered: Held, that the services of
the original order of removal in 1814 and
1815 were both defective, and that the appeal
was made in time, notwithstanding 49 G. 3,
c. 124, s. 2. Rex v. The Inhabitants of Aln
184
wick, M. 2 G. 4,
By a clause in an enclosure act, a commis
sioner was authorized to stop up any way,
provided it be done by the order, and with
the concurrence of two justices, and that
order was to be subject to an appeal in like
manner, and under such form and restrictions
as if the same had been originally made by
such justices. By a subsequent clause, any
party aggrieved was to be at liberty to appeal
at any time within six months after the cause
of complaint. Under this act the commis-
sioners, with the concurrence and order of
two justices, stopped up a road, without giving
the public notices required by the 55 G. 3, c.
68: Held, that a party aggrieved might,
under these circumstances, appeal at any time
within six month. Quere, whether it be
necessary to give such notices where roads
are stopped up under the provisions of an
enclosure act. Rex v. Townsend, H. 2 and 3
G. 4,

420

Where an order of removal has been exe-
cuted, and by consent of the removing parish
and the magistrates making it, it is super-
seded, and the paupers taken back, it is in
the discretion of the sessions to enter an ap-
peal against it or not, according as they may
think that justice requires it, in order to
compel the respondents to pay the costs of
maintenance, &c., incurred by the appellants
before the order was superseded. Rex y.
The Justices of Norfolk, H. 2 and 3 G. 4, 484
The 18 G. 3, c. 19, s. 5, gives an appeal only
in case the majority of overseers concur in
Rex v. Justices of Lancashire, E. 3 G. 4,

it.

APPEAL, (Notice of.)

755

ARBITRAMENT.

1. A submission to arbitration under 9 and 10
W. 3, c. 15, s. 1, may be made a rule of court
in vacation. In the Matter of Taylor, M. 2

217

G. 4,
2. Declaration stated that defendant covenanted
to obey, abide by, and perform an award,
and that he would not prevent the arbitrators
from making their award. It then stated
that the arbitrators made their award, and
thereby directed the defendant to pay a
certain sum therein mentioned; and alleged
as a breach of the covenant, that the defend-
ant did not pay the sum awarded. Plea,
that before the award, defendant, by deed,
revoked the authority of the arbitrators, of
which revocation they had notice: Held,
upon demurrer, that defendant was entitled
to judgment, although it appeared by the
plea that he had been guilty of a breach of the
covenant to abide by the award, by revoking
the authority of the arbitrators, the plaintiff
being entitled to recover damages only in
respect of the cause of action stated in his
declaration, and not in respect of a cause
of action disclosed in the plea.

The second count of the declaration stated
the deed of reference, and then averred that
defendant did, before the making of the
award, hinder and prevent the arbitrators
from making their award in this, that the
defendant, by a certain deed in writing,
signed and sealed to him, after reciting, as
was therein recited, did revoke the authority:
Held, upon demurrer, that this was an alle-
gation, not of the mere legal effect of the
deed, but of the fact of revocation; and that
it was unnecessary to state that the arbitra-
tors had notice of the revocation, that being
necessarily implied in the averment, that the
defendant had revoked the authority. Marsh,
Executor of Quinlan, v. Bulteel, H. 2 and 3
G. 4,
507
3. Where an action for breach of covenant was
pending, and, with all matters in difference,
was referred to arbitration, the costs of the
suit to abide the event: Held, that an award
that the plaintiff had no demand on the de-
fendant on account of any alleged breaches
of covenant, or on any other account what-
soever, was final, although the suit was not,
in terms, put an end to. Jackson v. Yabsley,
T. 3 G. 4,
848

ARREST.

1. Where, in the account between plaintiff and
defendant, there are items clearly due on
both sides, it is an arrest without reasonable
and probable cause within 43 G. 3. c. 46, s. 3,
if the plaintiff arrests and holds the defend-
ant to bail for the amount due to him, with-
out at the same time giving him credit for the
items clearly due on the other side of the
account. He ought only to hold the defend-
ant to bail for the admitted balance. Drone-
field v. Archer, H. 2 and 3 G. 4,

513

2. Where a defendant being previously in
custody in execution for a debt, a detainer
was lodged against him, but for too large a
sum, and on this being discovered in a few
hours, the plaintiff discontinued on payment

of costs, and before the payment of costs
lodged a fresh detainer. Held, that this
second detainer was regular, and that it
was not like the case of a fresh arrest which
cannot be made till the costs have been
paid. White v. Gompertz, T. T. 3 G. 4, 905

ASSIGNMENT.

1. Declaration stated, that in consideration that
plaintiff would assign to defendant a bill of
exchange, defendant undertook, &c., and
then averred that plaintiff did assign the
bill. It appeared that the parties had agreed
that the plaintiff should give up the bill to
the defendant, the latter, however, paying
over the proceeds of the bill to the plaintiff.
In pursuance of the agreement, the plaintiff
by deed assigned to the defendant, the bill
and all sums of money due thereon, to and
for the defendant's own use, and the defend-
ant covenanted to pay to the plaintiff a sum
equal to any money he should receive on
account of the bill: Held, that the declara-
tion imported, that the plaintiff had made an
absolute assignment of the bill; and conse-
quently, that the assignment in evidence
being only conditional, this was a fatal
variance. Vansandau v. Burt, M. 2 G. 4, 42
Where there were two assignments of the same
lease of premises within the county of Mid-
dlesex, and that executed last was registered
first: Held, that the deed last registered
must, in a court of law, be considered as
fraudulent and void, in consequence of 7 Ann.
c. 20, s. 1, although the party claiming under
the second assignment had full knowledge,
when it was executed, of the prior execution
of the first assignment. Doe dem. Robinson
v. Alsop, M. 2 G. 4,

2.

3.

142

Where an assignment of a lease by deed,
taken in execution, was made in the name
and under the seal of office of the sheriff, by
A. B., acting as under-sheriff: Held, that
such assignment was sufficiently proved,
without proving further the appointment of
A. B. as undersheriff, and that he had power
by deed to execute deeds in the name of the
sheriff. Doe dem. James v. Brown, M. 2 G. 4,
243

ASSUMPSIT.

See CARRIERS, 1, 2.

1. The giving up a suit, instituted to try a
question respecting which the law is doubt-
ful, is a good consideration for a promise to
pay a stipulated sum; and therefore, where a
ship having on board a pilot required by law,
ran foul of another vessel, and proceedings
were instituted by the owners of the latter to
compel the owners of the former to make good
the damage, and the former vessel was de-
tained until bail was given, and pending such
proceedings, the agents of the owners of the
the vessel detained, agreed, on the owners of
the damaged vessel renouncing all claims on
the other vessel, and on their proving the
amount of the damage done, to indemnify
them, and to pay a stipulated sum by way
of damages: Held, that there being con-
tradictory decisions as to the point whethe

the shipowners were liable for an injury done |
while their ship was under the control of the
pilot required by law, there was a sufficient
consideration to sustain the promise made by
the agents of the owners of the detained vessel
to pay the stipulated damages. Longridge
and Another v. Doreille and Another, M. 2 G.
4.
117

2. Assumpsit will lie upon a bill of exchange
against a trading corporation whose power
of drawing and accepting bills is recognised
by statute. Murray v. The East India Com-
204
pany, M. 2 G. 4,
3. A printer cannot recover for labour or ma-
terials used in printing any work, unless he
affixes his name to it, pursuant to the 39 G.
3, c. 79, 8. 27. Bensley v. Bignold, H. 2 and
3 G. 4,
335

ATTACHMENT.
See PRACTICE, 20.

ATTORNEY.

See PRACTICE, 9, 42.

1. Where an attorney, in order to get possession
of papers belonging to A. B., in the hands
of A. B.'s former attorney, who had a lien
upon them for the amount of his bill then in
dispute, undertook that A. B. should enter
into an unqualified reference, not revocable,
&c.: Held, that A. B. having become subse-
quently bankrupt for the second time, and
without paying 158. in the pound, the proof
of the debt under the commission was not an
election by the former attorney under 49 G.
3, c. 121, s. 14, so as to dispense with the
reference; and that the attorney was liable,
pursuant to his undertaking, to procure A.
B.'s signature to an agreement of reference,
and to find security for the performance of
the award to the satisfaction of the Master.
Ex parte Hughes, H. 2 and 3 G. 4,
2. A clerk to an attorney held, during the term
for which he was bound, the office of surveyor
of taxes under the crown: Held, that he
could not, within 22 G. 2, c. 46, s. 8 and 10,
be considered as serving his whole time and
term in the proper business of an attorney;
and that he ought not to be admitted on the
roll; and that having been admitted, he
ought to be struck off. Ex parte Taylor,
Gent. one, &c., H. 2 and 3 G. 4,

482

538

3. An attorney brought his action for his bill
of costs, and held the defendant to bail for a
larger sum than was afterwards found to be
due upon taxation, without having any
reasonable or probable cause for so doing:
Held, that this was a case within the 43 G.
3, c. 46, s. 3; and that if not within the
statute, still the Court, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction over its officers, would compel an
attorney to pay costs under such circum-
stances. Robinson v. Elsam, E. 3 G. 4, 661
4. Where a bailiff had written to an attorney
for writs, which the latter sent without know-
ing anything of the parties or circumstances,
but the bailiff never represented himself, or
had been considered as an attorney, nor
looked for any profit upon the law proceed-
ings: Held, that this was not a case within
the 22 G. 2, c. 46, s. 11; but that it was a

1. A., B., and C. entered into a bond to the
king, the condition of which was, that A., as
subdistributor of stamps, should well and
truly account for all stamped vellum which
he should receive, and should pay to the
commissioners the duties payable for such
stamped vellum; and also the price of such
vellum, together with all moneys which he
should receive on account of the duties on
personal legacies and stage-coaches. A., as
subdistributor, becomes indebted to the king
in a certain sum, and afterwards becomes
bankrupt, and obtains his certificate. A sci.
fa. having afterwards issued upon the bond,
B., one of the sureties, paid a sum of money
to compromise the suit, and a certain other
sum in defending the same: Held, in an
action brought by the surety to recover these
sums from the bankrupt, that A. was a person
"surety for, or liable for, a debt" of the
bankrupt, within the meaning of the 49 G. 3,
c. 121, s. 8, and consequently that the latter
was protected by his certificate: Held, also,
that the general plea of bankruptcy was well
pleaded. Westcott v. Hodges, M. 2 G. 4, 12
2. The owner of goods being indebted to a
factor in an amount exceeding their value,
consigned them to him for sale; the factor
being also similarly indebted to J. S., sold
the goods to him. The factor afterwards be-
came bankrupt; and on a settlement of
accounts between J. S. and the assignees, J.
S. allowed credit to them for the price of
goods, and he then proved the residue of his
claim against the estate: Held, that as the
factor had a lien on the whole price of the
goods, such settlement of accounts between
the vendee and his assignees, afforded a good
answer to an action against the vendee or
the price of the goods, brought either by or
on the account of the original owner. Hudson
v. Granger, M. 2 G. 4,
27

3. A., a foreign merchant, purchased in his
own name, but on account and with the
money of B., a British merchant, certain
bank shares in the French funds. The latter
drew bills upon A., which he accepted, on
the security of those shares standing in his
name; and these bills were assigned by B.,
for a valuable consideration, to C., a British
subject. Before they became due, B. autho-