with the faculty of writing and expressing their thoughts well, as others are with a genius for music, painting, or sculpture. Public affairs, either civil or military, require deep thought, profound discrimination, and the power of giving unwearied attention for a great length of time. Napoleon chose Cambaceres as second Consul, and Lebrun for the third. Cambaceres was of an honourable family in Languedoc, he was fifty years of age; he had been a member of the Convention, and had conducted himself with moderation; he was generally esteemed; his political career had not been dishonoured by any excess, and he had a just claim to the reputation which he enjoyed of being one of the ablest lawyers in the Republic. Lebrun was sixty years of age, he came from Normandy; he had been deputed to the Council of Ancients by the department of La Manche. He had been formerly employed in drawing up the decrees of the Chancellor Maupeon, and had distinguished himself by the purity and elegance of his style. He was one of the best writers in France, of inflexible integrity; and approved of the changes of the Revolution only in consideration of the advantages which resulted from them to the mass of the people, for his own family were all of the class of peasantry. The Constitution of the year VIII., so impatiently expected by all ranks of citizens, was published and submitted to the sanction of the people on the 13th of December, 1799, and proclaimed on the 24th of the same month: thus the Provisional Government lasted fortythree days. Napoleon's ideas were fixed; but the aid of time and events was necessary for their realization. The organization of the Consulate had produced nothing unfavourable to them: it taught unanimity, which was the first step. This point gained, Napoleon considered the forms and denominations of the several constituted bodies as wholly indifferent. He was a stranger to the Revolution: it was natural that the will of those men who had followed it through all its phases, should prevail in questions equally difficult and abstract. The wisest plan was to go on from day to day without deviating from one fixed point, the polar star by which Napoleon meant to guide the Revolution to the haven he desired. ULM. MOREAU. Defects of the plans of the campaigns of 1795, 1796, 1797Position of the French armies in 1800-Position of the Austrian armies-Plan of the First Consul-His dispositions-Opening of the campaign-Battle of EngenBattle of Moeskirch-Battle of Biberach-Manoeuvres and engagements round Ulm-Kray quits Ulm—Taking of Munich-Battle of Neuberg-Armistice of Pahrsdorf, July 15, 1800-Critical remarks. GERMANY. Defects of the Plans of the Campaigns of 1795, 1796, and 1797. THE French Republic had maintained three armies on the Rhine during the campaigns of 1795, 1796, and 1797. That called the Army of the North had its head-quarters at Amsterdam, and was composed of 20,000 Batavians, and as many French troops. By the treaties existing between the two Republics, that of Holland was to maintain a body of 25,000 French to protect the country. This army of from 40 to 45,000 men was to guard the coast of Holland, from the Scheldt to the Ems, and on the land side, the frontiers as far as opposite Wesel. The second army, or that of the Sambre and Meuse, had its head-quarters at Dusseldorf, and blockaded Mentz and Erenbriesten. The headquarters of the third, called the Army of the Rhine, were at Strasburg; it was supported on Switzerland, and blockaded Philipsburg. The army of the North was, in reality, only an army of observation, intended to awe the partisans of the house of Orange, and to oppose any attempt the English might make to land troops in Holland. The peace conIcluded at Basle with Prussia, and the houses of Hesse and Saxony, had established tranquillity throughout all the north of Germany. The army of the Sambre and Meuse, which was necessary as long as Prussia formed part of the coalition, became useless from the moment the French Republic had only to maintain war against Austria, and the southern part of Germany. In the campaign of 1796, this army, commanded by Jourdan, marched upon the Maine, took Wurtzburg, and took up a position on the Rednitz; its left supported on the entrance of Bohemia by Egra, whilst its right debouched in the Valley of the Danube. The army of the Rhine, commanded by Moreau, marched from Strasburg, crossed the Black Mountains and Wurtemberg, passed the Lech and entered Bavaria. Whilst these two armies of the Rhine and the Sambre and Meuse were manoeuvring under the command of two generals who acted independently of each other, the Austrian army opposed to them had united under the sole command of the Archduke Charles. Its forces being concentrated on the Danube at Ingoldstadt and Ratisbon, and being placed between the French armies, succeeded in preventing their forming a junction. The Archduke Charles defeated Bernadotte, who commanded the right of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, forced him to retreat towards Wurtzburg, and at length compelled him to repass the Rhine. The army of the Rhine remained spectators of this march of Prince Charles upon the army of the Sambre and Meuse; Moreau, when two late, ordered Desaix to pass over to the left bank of the Danube to the aid of Jourdan; this want of resolution in the general of the army of the Rhine soon obliged that army to retreat. It repassed the Rhine, and took up its first position on the left bank. Thus the Austrian army, which was very inferior to the two French armies, overthrew, without coming to any general engagement, all the plans formed |