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opinion that prevailed when it was written, respecting the issue of the siege, and of the difficulties that prevailed in Provence.

Dugommier determined that a decisive attack should be made upon Little Gibraltar: the Commandant of the artillery accordingly threw 7 or 8000 shells into the fort, while 30 twentyfour pounders battered the works.

On the 18th of December, at four in the afternoon, the troops left their camps, and marched towards the village of Seine: the plan was to attack at midnight, in order to avoid the fire of the fort and the intermediate redoubts. At the instant when every thing was ready, the Representatives of the People held a council to deliberate whether the attack should be put in execution or not: it is probable they either feared the issue of it, and were desirous to throw all the responsibility of the affair upon General Dugommier, or they were influenced by the opinion entertained by many officers, who conceived success impossible, chiefly on account of the dreadful weather; the rain was falling in

torrents.

Dugommier and the Commandant of artillery ridiculed these fears: two columns were formed, and marched against the enemy.

The Allied troops, to avoid the effect of the shells and balls, which showered upon the fort, were accustomed to occupy a station at a small distance in the rear of it. The French had great hopes of reaching the works before them; but the enemy had placed a line of skirmishers in front of the fort, and as the musquetry commenced firing at the very foot of the hill, the Allied troops hastened to the defence of the fort, whence a very brisk fire was immediately opened. Case-shot showered all around. At length, after a most furious attack, Dugommier, who according to his usual custom headed the leading column, was obliged to give way; and in the utmost despair he cried out "I am a lost man." Success was, indeed, in all respects important in those days, for the want of it usually conducted the unfortunate General to the scaffold.

The fire of the cannonading and musquetry continued. Captain Muiron of the artillery, a young man full of bravery and resources, and who was the adjoint of the Commandant of artillery, was detached with a battalion of light infantry, and supported by the second column, which followed them at the distance of a musquet-shot. He was perfectly acquainted with the position; and he availed himself so

well of the windings of the ascent, that he conducted his troops up the mountain without sustaining any loss. He debouched at the foot of the fort: he rushed through an embrasure: his soldiers followed him-and the fort was taken. The English and Spanish cannoneers were all killed at their guns, and Muiron himself was dangerously wounded by a thrust from the pike of an English soldier.

As soon as they were masters of the fort, the French immediately turned the cannon against the enemy.

By the time that Dugommier had been three hours in the redoubt, the Representatives of the People came with their drawn swords in their hands to load the troops which occupied it with eulogiums. [This positively contradicts the accounts of that time, which incorrectly state that the Representatives marched at the head of the columns.]

At break of day the French marched on Balagnier and l'Eguillette; the enemy had already evacuated those positions. The twenty-four pounders and the mortars were brought to line these batteries, whence they hoped to cannonade the combined fleets before nocn: but the Commandant of the artillery deemed it impossible to fix them there. They were

of stone, and the engineers who had constructed them had committed an error, in placing a large tower of masonry just at their entrance, so near the platforms that whatever balls might have struck them would have rebounded on the gunners, besides the splinters and rubbish. They therefore planted cannon on the heights behind the batteries. They could not open their fire until the next day; but no sooner did Lord Hood, the English Admiral, see that the French had possessed themselves of these positions, than he made signal to weigh anchor and get out of the roads.

He then went to Toulon to make it known that there was not a moment to be lost in getting out to sea directly. The weather was dark and cloudy, and every thing announced the approach of the Libeccio* wind, so terrible at this season. The council of the combined forces immediately met; and, after mature deliberation, they unanimously agreed that Toulon was no longer tenable. They accordingly proceeded to take measures as well for the embarkation of the troops, as for burning and sinking such French vessels as they could not

* Called also Lebeche; a south-west wind in the Medi

terranean.

carry away with them, and setting fire to the marine establishments: they likewise gave notice to all the inhabitants, that those who wished to leave the place might embark on board the English and Spanish fleets.

When these disastrous tidings were spread abroad, a scene of confusion took place which it would be difficult to describe; any more than the disorder and astonishment of the garrison, and of the unfortunate inhabitants, who, only a few hours before, calculating on the great distance of the besiegers from the place, the slow progress of the siege during four months, and the expected arrival of reinforcements, not only hoped to effect the raising of the siege, but even to become masters of Provence.

In the night, Fort Poné was blown up by the English, and an hour afterwards, a part of the French squadron was set on fire. Nine seventy-four-gun ships and four frigates or corvettes became a prey to the flames.

The fire and smoke from the Arsenal resembled the eruption of a volcano, and the thirteen vessels which were burning in the road were like so many magnificent displays of fireworks. The masts and forms of the vessels were distinctly marked by the blaze, which

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