res judicata is invoked in support of this contention. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to the extent insisted upon by plaintiffs in error. The issue that was determined by the decree of 1905 in respect to the $30,000 was that it belonged to plaintiffs in error-in other words, it was their money. That question was settled by the decree and their right and title to the money cannot again be called in question. The direction in the decree to pay it to them upon the confirmation of the report of sale was not the determination of any issue between the parties but a mere direction of the court, which would necessarily follow from the determination that they were entitled to the $30,000. If the court had made an order which in any way deprived the plaintiffs in error of the benefit of the $30,000 there would be some force in their contention, but we cannot lend our assent to the contention that a modification of the decree as to the disposition of the funds within the control and jurisdiction of the court, so long as such modification does not change the rights of the parties to the funds, is within the doctrine of res judicata. If by retaining this fund in the custody of the court the matter of adjusting the accounts between the parties can be facilitated and the controversy brought to a more speedy determination, plaintiffs in error have no just cause to complain so long as they are not deprived of their right to the funds. If, after the account is stated, the court should direct the master to pay out of said funds obligations resting upon plaintiffs in error by reason of their liability to pay a pro rata share of the losses sustained in this enterprise, such order would not deprive them of the full benefit of the funds. It was clearly within the power of the chancellor to retain this fund in the custody of the court until the rights of the parties were fully and finally adjudicated. Plaintiffs in error contend that they are not liable, as assignees of A. J. Cooper, upon his covenants in the origi nal contract. It is said, even though Cooper might have been liable for his pro rata share of the losses, that plaintiffs in error, as assignees, are not liable unless it be shown that they expressly assumed such obligations. Mariner and Underwood were parties to the former proceeding. This question might have been raised in that proceeding as a defense. Whether it was or not, the decree in that case is conclusive of that question. They are liable under that decree for a pro rata share of the losses. The decree of the circuit court and the judgment of the Appellate Court are affirmed. Judgment affirmed. THE ETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al. Appellees, vs. FRANKLIN M. HOPPIN et al. Appellants. Opinion filed June 21, 1912—Rehearing denied October 3, 1912. 1. EJECTMENT-practice in ejectment, when not altered by statute, is the same as at common law. The practice and procedure and all the incidents of the trial in an action of ejectment are the same as at common law when not altered by statute. 2. SAME-award of statutory new trial wipes out the verdict. The award of the statutory new trial in an ejectment wipes out the verdict so that no judgment can be rendered upon it, and when followed by a voluntary non-suit the whole action and all of its parts are annulled. 3. SAME the plaintiff may dismiss suit after judgment in his favor is reversed. Where a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in ejectment is reversed by the Supreme Court and the cause is remanded the plaintiff may dismiss the suit upon payment of costs, and the defendants cannot insist upon another trial even though the decision of the Supreme Court was upon the merits of the case. 4. SAME rules governing dismissal of actions in general apply to ejectment suits. Unless otherwise provided by statute, the rules governing the dismissal or discontinuance of actions in general, as well as the rules controlling the entry of a non-suit, apply to actions of ejectment. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Montgomery county; the Hon. THOMAS M. JETT, Judge, presiding. LANE & COOPER, for appellants. Oliver J. Bailey, William AbbOT, and JACK, Irwin, JACK & MILES, for appellees. Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court: This is a suit in ejectment brought in the circuit court of Montgomery county by appellees against appellants. On the first trial there was judgment against appellants. That judgment, on their motion, was set aside under the statute, the costs being paid, and a new trial had, which resulted again in a judgment against the appellants. On appeal this court held (249 Ill. 406,) that as appellees based their claim of title on an execution sale of a contingent remainder, and as such remainder is not subject to a sale on execution, they had no title in the real estate. Said judgment was therefore reversed and the cause remanded. After the remanding order had been filed in the trial court and proper notice served, appellees moved to dismiss the suit and appellants moved to set the cause down for hearing so that a proper judgment might be entered in conformity with the decision of this court. Appellants' motion was denied and that of appellees allowed and the suit dismissed at their costs. Appellants objected and excepted to this order and prayed this appeal. It has been held that the practice and procedure and all the incidents of the trial in an action of ejectment are the same as at common law when not altered by statute. (Williams v. Brunton, 3 Gilm. 600.) The statute on ejectment also provides that "the rules of pleading and practice in other actions shall apply to actions of ejectment, so far as they are applicable and except as is otherwise provided." (Hurd's Stat. 1911, chap. 45, sec. 10, p. 968.) The award of a statutory new trial in an ejectment suit wipes out the verdict so no judgment can be rendered upon it, and it is not a bar to another action. When followed by a volun tary non-suit the whole action and all its parts are annulled. Edwards v. Edwards, 22 Ill. 121; Sheldon v. Van Vleck, 106 id. 45; Preachers' Aid Society v. England, 106 id. 125. Counsel for appellants contend that the merits of this case were passed upon when it was here before; that therefore the trial court could only proceed in conformity with the views expressed in the former opinion of this court; that the suit could not be dismissed on the motion of appellees. They cite as supporting this contention, Wadhams v. Gay, 83 Ill. 250, In re Estate of Maher, 210 id. 160, Noble v. Tipton, 222 id. 639, Prentice v. Crane, 240 id. 250, People v. Waite, 243 id. 156, and other cases. An examination of these decisions will show that they were in chancery or under special statutes, where the parties were not entitled of right to a jury trial. In Crumbaugh v. Owen, 232 Ill. 191, we held that the rule laid down in those decisions did not apply when the parties were entitled to a jury trial. In Rigdon v. More, 242 Ill. 256, we had before us the effect of a remanding order in a suit at law. After a review of numerous authorities, including many cited here, we held that in those cases, where the parties were entitled, as a matter of right, to a jury trial and the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for errors intervening prior to the entry of the judgment, the parties were entitled to a trial de novo. Unless otherwise provided by statute, the rules governing the dismissal or discontinuance of actions in general, as well as the rules controlling the entering of a non-suit, apply to the action of ejectment. (15 Cyc. 164, and cases cited.) A plaintiff in a legal proceeding is entitled to control the disposition of his cause when he acts seasonably and upon the payment of costs. (6 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 833; 14 Cyc. 397.) At common law At common law a plaintiff could take non-suit at any time before verdict was rendered, in open court. (Berry v. Savage, 2 Scam. 261.) Under sec tion 70 of the present Practice act this common law rule has been modified so that non-suit is barred unless entered before the jury has retired from the bar, "or, if the case is tried before the court without a jury, before the case is submitted for final decision." In legal effect non-suits, dismissals and discontinuances closely resemble each other. (6 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 829.)* Under the Illinois statutes and our practice, the ejectment statute being silent on the question, (the parties being entitled, as a matter of right, to a jury trial,) the court rightly permitted the dismissal of the suit at appellees' costs. The judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. LILLIE B. MOONEY, Appellant, vs. CHARLES A. VALENTYNOVICZ, Appellee. Opinion filed June 21, 1912—Rehearing denied October 3, 1912. I. JUDGMENTS AND DECREES-court cannot set aside final decree at a subsequent term. A decree registering title after a full hearing of the cause is a final decree, and after the adjournment of the term the court loses jurisdiction of the cause, and has no power, at a subsequent term, to vacate or set aside the decree except as to matters of form or for clerical errors or misprisions of the clerk in writing up the decree. 2. SAME when decree registering title is not without jurisdiction. Where a petition to register title avers that the petitioner owns the premises in fee and the defendant admits, in writing, the averments of the petition, the court has jurisdiction to determine the question of title, and if it finds the averments of the petition are true and decrees that the title in fee be registered in the petitioner the decree is binding though erroneous, and it can not be set aside at a subsequent term on a cross-petition by the defendant. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. ADELOR J. PETIT, Judge, presiding. |