The certificate was on a printed form, in which the amounts were inserted by the architect, and the written. parts appear in the foregoing copy in italics. There were check-marks in ink (not shown on the copy) in the blank spaces opposite the words "Extra work, $... " "Deduction, $......" and "Balance, $...... These checkmarks are such as are usually made in checking over invoices or lists of articles. The plaintiff offered no other evidence, and the defendant offered to prove that the architect decided that there was a deduction from the balance remaining unpaid on the contract price for forty-eight days' delay at $25 per day. The offer was objected to and the objection sustained, and there was no further evidence in The defendant tendered to the plaintiff $11.50,

the case.

which was refused. findings of law:

The court then made the following

"The court finds that the architect's certificate put in evidence is, under the contract, binding and conclusive; that said certificate entitled the contractor, R. W. Weld & Co., to a final payment of $1211.50, with interest at five per cent from its date; that the notation following under 'Remarks' does not govern as to the amount shown to be due, and that parol evidence is not admissible as to the meaning of the certificate or the amount due."

The defendant moved for a new trial, and, the motion being denied, entered a motion in arrest of judgment, which was also denied and judgment was entered.

The construction of the contract and certificate was for the court as a matter of law. The court construed the certificate as certifying that the plaintiff was entitled to a final payment of $1211.50 at its date, and the statement therein that the contractor was forty-eight days beyond the time specified for finishing the work under his contract, for which the contract provided a penalty of $25 per day, as having no effect or not governing as to the amount shown to be due by the certificate. The Appellate Court

1

took the view that the architect had no authority to certify as to any delay in the completion of the contract because he had not been given any authority to certify in relation to that question. The certificate was on a blank form, on which spaces were provided for the contract price, the amount of former certificates and the present certificate, equaling the total contract price. Amounts were set down showing that the final payment of the contract price would amount to $1211.50, but the architect certified that the contractor was forty-eight days beyond the time specified for finishing the work, under which the contract provided a penalty of $25 per day. The certificate was certainly intended to state the balance of the contract price and the deduction to which the defendant was entitled under the contract, and it should be taken as a whole. In our opinion the construction given to it by the trial court was er

roneous.

We are also of the opinion that the Appellate Court erred in the conclusion that the length of the delay for which the defendant was entitled to a deduction was a matter concerning which the architect had no authority. The contract was that there should be a deduction of $25 a day for liquidated damages for failure to complete the work by December 1, 1906, but that if the delay was occasioned by the neglect or default of the owner, or any of the other causes mentioned, the time fixed for the completion of the work should be extended for a period equivalent to the time lost by reason of any or all of said causes, which extended period should be determined and fixed by the architect. By the terms of the contract the architect was authorized to determine what period of delay was chargeable to the plaintiff for which a deduction should be made. The trial court did not err in rejecting the offer of the defendant to prove what the architect had decided, since the certificate showed what his decision was. The parties having agreed that the architect should decide cer

tain questions, his certificate concerning matters referred to his decision was admissible in evidence, and his certificate that there was an amount due was a condition precedent to the right to demand payment and could only be attacked for fraud or mistake. Hennessy v. Metzger, 152 Ill. 505.

It is urged that inasmuch as the defendant did not submit propositions of law to the trial court embodying its theory applicable to the facts of the case there is no question open to review in this court. The defendant introduced no evidence and there was no controverted question of fact to be settled by the decision of the Appellate Court. The construction of the written instruments, which were the only evidence in the case, was a matter of law for the trial court, and that court made findings as above stated. It would have served no purpose for the defendant to have presented a proposition of law as to the construction of the contract and certificate in addition to the findings of the court respecting them. The only questions in the case are questions of law, and the decision of the trial court respecting them is shown by the record.

After the judgment was rendered the defendant moved to vacate it on the ground that if the construction given to the certificate by the court was correct there had been a mistake of the architect and that a new certificate had been issued for the sum of $11.50. The motion was supported by the affidavit of the architect that his decision was that there was due plaintiff but $11.50 and that he had made a new certificate and tendered the same to plaintiff for that sum. The motion was denied, but there is no occasion to consider the ruling, because we have held the construction given to the certificate by the trial court was wrong.

The judgments of the Appellate Court and municipal court are reversed and the cause is remanded to the municipal court. Reversed and remanded.

WILLIAM L. O'CONNELL, County Treasurer, vs. THEODORE S. SANFORD et al. Appellees.-(JACOB GLOS et al. Appellants.)

Opinion filed June 21, 1912.

TAX DEEDS-holder of an invalid tax deed is not entitled to reimbursement out of condemnation money. The holder of an invalid tax deed is not entitled to reimbursement for the amount of money paid for the tax title and subsequent taxes, out of the compensation awarded in a condemnation proceeding in which the entire property is taken for public use. (City of Chicago v. Pick, 251 Ill. 594, adhered to.)

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. LOCKWOOD HONORE, Judge, presiding.

JOHN R. O'CONNOR, for appellants.

George Gillette, (George W. HESS, of counsel,) for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE VICKERS delivered the opinion of the court: This is a controversy between the owners of the fee title to certain property and the holders of irregular and invalid tax titles on the same property as to the distribution of the damages awarded as compensation for the taking of the premises in a condemnation proceeding. The South Park Commissioners filed a petition in the circuit court of Cook county in 1905 against the People's Gas Light and Coke Company, praying that certain lands therein described be set apart for park purposes and that the fair and just compensation to be paid for the same be ascertained. Lots 1 to 16, inclusive, in block 7, Section 4 addition to Chicago, were described in the petition. A jury was empaneled and after a hearing returned a verdict awarding to the owners and parties interested in said lots 1 to 16 $10,800, upon which the court rendered judgment, and entered a decree that upon the payment of such sum to the

owners and parties interested in the said land, or to the county treasurer for their use, the South Park Commissioners should have the right to enter and take possession of the premises. On August 4, 1905, the said sum of $10,800 was paid to the county treasurer of Cook county by the park commissioners. Of this sum $625 was paid to the owner of lot 4, leaving $10,175 in the hands of the county treasurer. All of the foregoing facts were brought before the court by the county treasurer by a bill of interpleader. The bill alleged that Theodore S. Sanford, Frederick F. Sanford and Marcia Sanford Critz claimed to be the owners in fee of each of said lots except lot 4, and that certain other parties, to-wit, Catherine S. Fay, Thomas Fay, her husband, Adam S. Glos, Jacob Glos, Emma J. Glos, August A. Timke, trustee, A. A. Timke, D. Arnold, and others, claimed to be the owners of certain rights and interests in said lots except lot 4. The bill made all of the above mentioned persons defendants and prayed that they be required to interplead and adjust their demands among themselves. Jacob Glos filed an answer, claiming that he and Emma J. Glos were the owners of the premises and that he derived his title by means of certain tax sales and tax deeds. His answer stated that if the court should find his title was void for any reason, he should be reimbursed the amount expended at the tax sales and for the payment of subsequent taxes on said premises. The legal question involved in this case is sufficiently presented by the answer of Jacob Glos. The answers of other defendants need not be stated. The court found all the tax titles to be invalid. and decreed that the whole of the condemnation money be paid to the owners of the fee simple title.

The findings of the court as to the invalidity of the tax titles is not controverted. The only question presented for determination is whether the holder of an invalid tax title is entitled to reimbursement for the amount of money paid for the tax title and subsequent taxes, out of com