pensation awarded in a condemnation proceeding in which the entire property is condemned and taken for a public purpose. Appellants contend that to deny them reimbursement for the money paid for tax titles is a taking of their property without due process of law.

The precise question involved in this case was fully considered and decided by this court in City of Chicago v. Pick, 251 Ill. 594, and in disposing of that question this court, on page 599, said: "The tax deeds being invalid, is the holder thereof entitled, in a condemnation proceeding, to reimbursement, out of the compensation awarded, for the money expended in procuring such tax deeds and for the taxes subsequently paid? This question, we think, must be answered in the negative. The proviso to section 224 of the Revenue law (Hurd's Stat. 1908, chap. 120, p. 1788,) provides that when any judgment or decree of court setting aside any tax deed procured under that act is entered, the decree shall provide that the claimant shall pay to the party holding such tax deed all taxes and legal costs, together with all penalties provided by law, to which the holder of such deed shall be entitled, before the claimant shall have the benefit of such judgment or decree. There are many cases in this court where tax deeds have been set aside at the instance of the owner upon the terms imposed by the statute, but these cases are suits commenced in equity by the holder of the paramount title for the purpose of removing the tax title as a cloud upon the owner's title, and by applying the equitable maxim that 'he who seeks equity must do equity,' and in compliance with the proviso above referred to from section 224 of the Revenue law, this court has never hesitated to require, as a condition of relief, reimbursement to the holder of such defective tax title. The rule applied in that class of cases does not, in our opinion, extend to cases like the one at bar, for the reason that the condemnation proceeding was not instituted by the owner of the land but was commenced.

against him without his consent, for the purpose of condemning his land for a public use. The holder of an invalid tax title is only entitled to reimbursement when his tax title is attacked and set aside in a proceeding brought for that purpose by the owner of the land. (Miller v. Cook, 135 Ill. 190; Riverside Co. v. Townshend, 120 id. 9; Gage v. Eddy, 186 id. 432.) The appellants are not brought within either the language of the statute or the equitable principle which it declares."

Appellants concede in their brief that the question involved in the case at bar was determined adversely to their contention in the case above cited. On page 19 of their brief they say: "In discussing the question as to who is entitled to the award in a condemnation proceeding, or to any part thereof, we are confronted with the decision of this court in the case of City of Chicago v. Charles Pick et al. 251 Ill. 594, which would appear to be decisive of the question whether or not the holder of a tax title is entitled to reimbursement or compensation in a condemnation proceeding." Appellants then present an argument intended to show that the conclusion of the court in the Pick case is unsound, and ask, in view of their argument, that the grounds of the decision in the Pick case be carefully re-examined. We have carefully considered appellants' argument but our confidence in the views expressed in the Pick case is not shaken thereby. The case at bar cannot be distinguished from the Pick case, and we could not reverse the decree below without overruling that case, which we see no reason for doing.

The decree of the circuit court of Cook county is affirmed. Decree affirmed.

CATHERINE BOHLEBER et al. Appellants, vs. JOSEPH REBSTOCK et al. Appellees.

Opinion filed June 21, 1912.

Under

WILLS-mere intention to revoke will is not sufficient. section 17 of the Wills act, providing what acts shall constitute the revocation of a will, and that no spoken words, unaccompanied by any of the acts specified, shall be sufficient, a court of equity is not authorized to declare a will revoked upon proof of the testator's mere intention and desire to revoke it, even though such intention and desire were frustrated by beneficiaries of the will.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of White county; the Hon. W. H. GREEN, Judge, presiding.

JOE A. PEARCE, and Roy E. PEARCE, for appellants: If a revocation is accomplished through fraud or other outward undue control the revocation is ineffective. Voorhis v. Voorhis, 50 Barb. 119; 73 Me. 595; 68 Md. 203. The testator may, during his life, revoke a devise or abrogate it by conveyance. Lynn v. Lynn, 135 Ill. 18.

Intention to revoke one's will will have that effect if the testator is led to believe he has destroyed his will. I Redfield on Wills, (3d ed.) chap. 7, sec. 31; Pryor v. Coggin, 17 Ga. 444; White v. Carter, I Jones' L. 197.

Intention to revoke one's will, until carried into effect. as provided by statute, can have no effect; but if such intention is defeated by fraud, the party moving cannot benefit therefrom. Blanchard v. Blanchard, 32 Vt. 62.

Conger, Pearce & Conger, for appellees:

The mere wishes and declarations of a testator can never effect a revocation. Page on Wills, sec. 244.

An unexecuted intent to revoke, no matter how clearly expressed, is insufficient unless accompanied by one of the acts of destruction prescribed by the local statute, even though the attempt was frustrated by the improper conduct

of a third person, for, the legislature having pointed out certain modes by which a will may be revoked, it is not within the power of the judiciary to dispense with any of the prescribed requirements and accept the intention to perform the prescribed act as equivalent to the act itself. Reynolds v. Adams, 90 Ill. 134; Dickie v. Carter, 42 id. 376; 29 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, (1st ed.) 270, 271; Jarman on Wills, (4th ed.) 162; Page on Wills, secs. 130, 255; Blanchard v. Blanchard, 32 Vt. 62; Clingan v. Mitcheltree, 31 Pa. St. 25; Mundy v. Mundy, 15 N. J. Eq. 290; Doe v. Harris, 6 Ad. & Ell. 209; Gains v. Gains, 2 A. K. Marsh. 190; Boyd v. Cook, 3 Leigh, 32; Malone v. Hobbs, I Rob. 346; Delafield v. Parrish, 25 N. Y. 9; Hise v. Fincher, 10 Ired. 139; Kent v. Mahaffey, 10 Ohio St. 204; 47 Minn. 171; II Ind. 95; 3 Strobh, 44; 113 Ky. 102.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court:

This suit was begun by appellants by bill in chancery filed in the circuit court of White county. The bill alleged complainants were children of John Rebstock, who died in White county, Illinois, November 13, 1910, leaving as his children and only heirs-at-law the complainants and all the persons named as defendants to the bill except Jacob Fechtig, who was a step-son; that on November 19, 1902, said John Rebstock executed an instrument in writing purporting to be his last will and testament, and in December, 1906, he executed a codicil to said will. Copies of the will and codicil were made exhibits to the bill. By the original will the testator made substantial bequests of land to the five children who are made defendants to the bill. He also gave to the two daughters made defendants, Amelia and Margaret, all his household and kitchen furniture, and bequeathed to Jacob Fechtig, the step-son, $200 in money. To the complainant Elizabeth Kirchoff he gave $Coo, which was to be paid to her by defendant Joseph Rebstock and was made a charge against the land devised to him by the

testator. He gave the complainant Catherine Bohleber $100 by the original will and $100 additional by the codicil. The will states that the reasons of the testator for making the bequests in the amounts named to complainants were that he had previously made advancements to them out of his estate. By the original will he also gave his son William Rebstock the sum of $500, but this bequest was canceled and annulled by the codicil. By the original will, in addition to the land devised his son Edward Rebstock, he gave him the sum of $500 in money. The will then provided that if anything was left after the devises and bequests were satisfied it should be equally divided among all the testator's children. The son Edward, and the step-son, Jacob Fechtig, were named executors of the will. After the death of the testator the will was admitted to probate and letters testamentary issued to the persons therein named as executors. The bill alleges that before the death of the testator he desired to change or revoke said will and codicil; that said instruments were in the city of Carmi, Illinois, and the testator resided on his farm five miles from said city; that for more than two months before his death he was so feeble as to be unable to leave his house and most of the time was confined to his bed; that the son William Rebstock lived with his father, and Joseph Rebstock lived near him and was during the last illness of the testator at his home the greater part of the time; that during this period of confinement of the testator he requested and entreated his sons William and Joseph to have a lawyer brought to his house so that he might change or revoke his will and codicil, but that said William and Joseph Rebstock refused to comply with this request and threatened violence to anyone who would bring a lawyer to their father or in any manner render assistance to him in changing or revoking his will and codicil, thereby defeating his intention to revoke or change said instruments. The bill prays that said will and codicil and the probate thereof be