JAMES H. HOOPER, Appellant, vs. THE BANK OF Two RIVERS, Appellee. Opinion filed October 26, 1912. 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Section 62 of the Municipal Court act is not unconstitutional. Section 62 of the Municipal Court act, which authorizes the chief justice of the municipal court to prepare abbreviated forms in which judgments of that court may be entered, is not invalid. (Stein v. Meyers, 253 Ill. 199, followed.) 2. JUDGMENTS And decrees-invalid judgment does not create a lien against land. An alleged judgment of the municipal court of Chicago entered in unintelligible abbreviations of words is not sufficient to create a lien upon real estate, even though execution is issued thereon and part of the amount due is paid. 3. SAME when alleged judgment lien may be removed as cloud without showing it was unjust. If a judgment is invalid and insufficient to create a lien against land at the time the judgment debtor was declared a bankrupt and at the time the land was sold by the trustee in bankruptcy, the purchaser from the trustee is entitled to have the alleged judgment lien removed as a cloud upon his title without showing that the judgment was unjust and without paying the same, as he has a right to rely upon the records and purchase accordingly. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. CHARLES A. McDONALD, Judge, presiding. JAMES H. HOOPER, pro se. MUSGRAVE, OPPENHEIM & LEE, for appellee. Mr. JUSTICE HAND delivered the opinion of the court: This was a bill in chancery filed by the appellant in the superior court of Cook county, against the appellee, to remove a judgment lien as a cloud upon the title to certain real estate owned by the appellant, situated in the city of Chicago. A demurrer was interposed to the bill and sustained and the bill was dismissed for the want of equity, and an appeal has been prosecuted to this court. The facts disclosed by the record are as follows: On July 10, 1907, appellee recovered a judgment in the municipal court of Chicago against Frederick J. Norton and Henry Rennick for $2193.07, which was written up by the clerk of the municipal court in abbreviated form, as follows: "The Bank of Two Rivers (a corp.) VS. Frederick J. Norton and Henry Rennick. No. 466. First Class, Asspt. $2500. Date. Judge. July 2, 1907 July 10, 1907 Brugge Orders entered. On July 6, 1908, an execution was issued on said judg ment, on which was paid $1400.50. On September 14, 1909, Norton was declared a bankrupt and a trustee was appointed of his estate. At the time the judgment was rendered and at the time he became a bankrupt Norton was the owner of the premises in question. Subsequent to the bankruptcy of Norton the appellant purchased said premises from his trustee and took possession thereof, and thereupon the appellee threatened to sell the same upon execution in satisfaction of said judgment, whereupon this bill was filed. It is first contended that section 62 of the Municipal Court act, which authorizes the chief justice of the municipal court to prepare abbreviated forms in which the judgments of that court may be entered and in which the judg ment here involved was entered, is unconstitutional and void. This court, since this cause has been pending, has determined the validity of that section, (Stein v. Meyers, 253 Ill. 199; City of Chicago v. Coleman, 254 id. 338;) and that question need not be here considered. It is next contended that the judgment entered in the case of Bank of Two Rivers v. Norton et al. by the municipal court was invalid and did not create a lien upon said premises, and that the same should be set aside as a cloud upon said premises. In Stein v. Meyers, supra, it was held that a judgment entered in an abbreviated form was invalid, and that case is conclusive of the invalidity of the judgment relied upon to establish a lien in the case at bar, and establishes that the judgment rendered against Norton and Rennick was invalid and that it was not a lien upon the premises owned by Norton at the time judgment was entered or at the time said premises were sold and conveyed to the appellant by Norton's trustee in bankruptcy. It is contended that if it be admitted that said judgment is invalid under the holding in the Stein case, it can not be set aside and vacated as a cloud upon the title of appellant without a showing that it was unjust and that appellant purchased said premises without notice thereof. This is not a proceeding to vacate said judgment but is a proceeding to determine whether or not it is a lien upon the premises of the appellant and to remove the same as a cloud therefrom. If it be conceded that Norton and Rennick could not have said judgment set aside and held for naught unless they made it appear it was unjust, still a different rule applies, we think, as to the appellant. The debt which was the basis of said judgment was not the debt of the appellant and by the purchase of said premises he did not make himself liable to pay said judgment. He had the right to rely upon the record, and, if the title to said premises was in the trustee in bankruptcy free of all liens, to purchase said premises, and might thereafter, if the appellee attempted to enforce a lien against the premises which had no validity, file a bill to protect his title. and to remove the pretended lien as a cloud thereon without showing the judgment to be unjust or paying the debt of Norton and Rennick. Fitts v. Davis, 42 Ill. 391; Cox v. Spurgin, 210 id. 398. The decree of the superior court will be reversed and the cause remanded to that court, with directions to overrule the demurrer. Reversed and remanded, with directions. RAPHAEL ROSENTHAL et al. Exrs., Defendants in Error, VS. THE CHICAGO AND ALTON RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error. Opinion filed October 26, 1912. 1. NEGLIGENCE-general rule upon the subject of ordinary care. The general rule upon the subject of ordinary care is, that if one exercises the degree of care required of a reasonably prudent man he is guilty of no negligence, but if he fails to do so he is guilty of negligence and cannot recover in case he is injured. 2. SAME―when question of contributory negligence is for the jury. Whether the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence in stepping in front of a backing locomotive is a question of fact for the jury, even though the evidence shows he was old, had poor eyesight and wore a cap with flaps drawn over his ears, where it also tends to show that it was night, that the engine was running quietly, without ringing a bell or sounding a whistle and without having a bright light on the tender, as required by ordinance. 3. SAME a railroad company is bound to take notice of ordinance requiring crossing gates. Clause 27 of section 1 of article 5 of the Cities and Villages act authorizes a municipal corporation to provide, by ordinance, that a railroad company shall erect and operate gates at crossings, and as the statute does not require express notice to the railroad company, such company is bound to take notice of such ordinance. 4. SAME when an ordinance concerning operation of crossing gates is admissible. The fact that an ordinance requiring crossing gates to be operated from seven o'clock A. M. to ten o'clock P. M. was passed after the gates had been installed and were being operated by the company does not render the ordinance inadmissible in an action for damages for an injury occurring after six o'clock P. M., even though the company had never operated the gates after six o'clock P. M. and it is not shown to have had notice of the ordinance. 5. SAME "due care and caution" is a relative term. "Due care and caution" is a relative term, and what is required to constitute due care and caution in a particular case depends upon all the conditions and circumstances surrounding the person at the time he is called upon to act. WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court for the Third District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Logan county; the Hon. T. M. HARRIS, Judge, presiding. BLINN & COVEY, (SILAS H. STRAWN, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error. BEACH & TRAPP, for defendants in error. Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court: The executors of the last will and testament of Silas Rosenthal, deceased, recovered a judgment in the circuit court of Logan county against plaintiff in error in the sum of $2500 for the death of Rosenthal, caused by being struck by a tender attached to plaintiff in error's engine while crossing the railroad tracks over Pulaski street, in the city of Lincoln. On appeal to the Appellate Court for the Third District the judgment was affirmed. A writ of certiorari was issued by this court, and the case has been brought here for review. The first count of the declaration charges plaintiff in error with carelessly and negligently running an engine, with tender attached, over and across Pulaski street and striking deceased, who was exercising ordinary care for his safety, so severely injuring him as to cause his death. Other counts of the declaration charge the violation of an ordinance then in force requiring plaintiff in error to construct and maintain at certain street crossings (among them |