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§ 235. General Statement of the Functions of the Commission. In discussing the scope and validity of the Interstate Commerce Act, infra, Chapter II, it was seen that the Interstate Commerce Commission was an administrative body with no strictly judicial power; that it is an agency of the legislative department of the federal government to which has been delegated the legislative power of prescribing rates for the future. In the performance of its administrative duties, it adopts and observes certain forms and follows a procedure similar to those in use by courts when enforcing the judicial powers of the government. While, in a loose way, it is frequently said that the Commission exercises quasi-judicial powers, it cannot be said that any of the judicial powers conferred by the Constitution of the United States are, or can be, exercised by the Commission. Its duties under existing law naturally divide themselves into two distinct branches. The first of these are purely administrative in their nature. The second is the exercise of its delegated legislative power and consists of prescribing rules, regulations and rates for the future. Under the first head, upon complaint, the Commission, after hearing, may decide that the past practice of a carrier has not been in accord with the law, and it may determine that by such practices the complainant has been damaged in an amount which the Commission fixes. Its findings awarding reparation may or may not, at the option of the carrier, be obeyed. If the order therefor is obeyed, it is not that the carrier can be compelled to do so by any order of the Commission, but because the carrier recognizes the

justice thereof or fears that the courts may do so. If obedience is refused, the Commission, or the parties in whose favor the order is granted, may ask the judicial department of the government to lend its aid to make effective the findings. of the Commission. When the matter is brought to the attention of the proper court in such a way as to invoke its action, a hearing is had de novo, the findings of the Commission being, by a rule of evidence prescribed by the legislative department, prima facie correct. Exercising its full and unlimited judicial power, the court may give weight to the findings of the Commission like it might to the findings of any other administrative body; but the power to enforce the order is wholly in the courts.

The Commission prescribes forms of accounting which the carriers must obey, prescribes the forms of tariffs and methods of publishing same, and makes regulations or rulings applicable to the general enforcement of the Act.

By the Amendment of March 1, 1913, the Commission is directed to investigate, ascertain and report the value of all the property owned or used by every common carrier subject to the provisions of the commerce acts.

The Transportation Act, 1920, as heretofore stated, materially increases the powers of the Commission, modifies the language of the former Act as to existing powers, gives a right to the Commission to initiate rates and adds the duty to prescribe minimum rates, makes more definite the duty of the Commission in respect to giving railroads a "fair return" on investment, increases its duties as to the service and distribution of cars, deviates from the principle of competition required by former laws, and adopts the principle of co-operation, and adds the right to supervise the issuance of securities and the increase or decrease of existing facilities.1

§ 236. Appointment and General Duties of the Commission. The Interstate Commerce Commission is composed of eleven members, whose terms of office are seven years each,

1 For an historical sketch of former statutes and an analysis of the Transportation Act, 1920, see articles by

the writer hereof in Columbia Law Review, March, 1919, p. 47, et seq.; Railroad Herald, April, 1920.

and each of whom receives an annual salary of twelve thousand dollars. They are appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Not more than six of the commissioners may be of the same political party, and they may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. They shall not engage in any other business, vocation, or employment. The principal office of the Commission shall be in Washington, where its general sessions shall be held; but whenever the convenience of the public or of the parties may be promoted, or delay or expense prevented thereby, the Commission may hold special sessions in any part of the United States. It may, by one or more of the commissioners, prosecute any inquiry necessary to its duties, in any part of the United States, into any matter or question of fact pertaining to the business of any common carrier subject to the provisions of the Act. It shall inquire into the management of the business of all common carriers subject to the Act, and is authorized and required to enforce such Act. It has power to require, by subpoena, the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, and it may order testimony taken by depositions. Every order of the Commission shall be forthwith served by mailing to any one of the principal officers or agents of the carrier at his usual place of business a copy thereof; and the registrymail receipt is prima facie evidence of the receipt of such order by the carrier. The Commission may suspend or modify its orders and grant re-hearings. It has power to require reports from carriers subject to the Act and to prescribe forms for accounting by carriers. It must itself make annual reports to Congress.

§ 237. Switch Connections-Duty of Carrier in Relation Thereto. It is the duty of any common carrier subject to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, upon application by any lateral, branch line of railroad, or by any shipper tendering interstate traffic for transportation, to construct, maintain, and operate, upon reasonable terms, a switch connection with any such lateral, branch line of railroad, or private side-track which may be constructed to connect with its railroad, where such connection is reasonably practicable and can be put in with safety and will furnish sufficient busi

ness to justify the construction and maintenance of the same, and to furnish cars for the movement of such traffic to the best of its ability without discrimination in favor of or against any such shipper.2

Under Section 1 of the Act of March 4, 1887, as amended by the Act of June 29, 1906, the Supreme Court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission had power to compel switch connections with lateral, branch roads only at the instance of shippers, and that it had no power to compel switch connections on the application of a branch railroad.3

The Amendment of June 18, 1910, however, gives the right to "any lateral, branch line of railroad," as well as to any shipper.

In construing the words "lateral branch line," the Supreme Court gave as examples of such lines, "those that are dependent upon and incident to the main line-feeders, such as may be built from mines or forests to bring coal, ore or lumber to the main line for shipment," and the court held that the question of whether or not a particular line comes within the meaning of the statutory language must be determined by what the line is, and not by what it may become.*

§ 238. Switch Connections-Power of the Commission.Should a carrier fail to perform the duty to make switch connections, on application therefor in writing by any shipper or owner of such lateral, branch line of railroad, such shipper or owner of such lateral, branch line of railroad, may make complaint, and the Commission shall hear and investigate the same and shall determine as to the safety and

2 Paragraphs (4) and (9) of Section 1 of Interstate Commerce Act; Sections 404, 411, post; Sec. 76, ante. 3 Interstate Com. Com. v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 216 U. S. 531, 54 L. Ed. 605, 30 Sup. Ct. 415.

4 United States v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 226 U. S. 14, 57 L. Ed. 104, 33 Sup. Ct. 5, affirming Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States, 195 Fed.

962, Opinion Commerce Court No. 60, p. 431. For order of the Commission see, Cincinnati & Columbus Traction Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 20 I. C. C. 486. Following the Supreme Court see, St. Louis, S. & P. R. Co. v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 26 I. C. C. 226; Morris Iron Co. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 26 I. C. C. 240.

practicability thereof and the justification and the reasonable compensation therefor, and the Commission may make an order directing the common carrier to comply with the provisions of the statute in accordance with such order.5

This provision is supplemented by the Transportation Act, 1920, which authorizes the Commission, when in the public interest and practicable, to require that existing terminal facilities, including main-line track or tracks for a reasonable distance, to be opened to a joint use under such terms and for such compensation as may be agreed on or fixed."

When there is an application for a switch connection made as provided by statute and the evidence shows an existing siding from which interstate freight is tendered, and that there is sufficient business to justify the construction and maintenance of the switch and the connection is reasonably practicable and safe, the Commission will order a connection."

There must, however, be an existing side-track or lateral, branch line of railroad with which the connection can be made, and the Commission has no jurisdiction to enforce a contract for such connection."

The prohibition against requiring a carrier to give the use of its tracks, terminals and facilities to a competing carrier does not prevent the Commission, in a proper case, from requiring a carrier to receive cars from a connection for transportation over its tracks and terminals. Such a requirement, when the haul is "a substantial part of a continuous transportation routing" and necessary to such movement, is a proper regulation of the business of the carrier and not an appropriation of terminal facilities for the use and benefit

5 Par. (9) of Section 1 as numbered by Transportation Act, 1920.

6 Transportation Act, 1920, Section 405; paragraph (4) of Section 3 of Interstate Commerce Act; Section 431, post. See, for old law, Morris Iron Co. v. B. & O. R. Co., 26 I. C. C. 240, 243, 244; Louisville Board of Trade v. L. & N. R. Co., 40 I. C. C. 679, 688 and cases cited; Guyton & Harrington

Mule Co. v. L. & N. R. Co., 50 I. C.
C. 546.

7 Ridgewood Coal Co. v. Lehigh
Valley R. Co., 21 I. C. C. 183, 185.
8 Winters Metallic Paint Co. V.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 16 I.
C. C. 687.

9 Ralston Townsite Co. v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 22 I. C. C. 354.

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