clusive power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. The court answered that the business was carried on exclusively within the limits of the state of Illinois, that its regulation was a thing of domestic concern and that 'certainly, until Congress acts in reference to their interstate relation, the state may exercise all the powers of government over them, even though in so doing it may indirectly operate upon commerce outside its immediate jurisdiction.' In the decision of the railroad cases, above cited, the same opinion was expressed."

Congress did act in 1906, and now the states may not regulate grain and similar elevators save as to elevation not affecting interstate commerce.

109

§ 18. Through Routes and Joint Rates.-The statute provides that, as to transportation within the Interstate Commerce Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission may require carriers to establish through routes, the Commission having the power to prescribe the rate and determine the divisions.1 A state legislative act under which through routes and joint rates are prescribed, is valid when interstate commerce is not directly affected and when the requirement therefor is reasonable.110 In the absence of a statute, through routing could not be enforced,111 and, as said by Mr. Justice Holmes,112 "the requirement to deliver, transfer and transport freight to any point where there is a physical connection between the tracks of the railroad companies must be taken to refer to cases where the freight is destined to some further point by transportation over a connecting line."

109 Sec. 495, post; and a state commission, as to intrastate commerce, may apportion a joint rate, State v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 80 Minn. 191, 83 N. W. 60, 89 Am. St. Rep. 514, affirmed Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. State of Minnesota, 186 U. S. 257, 46 L. Ed. 1151, 22 Sup. Ct. 900.

110 But such a statute affecting interstate transportation is void, Lowe v. Seaboard A. L. Ry. Co., 63 S. C. 248, 41 S. E. 297, 90 Am. St. Rep. 678.

111 In Wadley So. Ry. v. State,

137 Ga. 497, 507, 73 S. E. 741, the Supreme Court of Georgia said: "It is true that railroad companies cannot be required to issue through bills of lading, or to contract to forward goods beyond their own lines. Coles v. Central R. Co., 86 Ga. 251, 12 S. E. 749; State v. W. & T. R. Co., 104 Ga. 437, 30 S. E. 891.''

112 Central Stock Yards v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 192 U. S. 568, 571, 48 L. Ed. 565, 24 Sup. Ct. 339.

As to intrastate commerce, a state may prohibit discrimination by a carrier against another, and where a joint rate is established it is subject to governmental regulation.113 This does not mean that a carrier may be compelled to make a contract to deliver over another road, but carriers may be compelled to deliver freight to and receive freight from a connecting carrier.114

States, however, have no power to compel a carrier to switch cars between a connection with a competing interstate carrier and a designated side-track within its own terminals, when such movement is for the accommodation of interstate traffic.115

§ 19. Regulation of the Movement of Trains-Sunday Law. -The legislature of the state of Georgia prohibited the running of freight trains on any road in the state on Sunday. There were certain exceptions referring to trains carrying live-stock and delayed trains. A conviction being had under the statute, and an affirmance thereof by the highest state court, the case was appealed to the Supreme Court. That court sustained the Georgia statute.116 Mr. Justice Harlan, concluding the opinion, said:

"The statute of Georgia is not directed against interstate commerce. It establishes a rule of civil conduct applicable alike to all freight trains, domestic as well as interstate. It applies to the transportation of interstate freight the same rule precisely that it applies to the transportation of domestic freight. And it places the business of transporting freight in the same category as all other secular business. It simply

113 Stephens v. Central of Ga. Ry. Co., 138 Ga. 625, 631, 75 S. E. 1041, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 541, 1913E, Ann. Cas. 609; Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. State, 137 Ga. 497, 73 S. E. 741. Affirmed: Wadley S. R. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 59 L. Ed. 405, 35 Sup. Ct. 214.

114 Sec. 15, ante; Hudson V. R. Co. v. Boston & M. R. Co., 45 Misc. 520, 92 N. Y. Supp. 928, affirmed same styled case, 106 App. Div. 375, 94 N. Y. Supp. 545; International & G. N.

R. Co. v. R. R. Com. of Tex., (Tex. Civ. App.), 86 S. W. 16, affirmed same styled case, 99 Tex. 332, 89 S. W. 961; Inman v. St. L. S. W. R. Co., 14 Tex. Civ. App. 39, 37 S. W. 37.

115 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Railroad Com. of La., 236 U. S. 157, 59 L. Ed. 517, 35 Sup. Ct. 275.

116 Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 41 L. Ed. 166, 16 Sup. Ct. 1086; Simpson, et al., R. R. Com. of Minnesota v. Shepard, 230 U. S. 352, 432, 433, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 33 Sup. Ct. 729.

declares that, on and during the day fixed by law as a day of rest for all people within the limits of the state from toil and labor incident to their callings, the transportation of freight shall be suspended.

"We are of the opinion that such a law, although in a limited degree affecting interstate commerce, is not for that reason a needless intrusion upon the domain of federal jurisdiction, nor strictly a regulation of interstate commerce, but, considered in its own nature, is an ordinary police regulation designed to secure the well being and to promote the general welfare of the people within the state by which it was established, and therefore not invalid by force alone of the Constitution of the United States."

§ 20. Same Subject-Requiring the Operation of a Particular Train.-An order of a railroad commission, made under adequate statutory authority, which requires a railroad company to furnish transportation between two points in the state, and to arrange its schedule to make connections with. through interstate trains, is not, when required by public convenience, illegal. Nor is such order unreasonable because the operation of the particular train required by the order may entail some pecuniary loss to the carrier.117

The Railroad Commission of Kansas, after hearing, ordered an interstate railroad to operate a passenger service from a point within the state to the state line, although the railroad had no station at the state line. The Supreme Court of the United States, having found that the order was not arbitrary or unreasonable, discussed and determined the contention. made, that the order was void because it operated as a direct burden upon interstate commerce. In support of the contention, the carrier urged "that the charter of the Interstate Railroad Company, the builder of the branch, provided for a road not only in Kansas, but to extend into Texas and Missouri, and therefore for an interstate railroad."

117 Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. North Carolina Corp. Com., 206 U. S. 1, 51 L. Ed. 933, 27 Sup. Ct. 585, 11 Ann. Cas. 398. The effect on interstate commerce of the order involved in this

case was not considered. This decision affirms North Carolina Corp. Com. v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 137 N. C. 1, 49 S. E. 191, 115 Am. St. Rep. 636.

The court held that the charter of the railroad "did not change the nature and character of our constitutional system and, therefore, did not destroy the power of Kansas over its domestic commerce," and that the order, being reasonable, was not void; and, in concluding the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice (later Mr. Chief Justice) White said:118

"Even if the performance of the duty of furnishing adequate local facilities in some respect affected interstate commerce, it does not necessarily result that thereby a direct burden on interstate commerce would be imposed.

When it was sought to enjoin an order of the New York Public Service Commission, which required the carrier to restore certain trains which had been discontinued, the District Judge held, under the facts there of record, that such an order was void. It appeared that, without the trains which had been discontinued, the service accommodated the necessities of the people, and that to operate the additional trains would mean a loss to the carrier. Under the facts, the judge aptly said: "What is reasonable and what is reasonably necessary is not to be determined by the occasional wants and wishes and convenience of a very few people living at points along the line."119 In holding void a statute of Wisconsin requiring "that every village having two hundred or more inhabitants and a post office, and being within one-eighth of a mile of a railroad, must be given by such railroad the accommodation of at least two passenger trains each way each day, if four or more passenger trains are run each way daily," the authorities are cited by the Supreme Court and the principles established by the authorities given as follows: "(1) It is competent for a state to require adequate local facilities, even to the stoppage of interstate trains or the rearrangement of their schedules. (2) Such facilities existing-that is, the local conditions being adequately met-the obligation of the railroad is performed, and the stoppage of interstate trains becomes an improper and illegal interference with interstate

118 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262, 283, 284, 54 L. Ed. 472, 30 Sup. Ct. 330, citing Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 52 L. Ed. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 121. See

also State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 11 S. D. 282, 77 N. W. 104.

119 Delaware L. & W. R. Co. v. Van Santwood, 216 Fed. 252.

commerce. (3) And this, whether the interference be directly by the legislature or by its command through the orders of an administrative body. (4) The fact of local facilities this court may determine, such fact being necessarily involved in the determination of the federal question whether an order concerning an interstate train does or does not directly regulate interstate commerce, by imposing an arbitrary requirement.''120

Sub-divisions (1) and (2) above are illogical. Whether or not a requirement that trains shall stop is reasonable is determinable in part from the extent of existing facilities; but interstate commerce is interstate commerce regardless of the adequacy or inadequacy of local facilities.

§ 21. Same Subject-Speed of Trains. In the absence of legislation by Congress, a city ordinance regulating the speed limit of trains within the city limits, is not, as to interstate trains, unconstitutional. This law was announced by Mr. Justice Brewer (Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 584, 44 L. Ed. 897, 20 Sup. Ct. 819), who said:

"A city, when authorized by the legislature, may regulate the speed of railroad trains within the city limits.-Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521, 24 L. Ed. 734; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Illinois ex rel. Jett, 177 U. S. 514, 44 L. Ed. 868, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722. Such act is, even to interstate trains, one only indirectly affecting interstate commerce, and is within the power of the state until at least Congress shall take action in the matter."

A statute of Nebraska fixing a rate of speed for cattle trains moving between points within the state and providing a sum as liquidated damages for its violation, is valid, the Supreme Court of the United States having held that the legislature had power "to impose a limitation of the time for the transportation of live-stock" and "to provide a definite measure of damages," such damages being "difficult to estimate or prove.

121

120 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Railroad Com. of Wis., 237 U. S. 220, 59 L. Ed. 926, 35 Sup. Ct. 560. Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Texas, 246 U. S. 58, 62 L. Ed. 574, 38 Sup. Ct. 236.

121 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Cram, 228 U. S. 70, 84, 57 L. Ed. 734, 33 Sup. Ct. 437, affirming Cram v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 84 Neb. 607, 122 N. W. 31, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.)