held not to be void under the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States.170 A state law relating to the delivery of a telegram and providing a penalty was held void when the default occurred within a navy yard,171 although the same law when delivery was made in the territory within the jurisdiction of the state was, in an opinion following the Georgia and Michigan cases, supra, held valid.172 In the last-cited case, the court said: "The requirement of the Virginia statute as here applied is a valid exercise of the power of the state in the absence of legislation by Congress. It is neither a regulation of nor a hindrance to interstate commerce, but is in aid of that commerce.' * Similar language calling attention to the "absence of legislation by Congress" appears in the cases relating to the Georgia and Michigan statutes. As the Amendment of 1910 says that "telegraph, telephone and cable companies (whether wire ' or wireless) engaged in sending messages from one state, territory, or district of the United States to any other state, territory, or district of the United States or to any foreign country, shall be considered and held to be common carriers within the meaning and purpose of this Act," there is legislation by Congress and it would seem that the decisions relating to the delivery of interstate freight, Sections 25 and 26, ante, would be applicable to interstate messages, and that state laws regulating the receipt and delivery of telegrams and telephone messages from points in one state to points in another are void. The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Warren-Godwin Lbr. Co., 251 U. S. 27, 64 L. Ed. 118, 40 Sup. Ct. 69, expressly held that the Act of Congress of 1910 occupied the field of the interstate regulation of telegraph companies to the exclusion of state action. The same principle, for the same reason, would undoubtedly apply to telephone companies. 170 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., supra. V. 171 Western Union Tel. Co. Chiles, 214 U. S. 274, 53 L. Ed. 994, 29 Sup. Ct. 613. 172 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Crovo, supra. When the President, under authority of an Act of Congress, had taken over telephone and telegraph lines rates prescribed under his direction superseded intrastate rates prescribed by state authority.173 § 30. Separate-Coach Laws.-The statute of Louisiana, which, as construed by the courts of that state, compelled common carriers to receive, in compartments set aside for whites only, negro passengers, was held by the Supreme Court to be invalid in so far as it affected interstate commerce.174 The court quoted from the opinion of Mr. Justice Field, in Welton v. Missouri,175 to the effect that, "inaction (by Congress) * is equivalent to a declaration that interstate commerce shall remain free and untrammeled," and said: * "Applying that principle to the circumstances of this case, congressional inaction left Benson at liberty to adopt such reasonable rules and regulations for the disposition of passengers upon his boat, while pursuing her voyage within Louisiana or without, as seemed to him most for the interest of all concerned. The statute under which this suit is brought, as construed by the state court, seeks to take away from him that power so long as he is within Louisiana; and while recognizing to the fullest extent the principle which sustains a statute, unless its unconstitutionality is clearly established, we think this statute, to the extent that it requires those engaged in the transportation of passengers among the states to carry colored passengers in Louisiana in the same cabin with whites, is unconstitutional and void." While this decision has been criticised by text-book writers, it is sound in principle. Carriers may not unjustly discriminate between those who patronize them, but they are free, subject to that rule and the further one that charges must not be unreasonable, to regulate the general conduct of their business. It cannot be held an unjust discrimination to require whites and negroes to ride in separate compartments of a pub 173 40 Stat. 904, Chap. 154, Comp. Stat. 1918, Sec. 3115-4. Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163, 63 L. Ed. 910, 39 Sup. Ct. 507; Burleson v. Dempey, 250 U. S. 191, 63 L. Ed. 929, 39 Sup. Ct. 511. 174 Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, 5 Otto 485, 24 L. Ed. 547. 175 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, 282, 23 L. Ed. 347, 350. lic conveyance, the accommodations being equal. For the negro to contend that he is discriminated against in favor of the white man would be a contention on his part of inferiority to the white man. The separation of equals discriminates in favor of neither. Whatever may be said as to the actual inferiority of the negro, he is, under the law, entitled to equal rights with the other races. The state of Mississippi has a law requiring railroads carrying passengers to give "separate accommodations to white and colored races," by furnishing either separate coaches or separate compartments in the same coach. The law was construed by the state courts as applying only to commerce within the state. The Supreme Court of the United States held the law valid.176 The decision is in harmony with the case of Hall v. DeCuir, supra. In the Louisiana case, the regulation affected interstate commerce and was invalid; in the Mississippi case, the regulation did not affect interstate commerce and was valid. In the Mississippi case, the court said: "The reason for this is that both the charge and the actual transportation in such cases are exclusively confined to the limits of the territory of the state, and is not commerce among the states, or interstate commerce, but is exclusively commerce within the state. So far, therefore, as this class of transportation, as an element of commerce, is affected by the statute under consideration, it is not subject to the constitutional provision concerning commerce among the states. It has often been held in this court, and there can be no doubt about it, that there is a commerce wholly within the state, which is not subject to the constitutional provision, and the distinction between commerce among the states and the other class of commerce between the citizens of a single state, and conducted within its limits exclusively, is one which has been fully recognized in this court, although it may not be always easy, where the lines of these classes approach each other, to distinguish between the one and the other." 176 Louisville N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U. S. 587, 33 L. Ed. 784, 10 Sup. Ct. 348, 2 I. C. R. 801. This case in the Supreme Court of Mississippi was styled Louisville, Louisiana subsequently passed a separate-coach law, which the Supreme Court sustained, as it affected only commerce in that state.177 A similar law in Kentucky was also sustained by the Supreme Court.178 A state statute requiring the separation of interstate passengers would be void as an attempt to regulate interstate commerce, but, as said in Hall v. De Cuir, supra, Congress having failed to act, the subject of the separation of the races in interstate transportation is unregulated and interstate carriers are free to make such reasonable rules with reference thereto as thy see fit; "reasonable" including the requirement that there be no discrimination in the accommodation.179 A statute of Oklahoma applying to intrastate travel, in so far as it gave equal, although separate, accommodation to passengers, members of the white and negro races, was held valid by the Supreme Court, and in so far as it provided accommodations for whites not accorded to negroes, it was held to be invalid.180 § 31. Posting Time of Trains.-A statute of the state of Indiana requiring all railroads to "cause to be placed in a conspicuous place in each passenger depot of such company located at any station in this state at which there is a telegraph office, a blackboard at least three feet long and two feet wide, upon which such company or person shall cause to be written, at least twenty minutes before the schedule time for the arrival of each passenger train stopping upon such route at such station, the fact whether such train is on schedule time or not, and if late, how much," and providing a penalty for 177 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 41 L. Ed. 256, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138. 178 Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 179 U. S. 388, 45 L. Ed. 244, 21 Sup. Ct. 101. See also Edwards v. N. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 12 I. C. C. 247; Gaines v. Seaboard A. L. Ry. Co., 16 I. C. C. 471; Cozart v. So. Ry. Co., 16 I. C. C. 226. 179 Chiles v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 218 U. S. 71, 54 L. Ed. 936, 30 Sup. Ct. 667; Hall v. De Cuir, ante, is cited in Simpson, et al., R. R. Com. of Minnesota v. Shepard, 230 U. S. 352, 432, 433, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 33 Sup. Ct. 729. 180 McCabe v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 235 U. S. 151, 59 L. Ed. 169, 35 Sup. Ct. 69. See also South Covington & C. St. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 252 U. S. 399, 64 L. Ed. 631, 40 Sup. Ct. 378. violating the regulation, is within the legislative power. It is true that the regulation may apply to the time of an interstate train, but the matter is one of local concern, one upon which Congress has not acted, and one which does not directly affect interstate commerce.181 If, however, the regulation is unreasonable, or is made by a commission without a finding of facts or evidence showing the relation between the receipts and the expense, it is void.182 § 32. Laws to Promote the Security and Comfort of Passengers. States may protect the personal security of those who are passengers on cars used within their limits. Under this principle, a law of New York prescribing how passenger cars should be heated, was, in the absence of national regulation on the subject, valid. This was true, although the regulation incidentally affected interstate commerce.183 The statute requiring passenger cars to be heated, supra, was relied upon to sustain the Georgia statute requiring engines to be equipped with electric head lights. Since the Supreme Court sustained the New York law, supra, Congress has passed several statutes relating to safety appliances, and even though after the passage of these statutes the heating law might be sustained, it would seem that the electric-headlight law, in so far as it applies to a locomotive engaged in interstate commerce, would be void.184 This contention was urged before the Supreme Court of the United States; but that court held that the Georgia statute was valid. In the course of the opinion, reference was made to the different Federal Safety-Appliance Acts, and it was 181 State v. Indiana & I. S. Ry. Co., 133 Ind. 69, 32 N. E. 817, 18 L. R. A. 502; State v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 157 Ind. 288, 61 N. E. 669. Posting a tariff of rates would be governed by the same principles, Johnson v. Seaboard A. L. Ry. Co., 78 S. C. 361, 52 S. E. 644. 182 Kansas C. S. Ry. Co. v. State, 27 Okla. 806, 117 Pac. 207; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Newell, 25 Okla. 502, 106 Pac. 818. 183 New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 41 L. Ed. 853, 17 Sup. Ct. 418. In a note to the decision will be found cited a large number of cases sustaining the general principle involved in the statement of law in this section. 184 Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. State, 135 Ga. 545, 69 S. E. 725, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 20, citing People v. N. Y. etc., R. Co., 55 Hun. 409, 608 (8 N. Y. S. 673); N. Y., etc., R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628, 41 L. Ed. 853, 17 Sup. Ct. 418. See Notes 122 and 123, ante. |