Notes of Decisions Rendered Since 1915.

Lawful to have one auctioneer to sell fruits at produce yards. Andrews Bros. Co. v. P. R. Co., 38 I. C. C. 165. Brokers who receive shipments from Canada and forward them to points in the United States are protected by this section against unjust discrimination.-Emery & Co. v. B. & M. R. Co., 47 I. C. C. 200. Nothing unlawful found in rules relating to compressing cotton.-Cotton Concentration at Weleetka, Okla. 39 I. C. C. 181. Effect of intervention in rate schedules of lines other than those directly serving complaining point.Henderson Cotton Mills v. L. & N. R. Co., 39 I. C. C. 399, 405, and cases cited; Chamber of Commerce Johnston City v. Sou. Ry. Co., 46 I. C. C. 527. An unjustly discriminatory system of rates.-Missouri River-Nebraska Cases, 40 I. C. C. 201. Localities as well as passengers and shippers may successfully complain.-Public Service Com. of Wash. v. A. & V. Ry. Co., 42 I. C. C. 54, 63. Combination rates on grain contrasted with through rates on the products.-Eldred Milling Co. v. C. N. R. Co., 42 I. C. C. 215, 219, and cases cited. Proportional rates must be accorded without unjust discrimination.-Traffic Bureau of Toledo v. C. H. & D. Ry. Co., 43 I. C. C. 466. As to drayage absorptions.-Drayage Absorptions, 43 I. C. C. 472. As to carload minima.-Northern Potato Traffic Asso. v. B. & O. R. Co., 43 I. C. C. 545. Grant of trackage rights to another railroad may exclude grantee from participating in local traffic on the granted line tracks.— Hocking Domestic Coal Co. v. K. & M. Ry. Co., 44 I. C. C. 392, 400. As to notice of embargoes.-Baltimore Chamber of Commerce v. B. & O. R. Co., 45 I. C. C. 40. Not unjust discrimination when the discrimination operates "in the interest of the public as a whole."-Swaney v. B. & O. R. Co., 49 I. C. C. 345. Carriers may establish eating houses.-Montgomery v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 228 Fed. 616. Section considered in a proceeding to enjoin laborers from combining to do an unlawful thing.-Alaska S. S. Co. v. International Longshoreman's Asso., 236 Fed. 964, 971. Discrimination in divisions condemned.-Chestnut Ridge Ry. Co. v. United States, 248 Fed. 791. Discrimination between producing mines complained of by a consuming market not under the admitted facts unlawful.-Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. United States,

240 U. S. 334, 60 L. Ed. 675, 36 Sup. Ct. 354. Terminals open to one but not to another road not unlawful under facts found. ' -Louisville & N. R. Co. v. United States, 242 U. S. 60, 61 L. Ed. 152, 37 Sup. Ct. 61.

Notes of Decisions Rendered Since 1920.

Statewide order against intrastate passenger fares could not be upheld under Sec. 3 of Act.-Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 66 L. Ed. 371, 42 Sup. Ct. 232. To be lawful rate fixed by interstate carrier must be non-discriminatory.-Keogh v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 260 U. S. 156, 67 L. Ed. 183, 43 Sup. Ct. 47. Fact that rate is combination of locals will not prevent it from being unduly prejudicial as contrasted with joint through rate.— U. S. v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 263 U. S. 415, 68 L. Ed. 417, 44 Sup. Ct. 189. Agreement to furnish cars at particular time on open terms, conditions and at rates open to all not an unjust discrimination or undue preference.-Vander Zyl v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 195 Iowa 901, 189 N. W. 953; writ of error dismissed, 266 U. S. 636, 69 L. Ed. 481, 45 Sup. Ct. 10. A carrier may not vary its charges according as goods are, or are not, to be shipped over a certain railroad.-A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 279 U. S. 768, 73 L. Ed. 947, 49 Sup. Ct. 494. Right of shipper to protection against undue preference of others preserved to him by Sec. 3 of Act.-Rules Governing Ratings of Coal Mines, 95 I. C. C. 309. For discrimination to be unlawful under third section, ordinarily prejudice to one must be advantage to other.-York Mfgrs. Asso. v. Penn. R. R. Co., 107 I. C. C. 219. The difference in rates to be within purview of Sec. 3 must be measured by the transportation standard.-Id. Rules as well as rates affected by inhibitions of Sec. 3.-Wasmuth Endicott v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 107 I. C. C. 588. Undue preference to one locality indicates undue prejudice to another.-Galveston Commercial Asso. v. A. & S. Ry. Co., 109 I. C. C. 114. Section applies to localities as well as shippers.-Sioux Falls Livestock Exchange v. A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 109 I. C. C. 501. Fundamental purpose of Act is "to compel the carrier as a public agent to give equal terms to all," "to cut up by the roots every form of discrimination, favoritism, and inequality," and to "place all shippers upon equal terms."

Service on K., O. & G. Ry., 118 I. C. C. 412. Transit charge is a local charge for which carrier establishing it is alone responsible. Birkett Mills Co. v. D., L. & W. Ry. Co., 123 I. C. C. 63. Carrier may meet competition so long as it is not guilty of undue prejudice and does not charge rates so low as to burden other traffic.-Galveston Commercial Asso. v. G., H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 128 I. C. C. 349. Intrastate rates found unjustly to discriminate against interstate shippers.— Rates on Chert, Clay, Sand & Gravel, 160 I. C. C. 309.

§ 429. Regulation of Collection of Transportation Charges. -From and after July 1, 1920, no carrier by railroad subject to the provisions of this Act shall deliver or relinquish possession at destination of any freight transported by it until all tariff rates and charges thereon have been paid, except under such rules and regulations as the Commission may from time to time prescribe to assure prompt payment of all such rates and charges and to prevent unjust discrimination: Provided, That the provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed to prohibit any carrier from extending credit in connection with rates and charges on freight transported for the United States, for any department, bureau or agency thereof, or for any state or territory or political subdivision thereof, or for the District of Columbia.

Paragraph (2) of Section 3, Interstate Commerce Act, added by Transportation Act, 1920.

Carriers always have had a lien for charges and could not be compelled to make delivery until such charges were paid; having delivered the commodity, only a person liable for the charges could be made to pay. It has always been the right and duty of carriers to collect the correct tariff rate.— Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Fink, 250 U. S. 577, 63 L. Ed. 1151, 40 Sup. Ct. 27.

Recoupment for damages not allowed in suits for freight charges. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Hopper & Sons, 233 Fed. 135; Johnson Brown Co. v. S. L. & W. R. Co., 239 Fed. 590. Contra, Wells Fargo & Co. v. Cuneo, 241 Fed. 727, 730; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Tecktonius Mfg. Co., 262 Fed. 715. See section cited and discussed.-Payment of Freight Charges.— 57 I. C. C. 571.

Paragraph (2) of Section 3 of the Act was amended March 4, 1927, (44 Stat. 1447, U. S. C. A., Title 49, Sec. 3 (2) ). The annotations refer to the previous law. The new provision is as follows:

No carrier by railroad subject to the provisions of this Act shall deliver or relinquish possession at destination of any freight transported by it until all tariff rates and charges thereon have been paid, except under such rules and regulations as the Commission may from time to time prescribe to govern the settlement of all such rates and charges and to prevent unjust discrimination: Provided, That the provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed to prohibit any carrier from extending credit in connection with rates and charges on freight transported for the United States, for any department, bureau, or agency thereof, or for any state or territory or political subdivision thereof, or for the District of Columbia. Where carriers by railroad are instructed by a shipper or consignee to deliver property transported by such carriers to a consignee other than the shipper or consignor, such consignee shall not be legally liable for transportation charges in respect of the transportation of such property (beyond those billed against him at the time of delivery for which he is otherwise liable) which may be found to be due after the property has been delivered to him, if the consignee (a) is an agent only and has no beneficial title in the property, and (b) prior to delivery of the property has notified the delivering carrier in writing of the fact of such agency and absence of beneficial title, and in the case of a shipment reconsigned or diverted to a point other than that specified in the original bill of lading, has also notified the delivering carrier in writing of the name and address of the beneficial owner of the property. In such cases the shipper or consignor, or, in the case of a shipment reconsigned or diverted, the beneficial owner, shall be liable for such additional charges, irrespective of any provisions to the contrary in the bill of lading or in the contract under which the shipment was made. An action for the enforcement of such liability may be begun within the period provided in paragraph (3) of Section 16 of this Act or before the expiration of six months after final judgment against the car

rier in an action against the consignee begun within the period provided in paragraph (3) of Section 16. If the consignee has given to the carrier erroneous information as to who the beneficial owner is, such consignee shall himself be liable for such additional charges, notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this paragraph. An action for the enforcement of such liability may be begun within the period provided in paragraph (3) of Section 16 or before the expiration of six months after final judgment against the carrier in an action against the beneficial owner named by the consignee begun within the period provided in paragraph (3) of Section 16.

§ 430. Carriers Shall Accord Reasonable and Equal Facilities for Interchange of Traffic. All carriers, engaged in the transportation of passengers or property, subject to the provisions of this Act, shall, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers or property to and from their several lines and those connecting therewith, and shall not discriminate in their rates, fares, and charges between such connecting lines, or unduly prejudice any such connecting line in the distribution of traffic that is not specifically routed by the shipper.

Paragraph (3) of Section 3, Interstate Commerce Act as amended by Transportation Act, 1920, Section 405. former section read:

The

Every common carrier subject to the provisions of this Act shall, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers and property to and from their several lines and those connecting therewith, and shall not discriminate in their rates and charges between such connecting lines; but this shall not be construed as requiring any such common carrier to give the use of its tracks or terminal facilities to another carrier engaged in like business. Paragraph (2) of Section 3 as originally enacted.

A private stock-car company is not a connecting line within