I

and represented by the author himself as of vaft LETTER importance. Ifhall content myself with making fome general observations upon it.

And first, whereas this writer frequently, throughout these Essays, lays a mighty ftrets upon experience, as the great guide of human life, and the only foundation of all our knowlege, especially with respect to matter of fact, and the existence of objects: He here plainly endeavours to fhew, that there can be no arguing from experience at all; nor can any reasonable conclufion be drawn from it: For he will not allow, that any argument can be drawn, or inference made, from experience, but what is founded on the fuppofed relation. or connection betwixt caufe and effect. If therefore there be no relation or connection betwixt cause and effect at all, in the nature of things, which it is the whole defign of his reafoning on this fubject to fhew, then all certainty of experience, all proof from it, entirely fail; all experiences, as he himself expreffes it, becomes ufelefs, and can give rife to no inference or conclufion*. · Secondly. Another remark I would make upon Mr. Hume's way of arguing, is, that it proceeds upon a wrong foundation, and which is contrary to truth and reafon; viz. that we cannot have any reasonable certainty of the truth of a thing, or that it really is, when we cannot diftinctly explain the manner of it, or how it is. The fum of his argumentation, as I have already Hume's Philofophical Effays, p. 66.

1

I.

LETTER hinted, with relation to cause and effect, is, that we cannot be certain of any fuch thing, as power or energy, because we cannot conceive or explain precisely wherein it confifts, or how it operates. But this is a very fallacious way of reafoning: Though we cannot metaphyfically explain the manner in which the cause operateth upon the effect, yet we may, in many cases, be fure that there is a connection between them; and that, where there are certain effects produced, there are powers correfpondent or adequate to the production of those effects. The mind, in such cases, when it fees an effect produced, is led, by a quick and undoubted procefs of reasoning, to acknowlege that there must be a cause which hath a power of produc ing it; or else we must say, that it is produced without any cause at all, or that nothing in nature hath any power of producing it; which is the greatest of all abfurdities. He urgeth, that " it must be allowed, that when we know

a power, we know that very circumstance "in the caufe, by which it is enabled to pro"duce the effect." And then he asks, "Do

we pretend to be acquainted with the nature "of the human foul, and the nature of an idea,

or the aptitude of the one to produce the "other" But certainly we may know, that there is fomething in the cause which produceth the effect, though we cannot diftinctly explain what that circumftance in the cause is, by Hume's Philofophical Effays, p. 110, 111.

which it is enabled to produce it. We muftLETTER not deny, that there is in the mind a power of raifing up ideas, and recalling them, and fixing the attention upon them, because we cannot explain how this is done. The argument Mr. Hume offers to prove, that we can have no affurance of the reality of force or power; viz. because we cannot diftinctly conceive or explain how it operateth, would equally prove that we cannot be fure that we have any ideas at all, be cause we cannot well explain the nature of an idea, or how it is formed in the mind. He himself, on another occafion, obferves against Malebranche, and the modern Cartefians, who deny all power and activity in fecond caufes, and ascribe all to God; that "we are indeed ignorant of the manner in which bodies operate upon one another; and fo we are of the manner or force by which a mind, even the Supreme mind, operates, either on itself or “ on Body. Were our ignorance therefore "a fufficient reafon for rejecting any thing, we "fhould be led into that principle of refufing "all energy to the Supreme Being, as much as "to the groffeft matter *." He here feems to cenfure it as a wrong way of arguing, to deny that a thing is, because we cannot diftinctly conceive the manner how it is; or to make our ignorance of any thing a fufficient reason for rejecting it: And yet it is manifeft, that his own reasoning against power or causality, force

• Hume's Philofophical Effays, p. 117, 118.

or

LETTEROF energy, depends upon this principle; and

I.

indeed, by comparing the feveral parts of his scheme, there is too much reason to apprehend, that he had it in view to deny all force and energy, and all power whatsoever, in the Supreme, as well as in fecondary causes; or at least to reprefent it as very uncertain. I think this Gentleman would have done better, to have faid, as a late injurious author of his own country, "We have no adequate idea of power; "we fee evidently that there must be such a

thing in nature; but we cannot conceive "how it acts, nor what connects the produc"ing cause with the produced effect." Chevalier Ramsay's principles of natural and revealed religion, Vol. I. p. 109.

Thirdly, A third remark is, that many of our author's arguings, on this fubject, are contrary to the most evident dictates of common fenfe. Such is that, where he afferts, that not fo much as a probable argument can be drawn, in any cafe, from experience, concerning the connection betwixt caufe and effect; or from whence we may conclude, that from a fimilar cause we may expect fimilar effects *. e. g. according to his way of reasoning, it cannot fo much as probably be concluded from experience, that if a quantity of dry gun-powder be laid in any place, and fire be applied to it, it will caufe an explosion; or that if it hath such an effect to day, a like quantity of powder, the • Hume's Philofophical Effays, p. 61, 62, 63.

Thus,

fame

I.

ame way circumstanced, will produce the fame LETTER effect to-morrow. No probable reason can be brought to fhew, that that which has had the effect in thousands of inftances in time past, will, though all circumstances appear perfectly fimilar, have the fame effect in time future. He grants, indeed, that, in fuch cafes, the mind is determined to draw the inference; yet he afferts, that the understanding has no part in the operation. But furely, when, from obfervation and experience, we come to know and judge of the ordinary courfe of nature, the understanding may justly draw a probable argument or conclufion, that from fuch and fuch causes, so circumftanced, fuch effects will follow. This inference is perfectly rational. And it is a strange way of talking, that, even from a number of uniform experiments, we cannot fo much as probably infer a connection between the cause and the effect, the fenfible qualities and the fecret powers: The reafon he gives, is, that "if "there be any fufpicion, that the course of nature may change; and that the past may be

no rule for the future; experience can give "rife to no inference or conclufion *." But is the probability of a thing deftroyed, according to any way of reafoning allowed hitherto, because it is barely poflible it may happen. other wife, though there is ten thousand to one against it? Mr. Hume, elsewhere, when arguing against miracles, lays it down as a principle, Hume's Philofophical Essays, p. 65, 66.

that