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III.

fing it to partake of the extraordinary and the LETTER "marvellous." He argueth, that "in that cafe "the evidence refulting from the teftimony re"ceives a diminution greater or less in propor"tion as the fact is more or lefs unusual. When "the fact attefted is fuch a one as has feldom "fallen under our obfervation, here is a conteft " of two oppofite experiences, of which the one ແ destroys the other as far as its force goes; " and the fuperior can only operate upon the "mind by the force which remains." This is a plaufible, but a very fallacious way of reasoning. A thing may be very unusual, and yet, if confirmed by proper teftimony, its being unufual may not diminish its credit, or produce in the mind of a thinking perfon a doubt or fufpicion concerning it. Indeed vulgar minds, who judge of every thing by their own narrow notions, and by what they themselves have seen, are often apt to reject and disbelieve a thing, that is not conformable to their own particular customs or experience. But wiser men, and those of more enlarged minds judge otherwife: and provided a thing comes to them fufficiently attefted and confirmed by good evidence, make its being unusual no objection at all to its credibility. Many uncommon facts, and unusual phænomena of nature, are believed by the most fagacious philofophers, and received as true without hefitation upon the teftimony of perfons who are worthy of credit, without following the author's rules; or making their own want

III.

LETTER of experience or obfervation an objection against thofe accounts. And upon this dependeth no fmall part of our knowlege. Mr. Adams hath very well illuftrated this by feveral inftances, and hath justly obferved, That the most uniform experience is fometimes outweighed by a single teftimony; because experience in this cafe is only a negative evidence, and the flighteft pofitive teftimony is for the most part an over-ballance to the strongest negative evidence that can be produced *.

Our author here very improperly talks of a contest between two oppofite experiences, the one of which deftroys the other. For when I believe a thing unusual, I do not believe a thing oppofite to mine own experience, but different from it, or a thing of which I have had no experience; though if it were a thing contrary to my own experience, provided it were confirmed by fufficient teftimony, this is not a valid argument against its truth, nor a fufficient reafon for disbelieving it. This gentleman himself hath mentioned a remarkable inftance of this kind in the Indian Prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of froft. This inftance, though he laboureth the point here, and in an additional note at the end of his book, is not at all favourable to his scheme. He acknowlegeth, that in this case of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy, and is SUCH AS A RATIONAL INDIAN

Adams's Effay, in anfwer to Hume on Miracles, p. 19, 20.

would

would not look for. The conftant experience LETTER in those countries, according to which the waters are always fluid, and never in a ftate of hardness and folidity, is against freezing. This according to his way of reafoning might be regarded as a proof drawn from conftant experience, and the uniform courfe of nature, as far as they knew it. Here then is an inftance, in which it is reasonable for men to believe upon good evidence an event no way conformable to their experience, and contrary to the rule of analogy, which yet he feems to make the only rule by which we are to judge of the credibility and truth of facts.

From the confideration of facts that are unufual, he proceeds to those that are miraculous, which is what he hath principally in view. And with regard to these he endeavoureth to fhew that no teftimony at all is to be admitted. "Let us fup"pose, faith he, that the fact which they affirm, "inflead of being only marvellous, is really

miraculous; and fuppofe alfo that the testimony confidered apart, and in itself, amounts "to an entire proof; in that cafe, there is proof "against proof, of which the strongest must pre

vail, but ftill with a diminution of its force " in proportion to that of its antagonist *." It may be proper to remark here, that this writer had in a former Effay defined a proof to be fuch an argument drawn from experience as leaves no room for doubt or oppofition†. Admitting • Hume's Philofophical Effays, p. 180. + 16. p. 93.

III.

LETTER this definition, it is improper and abfurd for him to talk of proof against proof. For fince a proof, according to his own account of it, leaves no room for doubt or oppofition; where there is a proper proof of a fact, there cannot be a proper proof at the fame time against it: For one truth cannot contradict another truth. And no doubt his intention is to fignify that there can be no proof given of a miracle at all, and that the proof is only on the other fide. For as he there adds, "A miracle is a violation of the laws of

nature, and as a firm and unalterable expe"rience hath established those laws" [he fhould have faid, hath difcovered to us that these are the eftablished laws, i. e. that this is the ordinary course of nature] "the proof against a miracle "from the very nature of the fact is as entire

as any argument from experience can poffibly "be imagined." He repeats this again afterward, and obferves, that "there must be an uni"form experience against every miraculous

event, other wife the event would not merit "the appellation; and as an uniform expe"rience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct " and full proof from the nature of the fact, "against the exiftence of any miracle *." He seems to have a very high opinion of the force of this way of reafoning, and therefore takes care to put his reader again in mind of it in the latter part of his Effay." "Tis experience alone, faith he, which gives authority to human te

Hume's Philofophical Effays, p. 181.

"stimony;

દ

cr

"ftimony; and 'tis the fame experience that "affures us of the laws of nature. When there"fore these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do, but to fubftract "the one from the other-And this fubftraction "with regard to all popular religions amounts "to an entire annihilation *." And it is chiefly upon this that he foundeth the arrogant cenfure, which, with an unparallelled affurance, he paffeth upon all that believe the Chriftian religion, viz. That "whofoever is moved by faith

LETTER

to affent to it, is confcious of a continued "miracle in his own perfon, which fubverts all "the principles of his understanding, and gives "him a determination to believe whatever is "moft contrary to custom and experience. It is thus that he concludes his Essay, as if he had for ever filenc'd all the advocates for Chriftianity, and they must henceforth either renounce their faith, or fubmit to pass with men of his fuperior understanding for perfons miraculously stupid, and utterly loft to all reafon and common fenfe.

Let us therefore examine what there is in this argument, that can fupport fuch a peculiar ftrain of confidence; and I believe it will appear, that never was there weaker reafoning fet off with fo much pomp and parade.

There is one general obfervation that may be fufficiently obvious to any man, who brings with him common fenfe and attention, and which is alone fufficient to fhew the fallacy of this Hume's Philofophical Effays, p. 202, 203.

boafted

III.

n