The Indianapolis, etc., G. R. Co. v. The State, ex rel. Flack, Comm'r, etc. be backed on and over the defendant's road, to its damage in a much larger sum than the amount of its assessment. The court sustained a demurrer to this answer, and this ruling is assigned as error. It is true, as counsel for appellant forcibly contends, that, in a statutory proceeding affecting the property of the citizen, -the statute must be substantially pursued, and that any material variance from the course of procedure therein prescribed vitiates the proceedings when properly brought in question. Merritt v. Village of Portchester, 71 N. Y. 309 (27 Am. R. 47); Combs v. Etter, 49 Ind. 535. This doctrine is peculiarly applicable to the proceedings prescribed in the location and establishment of the ditch in the first instance. The irregularities and departures set up in the answer do not pertain to the proceedings. They are not challenged. The omissions and departures, which are relied on as a defence, relate to the conduct and purposes of the commissioner who has the construction of the ditch in charge. As it seems to us the rule stated has no application to the facts relied on as a defence. The drainage commissioner, while he is constructing the work, is under the control and direction of the court, and it is provided in the statute that he must obey such directions, subject to the penalty of being dealt with as for a contempt, or of being removed by the court and subjected to damages on his bond. The remedy, therefore, is to apply to the court, and through its order and intervention secure the due execution of the work. The proceeding establishing the ditch and assessing benefits having been regularly taken, payment of assessments may be enforced, and it will be no answer in such a case to assail either the practicability of accomplishing the work so ordered or the conduct of the commissioner who has its execution in charge. That it was practical must be deemed to have been determined in the proceeding for the establishment of the ditch, and can not be again inquired into. If the commissioner is proceed The Indianapolis, etc., G. R. Co. v. The State, ex rel. Flack, Comm'r, etc. ing contrary to the method prescribed, or in any other manner neglecting his duty, a direct application to the court will secure the performance of its order. Anderson v. Baker, 98 Ind. 587; Patterson v. Baume, 43 Iowa, 477. We think the demurrer to the answer was properly sustained. The next objection urged against the rulings of the court relates to the form of the decree. The court rendered judgment against the appellant for the amount of the assessments, and gave a decree foreclosing the lien on its right of way. It also ordered the sale of a specified portion of the right of way to satisfy the judgment. The sale was ordered without relief from valuation or appraisement laws. The defendant objected and excepted to the decree and order of sale. The point made in respect to the decree and order is, that it was not competent for the court to enforce a lien for the assessment, and order a sale of part of appellant's right of way. It is said that the appellant's interest in its right of way is a mere easement, and was not subject to the enforcement of a lien, or to be sold in the manner ordered by the court. As we have already seen, the statute regulating the subject of draining provides that benefits and injury to easements in lands held by corporations, which are affected by the construction of a ditch, shall be estimated. It also provides that the commissioners shall embrace a description of all lands against which assessments are made in their report, and that the amounts shall become a lien on the lands against which they are assessed. We think from the whole scope of the act, it was the purpose of the Legislature to provide that all interests in land— no matter to whom it belonged-which might receive benefits from drainage, were subject to assessment for such benefits, and that the benefits so assessed should become a lien on the land or interest against which it was assessed. If in any case the right or interest of any person or corporation in any The Indianapolis, etc., G. R. Co. v. The State, ex rel. Flack, Comm'r, etc. land which is described in the petition is such that it is not subject to assessment of benefits, and consequently not subject to a lien for benefits assessed, this should be made to appear during the progress of the proceeding. If the proceeding is allowed to go to the extent of fixing an assessment on a specified interest or easement in land which is subject to assessment whether the interest or easement so assessed is owned by a natural or artificial person, the lien which follows such assessment can not be defeated by a collateral attack on the proceeding which imposed it. We have, therefore, this proposition: The statute authorizes assessments of benefits to be made against easements held by corporations in lands, which are properly described in the petition for the establishment of the drain, and in the report of the commissioners to whom the petition is referred. It also provides that such assessments shall constitute a lien on the land against which it is assessed. An assessment having been made and confirmed against an easement or right of way of a corporation, we must conclude that the easement, against which the assessment was made, was one against which an assessment could properly be made and one upon which a lien attached, as the statute provides it shall, and that all such other steps may be taken as are provided for making the lien effectual. The assessment sued for was, therefore, to be treated as constituting a lien on the appellant's easement in the land over which it had a right of way, as the same was described in the proceeding establishing the ditch. This lien the statute by its terms authorized the commissioners of drainage to enforce. This court held in Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. North, supra, that lands devoted to a public use by a corporation, under the power of eminent domain, could not be taken for another use without special authority to that end. Accordingly, it was ruled in that case that courts had no jurisdiction to order the location of a ditch longitudinally along the right The Indianapolis, etc., G. R. Co. v. The State, ex rel. Flack, Comm'r, etc. of way of a railroad. That question is, however, not involved here. We assent also to the general proposition, that the right of way of a railroad or turnpike company is not subject to sale on judicial process unless made so by statute. As respects gravel road companies, we think statutory authority to that end is conferred. Section 3646, R. S. 1881, concerning gravel road companies, provides that, upon execution issued upon any judgment or decree rendered in favor of any person or persons against a gravel road company, the property shall be sold without any valuation or appraisement. Whatever might be said concerning the right to sell the easement in part or the whole roadway of a turnpike company to satisfy an execution, we have no doubt that where a specific statutory lien is acquired upon the whole or any part of such easement, such lien may be enforced by a decree of foreclosure and sale. Where the statute fastens a specific lien on property, and authorizes the enforcement of such lien, a court must have the power to render a decree which will be effectual for its enforcement. The general proposition is true, and well supported, that the property of a public corporation, essential to its corporate existence and the execution of its corporate duty, can not be sold on execution or otherwise except as provided by statute; but the scope and meaning of the act under which gravel road companies are organized plainly indicates that its property in its road-bed is, to say the least, subject to sale in pursuance of a decree enforcing a statutory lien against it. Sections 3654, 3658, 3665, R. S. 1881. These sections provide that upon a sale of a gravel road upon any judgment rendered against it, the directors or other officers shall have the right to become purchasers the same as other persons, and that an organization may be formed for the purpose of purchasing and using a part or section of a road already built. Rowe v. Major, 92 Ind. 206. It thus results that the decree enforcing the lien and order Carver v. Lewis, Administrator. ing the sale in the manner prescribed in the decree was not erroneous. Judgment affirmed, with costs. ELLIOTT, J., did not participate in the decision of this case. No. 12,074. CARVER v. LEWIS, ADMINISTRATOR. DECEDENTS' ESTATES.—Administrator.-Failure to Inventory and Account for Assets.-Final Settlement.-Conclusiveness of.—The assignee of the children of a decedent can not maintain an action against the latter's administrator, who has made a final settlement and been discharged, and while such settlement remains in force, on the ground that, as administrator, he failed to turn over to himself, as guardian of such children, their portion of assets of the estate which he failed, as administrator, to inventory and account for, because such final settlement of the decedent's estate was an adjudication that he had properly accounted for all of such assets. From the Putnam Circuit Court. H. H. Mathias and J. B. Black, for appellant. ZOLLARS, J.-Appellant instituted this action to have a claim allowed against, and collected from, the estate of Jacob Durham, deceased, of which estate appellee is administrator. He filed an amended complaint in the circuit court, to which a demurrer was sustained. He seeks by this appeal to have that ruling reversed. The complaint, in the main, is the same as the complaint in the case of Carver v. Lewis, 104 Ind. 438. We need not, therefore, set it out here. There is this difference; here the appellant is seeking to recover, as the assignee of two of the children of Benjamin A. Durham, deceased. The assignment |