tified, and disturb the public content with complaints, which no wisdom or benevolence of govern

ment can remove.

It will not be thought extraordinary, that an idea, which occurs fo much oftener as the fubject of panegyric and carelefs declamation, than of just reafoning or correct knowledge, fhould be attended with uncertainty and confufion; or that it fhould be found impoflible to contrive a definition, which may include the numerous, unfettled, and ever varying fignifications, which the term is made to ftand for, and at the fame time accord with the condition and experience of focial life.

Of the two ideas that have been stated of civil liberty, whichever we affume, and whatever reasoning we found upon them, concerning its extent, nature, value and prefervation, this is the conclufionthat that people, government, and conftitution, is the freeft, which makes the best provifion for the enacting of expedient and falutary laws.

CHAP

СНА Р. VI.

OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT.

A

S a series of appeals must be finite, there neceffarily exists in every government a power from which the conftitution has provided no appeal; and which power, for that reafon, may be termed abfolute, omnipotent, uncontrollable, arbitrary, defpotic; and is alike fo in all countries.

The perfon, or affembly, in whom this power refides, is called the fovereign, or the fupreme power of the state.

Since to the fame power univerfally appertains the office of establishing public laws, it is called alfo the legislature of the state.

A government receives its denomination from the form of the legislature; which form is likewise what we commonly mean by the conftitution of a country.

Political writers enumerate three principal forms of government, which, however, are to be regarded rather as the fimple forms, by fome combination and intermixture of which all actual governments are compofed, than as any where exifting in a pure and elementary ftate. Thefe forms are,

I. Defpotifm, or abfolute MONARCHY, where the legiflature is in a fingle perfon.

II. An ARISTOCRACY, where the legislature is in a felect affembly, the members of which, either fill up by election the vacancies in their own body, or fucceed to their places in it by inheritance, proper

Bb 2

ty.

ty, tenure of certain lands, or in respect of some perfonal right, or qualification.

III. A REPUBLIC, or democracy, where the people at large, either collectively or by representation, conftitute the legislature.

The separate advantages of MONARCHY, are unity of council, activity, decifion, fecrecy, dispatch; the military ftrength and energy which refult from thefe qualities of government; the exclufion of popular and aristocratical contentions; the preventing, by a known rule of fucceffion, of all competition for the fupreme power; and thereby repreffing the hopes, intrigues, and dangerous ambition of afpiring citizens.

The mischiefs, or rather the dangers of MONARCHY, are tyranny, expence, exaction, military domination; unneceflary wars waged to gratify the paffions of an individual; risk of the character of the reigning prince; ignorance in the governors of the interefts and accommodation of the people, and a confequent deficiency of falutary regulations; want of conftancy and uniformity in the rules of government, and, proceeding from thence, infecurity of perfon and property.

The feparate advantage of an ARISTOCRACY Con fifts in the wisdom which may be expected from experience and education-a permanent council naturally poffeffes experience; and the members, who fucceed to their places in it by inheritance, will, probably, be trained and educated with a view to the stations, which they are destined by their birth to occupy.

The mischiefs of an ARISTOCRACY are, diffenfions in the ruling orders of the ftate, which, from the want of a common fuperior, are liable to proceed to the most desperate extremities; oppreffion of the lower orders by the privileges of the higher, and by laws partial to the feparate interests of the law makers.

The

The advantages of a REPUBLIC are, liberty, or exemption from needless restrictions; equal laws; regulations adapted to the wants and circumstances of the people; public fpirit, frugality, averfeness to war; the opportunities which democratic affemblies afford to men of every defcription, of producing their abilities and councils to public obfervation, and the exciting thereby, and calling forth to the service of the commonwealth, the faculties of its beft citizens.

The evils of a REPUBLIC are, diffenfions, tumults, faction; the attempts of powerful citizens to poffefs themselves of the empire; the confufion, rage, and clamour which are the inevitable confequences of affembling multitudes, and of propounding questions of ftate to the difcuffion of the people; the delay and disclosure of public councils and defigns; and the imbecility of measures retarded by the neceflity of obtaining the confent of numbers: laftly, the oppreffion of the provinces which are not admitted to a participation in the legiflative power.

A mixed government is compofed by the combination of two or more of the fimple forms of government above defcribed-and, in whatever proportion each form enters into the conftitution of a government, in the fame proportion may both the advantages and evils, which we have attributed to that form, be expected; that is, thofe are the ufes to be maintained and cultivated in each part of the conftitution, and thefe are the dangers to be provided against in each. Thus, if fecrecy and dispatch be truly enumerated amongst the separate excellencies of regal government; then a mixed government, which retains monarchy in one part of its conftitution, fhould be careful that the other eftates of the empire do not, by an officious and inquifitive interference with the executive functions, which are, or ought to be, referved to the admi

niftration

nistration of the prince, interpose delays, or divulge what it is expedient to conceal. On the other hand, if profufion, exaction, military domination, and needless wars, be justly accounted natural properties of monarchy, in its fimple unqualified form, then are these the objects to which, in a mixed government, the aristocratic and popular parts of the conftitution ought to direct their vigilance; the dangers against which they should raise and fortify their barriers: these are departments of fovereignty, over which a power of infpection and control ought to be depofited with the people.

ed

The fame obfervation may be repeated of all the other advantages and inconveniencies which have been afcribed to the feveral fimple forms of government; and affords a rule whereby to direct the construction, improvement, and administration of mixgovernments, fubjected however to this remark, that a quality fometimes refults from the conjunction of two fimple forms of government, which belongs not to the separate existence of either: thus corrup tion, which has no place in an abfolute monarchy, and little in a pure republic, is fure to gain admiffion into a conftitution, which divides the fupreme power between an executive magiftrate and a popular council.

An hereditary MONARCHY is univerfally to be preferred to an elective monarchy. The confeflion of every writer upon the fubject of civil government, the experience of ages, the example of Poland, and of the papal dominions feem to place this amongst the few indubitable maxims which the science of politics admits of. A crown is too fplendid a prize to be conferred upon merit. The paffions or interefts of the electors exclude all confideration of the qualities of the competitors. The fame obfervation holds concerning the appointment to any office which is attended with a great fhare of power

or