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endowment for charitable or pious purposes, but endow-| Sir E. Ryan said, that the court were satisfied that ments were appropriationst o the service of God, where all neither Hurryloll nor his attorneys were in fact contemporal uses were renounced by the donor. Such was senting parties to this order. A common consent paper not the case here. But, even admitting that it was an was put into counsel's hands, and it seems the practice endowment, how had it been shewn that a different rule of is for the opposite attorney to give the instructions upon construction ought to prevail as to the period of talking an understanding between the attornies themselves, aleffect. The general principle had been admitted, that though nominally the counsel are instructed by the according to Mahommedan law, a gift in prospectu can- attorney of their own client. Now the court was of not be valid the owner must divest himself of the opinion that it is the duty of counsel when handing property at the time. Now here the property was not in a consent paper to be so far acquainted with the immediately aliened-the proprietorship was retained, circumstances of the case as to be able to exercise for the owner might have disposed of it at any subse- his discretion in the event of matters taking an unforequent period. The treatise of M. D'Husson had been seen turn, and any alteration being suggested in the sneeringly referred to on the other side, because the terms of the order. Yet under the circumstances, dictum was in point against them. It must be admitted, especially as their Lordships were satisfied that the indeed, to be nothing more than the opinion of a learned attorney for the creditors must have been aware that no and able man, reasoning from what he had seen or consent would ever have been given voluntarily 10 heard. But what more was Mr. Hamilton's opinion. the altered terms, they could not hold this party or Sir F. Macnaghten's? they were opinions certainly bound by an order to which he never in fact conentitled to considerable weight. Nay, what was the sented. As to the costs of the present application, Hadaya itself? Undoubtedly a book of authority, when they must be paid by the respective attornies of the the meaning could be discovered, but the writers of defendant Hurryloll and of the two creditors. The that work appeared to resemble the ancient scholiasts, costs of the proceedings in the Master's office to who used to boast that they could maintain any question remain as before, and unaffected by this application. equally well on either sided. Motion granted for the withdrawal of the consent. The cases of Rodriguez v. Syed Buksh, and Bebee Hoorun v. Shaik Khyroolla stand on the Common Law Board fo: to-morrw, Friday (this day.) Hurk., March 16.
FRIDAY, MARCH 16.
(Before Sir Edward Ryan and Sir J. P. Grant.)
MARCELLINO RODRIGUEZ v. SYED RUKSH.
The Advocate-General and Mr. Tandes appeared for the plaintiff, no counsel were instructed on behalf of the defendant, who had let judgment go by default.
The Court at the conclusion of the argument said, that they should consider the case, and deliver judgment on a future day. In the course of the argument Sir E Ryan intimated that in motions for new trials, or to set aside verdicts, notice ought always to be given to the clerk of the papers, by the party intending to make the motion, in order that the exhibits produced in evidence at the trial, might be brought into court.
NIBBUNMONEY DABEY V. SHAMYLOLL TAGORE AND
Mr. Leith and Mr. Grant renewed the application previously made to the court, that the order, in which the consent of the defendant Hurryloll, had been inserted through mistake, might be altered. The necessary affidavits both of the attorney and of Hurryloll were now put in, deposing that neither the party nor his attorney at 12 per cent., lent by the plaintiff to the defendant. were in court at the time that the alteration was made
This was a writ of inquiry to assess damages, the action being in assumpsit for rupees 656, with interest
in the terms of the order.
A written instrument was put in, and the signature duly proved. The case did not fall within 21 of the new rules of pleading which directs that in certain actions brought for re-payment of money only, the prothonotary shall compute principal and interest.
The Court assessed the damages at the full amount claimed.
Mr. Prinsep, on behalf of the creditors, strenuously contended that the consent ought not to be withdrawn. It was either a lapse of counsel, or a dereliction of duty in the attorney, and the client was bound. If a consent paper is put in, it is the duty of the counsel or the attorney to exercise their discretion, whether under an altered state of circumstances the consent ought to be
BEEBEE HOORUN v. SHAIK KHY ROOLLAH. Mr. Prinsep and Mr. Leith were for the plaintiff-no withheld or not. It is too late to object afterwards, | counsel appeared for the defendaut, who had allowed and the retraction involves an innocent party in great hardship and expense, at all events the party in making Judgment to pass by default, and against whom the the present application ought to pay not only the damages were now assessed. full costs of the application itself, but all the costs
The action was assumpsit, on a special agreement,
terim in the master's office.
of the reference which had been going on in the in-nstituted by a wife against her husband. This agreement was a formal post-nuptial settlement, by which the husband undertook to pay a marriage-portion of Sa. Rs 4,000, one moiety immediately, and the other during wedlock; and, further, to find food and raiment for his wife, and not to marry a second wife without her consent and approbation. The breaches were, 1st, the nonpayment of the stipulated marriage portion; 2dly, default in providing for and maintaining the wife; 3dly, marrying a second wife without the consent of the plaintiff; and lastly, marrying a third wife.
The Advocate-General also opposed the application. appearing on behalf of Shamyloll the co-defendant, but he did not speak of costs, as his client could not be liable.
Mr. Clarke, as counsel for the complaint in the suit, said that it a was matter of indifference to him whether the disputed consent was given or withdrawn; but he had found it necessary to watch the proceedings in order that the disputes of the other parties might not have the effect of delaying his client in obtaining the benefit of his decree. It was for this reason that he had considered it to be his duty to urge upon the court that the reference ought not to be suspended in the Master's office during the continuance of these proceedings.
The Court at first questioned whether an agreement not to marry a plurality of wives (that privilege being recognized by Mahommedan law) was not allegal, as being against public policy, and in restraint of marriage in general; but its legality was afterwards admitted."
The deed of marriage settlement was put in and proved by the attesting witness and by the Mullah, who
The half-brother of the plaintiff was called to prove | September, and the contract was broken in July, the the circumstances. By his evidence it appeared, that plaintiffs might have sold immediately and obtained the the wife (the present plaintiff) had been sent on a visit full price agreed for. They have sustained no loss, to her father, and the defendant, in the meantime availed therefore, which the court can recognize, because they himself of the opportunity to take unto himself another might themselves have prevented it. It may be argued bride. His first wife returned once to the house; but, on the other side, that the time for the performance having quarrelled with her husband for his conjugal of the contract was not terminated at the expiration of infidelity, was promptly turned out, and never took up the period of ten days, and that, therefore, the plaintiffs her abode with him again. She had been living ever would not then have been at liberty to re-sell the indigo. since with her mother, and her personal expenditure But it is clear, from the terms of the agreement, that ten might amount to about eight rupees per month, besides days were limited absolutely, and that, at the close of four rupees for a servant, and the expenses of a child that time, the plaintiffs might have either re-sold the prowhich she had bought! perty, or brought an action immediately for the stipulaSir Edward Ryan.-The court is of opinion, that ted price. hat led the plaintiff is entitled to Rs 2,000, being that half of The Advocate-General in support of the rules. They the dower payable immediately; but the other moiety first contended that, admitting there was no loss from the cannot be said to have yet fallen due, because no par- deterioration of the value of indigo in the market up to ticular time having been specified, the husband must be September, they were entitled to some addition to the allowed the whole period of wedlock for the payment. verdict for nominal damages, on the ground that interest We also think that the wife is entitled to Rs 10 per on the money was due from the time of weighing. month for maintenance. As to the third and fourth breaches, we cannot consider the non-fulfilment of an engagement against marrying a plurality of wives, aing, or from the expiration of ten days. subject matter for damages, unless you can give posi tive proof what damages have been sustained.
doubt whether the interest ran from the time of weighSir Edward Ryan said, that there was considerable
Mr. Prinsep suggested, that as it was a valid breach nominal damages, at all events, ought to be entered, pro forma.
The Court acquiesced.
Verdict for the plaintiff accordingly.
(Before Sir Edward Ryan, and Sir John P. Grant.)
AMELIA DENT versus DE SOUZA AND OTHERS. The Advocate-General moved that it be referred to the Master to inquire and report what sum may be requisite to be set apart out of the estate for the purchase of a commission in the army and outfit expenses of an in fant ward. The learned counsel said, that he moved upon notice, and as there was no doubt that the infant was entitled to the property, he apprehended that there would be no opposition made.
The Advocate-General said that, if that was the case, and no advantage gained by either party. there would be no possible object in weighing the goods,
Mr. Clarke shewed cause. The plaintiffs are only entitled to a nominal verdict, because in this form of ac. tion they are bound to shew what precise amount of damages they sustained by the breach of contract. Now
Sir E. Ryan. Yes, there would. As soon as the goods were weighed an action might have been brought for their value immediately, as the property would be changed by the act, and the goods would thenceforth remain at the risk of the purchaser.
Mr. Prinsep followed on the same side.
SREEKISSEN SING versus GovINDCHUNDER BUNDOPADUYA.
Sir Edward Ryan.-There is no doubt whatever of the justice of this case; nevertheless, we are of opinion, The Advocate General on a former day had obtained a that the form of action ought in strictness to have been rule nisi to set aside the nominal verdict given at the for goods, bargained and sold. The plaintiffs would then trial of this case, and to enter a verdict for Rs 33,653, have been entitled to recover the full contract price, and instead. The action was for not accepting, and paying they might have maintained that action in July, as soon for 155 maunds of indigo agreed to be purchased at as the united period of ten days had expired. In the Sa. Rs 248 per maund. The agreement was entered into present form they are tied down to proving the precise on the 16th July, 1837, and the defendants undertook amount of damages which they sustained by the defento weigh the indigo within ten days, to remove it from dants' nonfulfilmant, and it is clear, that if the marketthe premises of the plaintiffs, and to pay the full amount price was not lower than the contract-price at the time of the purchase-money, or on default to payment interest when the contract ought to have been performed, the on the whole at the rate of 9 per cent. This the defen- plaintiffs actually suffered no loss, and are entitled only dant failed to do, and, in September, they endeavoured to to nominal damages. However, we think the verdict compromise the matter, and to obtain a remission of the ought to be increased on a different ground. Acprice, as the value of indigo was likely to be consider-cording to the evidence, although the price was susably deteriorated. From the evidence adduced at the tained for a long time, no sales were effected at all trial, it appeared, that indigo began to fall in the month until after the fall had taken place. For this reason of September, and that the greatest depreciation occurwe shall allow the plaintiffs damages at the rate of red in the following month, and that no sales in fact Sa. Rs 20 per maund, but we cannot give them the took place between July and December. costs of the present application.
The Advocate General then urged his main ground of argument, viz., that this was a continuing contract, and that the time of performance was not limited to the ten days, because the payment of interest was the penalty to which the defendants were to submit for the privilege of enlarging the time. The defendants treated it as an open contract by the negotiation which they kept on foot, and their application in September to have the price remitted. Again, it appears from the evidence that there were no sales of indigo between the months of July and December; this is a sufficient explanation of the alleged circumstance that the value was not depreciated for a long period. The price could not be said to have either risen or tallen, because, in fact, no sale could have been effected at all.
The councel for the plaintiffs urged another applicato the court, in the event of the first being refused, viz. that the plaintiff, might be allowed to discontinue and commence de novo. This point, however, becoming
SUMBOOCHUNDUR MOGKERJEE AND OTHERS versus NUBBOO
WALKER V. BRUCE.
The court this morning delivered judgment in this
Mr. Clarke (with whom was Mr. Barwell, for the plaintiffs) shewed cause against a rule obtained by Mr. Prinsep, for setting aside proceedings for irregularity. The plaintiffs had obtained a judgment in the original action, and several of the parties, plaintiff and defend- case. ants, having since died off, writs of scire facias, and alin scire facias were successively issued at different periods for an injury alleged to have been sustained by the Sir Edward Ryan. -This was an action on the case to revived the judgment. The revived proceedings were plaintiffs, by means of a false and fraudulent representa against the representatives of all the defendants, and the tion on the part of the defendants. It will be necessary rule nisi was obtained on the ground that the judgment for me to state the facts at some length, as several quesought to have been revived against the representatives tions were raised during the argument, concerning the of the survivor only. Now there is no authority to be facts which really were or were not proved at the trial. found in the books precisely in point, but it is contended
The Court inquired whether counsel recollected the decision given upon this point, or an analogous point, in the Tagore's case in March 1835.
that, as the rule of English law allows execution under The plaintiffs are merchants in Calcutta, and the dea scire facias against the personal and real representa- fendants carry on business as insurers at the same place, tives of the survivor, and against the real represen-under the style and firm of the Union Insurance Comtatives of the deceased, in this country where there is no pany One Dear Christian applied to Jones, the agent distinction between real and personal representatives, the of the defendants, to grant a policy on certain goods injudgment ought to be revived indiscriminately against tended to be consigned from Dinapore to Calcutta. the general representatives both of the survivor and the The policies were accordingly made out by this agent, who sent peons on board, with directions to take charge of the goods laden on board the boats. It was proved that according to the custom of trade, the peons were always the servants of the Insurance Company, and supplied by the party insured. It was further proved, distinguished by particular numbers, but the boats were that in general, the policies are not made out and given to the party, until it is ascertained that the goods have been actually shipped; and that, therefore, the agent ought not to have previously parted with the policies. Now, Jones was aware, at the time, that he granted the policies, that the goods were not on board; but, he himself swears, that he would not have parted with them, had it not been for his confidence in Christian's inte grity and good faith. In these policies the goods are expressed to be laden on board. There was also an indorsement, (never seen, however, by Jones), in the hand-writing of Christian, empowering the present plaintiffs to adjust in the event of loss. Christian, on obtain. ing the policies, transmitted them to the plaintiffs, advising them at the same time that he had consigned to twenty-drawn bills against the proceeds. These bills were them the goods mentioned therein, and that he had
PARKER versus HILLS.
Rule nisi granted.
The Advocate-General moved, upon the usual four hours' notice, for eight days further time to plead.cepted by the plaintiffs, and paid when due, but the The defendant was up the country, and a consultation goods, prevented to be consigned, never arrived, having was necessary between the attorney and his client before never been shipped on board at all. Christian, after a plea could be filed. successfully practising this fraud, absconds, and the consignors bring their action for the consequential injury they allege themselves to have sustained, through the representation made on the part of the Insurance Company. At the trial, we were of opinion, that the plaintiffs would not have accepted the bills, but for the representation made by the defendants, at the same time, however, we negatived all fraudulent intention in general and, therefore, by implication, any intent to defraud the plaintiffs individually. Under these circumstances we found a verdict for the plaintiffs, reserving liberty to move for a nonsuit. This rule having been obtained, and argued before us in the course of the present term, we are now of opinion that it must be made absolute.
Mr. Prinsep as counsel for the defendants, and Mr. Grant is Amicus Curia, mentioned that, in the case in question, the court held, after long deliberation, that the scire facias ought to be against the representatives of the survivor only.
Mr. Clarke said, that if that were really the case, he should not take up the time of the court by pressing the argument further, but he apprehended the decision would be found to be not quite in point.
The Court, after some further discussion, ordered the matter to stand over, for the purpose of ascertaining the
but we cannot make a special order relating to the ser vice, unless the parties have absconded, or some other special reason be shewn.
Rule nisi granted.-Hurk., March 20.
THURSDAY, MARCH 22.
(Before Sir E. Ryan, and Sir J. P. Grant.)
RAMNARAIN MOKERJEE versus ANNA MARIA GONSALVES.
The Advocate-General for a rule to shew cause why the judgment should not be set aside on the ground of gross fraud. From the facts sworn to in the affidavit, it appeared that Mrs. Gonsalves had been induced to sign certain papers, in the belief that they were securities to herself for certain sums of money which she had lent at different times; but the papers so signed turned out to be a deed of mortgage of a house and premises, and bond for Rs 40,000, with a warrant of attorney to enter up judgment thereon. The judgment had been entered up on this same warrant of attorney.
The learned counsel also applied to the court for a special order that service of the rule nisi on the attorney of the plaintiffs might be deemed good service; but he shewed no grounds.
The earlier cases clearly do not affect the present question, as they all proceeded upon the ground of posiHaycroft v. Creasy, Ashllin v. White, and Scott v. Lara. ive fraud. These are Palsy v. Freeman, Papp v. Lee, But two decisions of a more recent date approach nearer and afford some ground of argument for the defendant
RAMCHUNDER CHOWDRY v. SHAMYLOLL TAGORE.
FRIDAY, MARCH 23.
Corbett v. Brown, 8 Bing. By these cases a distinction | is taken between moral fraud, and fraud in law, and it is held that a statement, false within his own knowledge, made bythe defendant to the plaintiff, and occasioning an injury to the latter, will furnish a ground of action, without proof of any interested or malicious motive. The distinction, however, consists in this, that in all the cases stood for hearing ex-parte, on the equity board for torelied on for the plaintiffs, the false representation was day. Sir Edward Ryan said, that it would be more regular made directly to he plaintiffs, and with an intention to induce them to act upon the faith of it. The strongest to postpone it until to-morrow, as Thusday was a motioncase of all is Polhill v. Walter, 3 Barnewall, and day. Adolphus's Reports, p. 114,yet it is no exception to the previously established rule. In that case, the defenRAMCHUNDER CHOWDRY v. SHAMYLOLL TAGORE is dant had, in good faith, accepted a bill of exchange by the first of four cases, which are entered on the plea procuration for the drawee, but without any authority side for Friday (This day.)-Hurkaru, March 23. from the latter, and an endorsee, having been nonsuited in his action against the drawee, brought an action for the consequential injury thus sustained through the wrong ful representation of the defendant, that he was duly authorized to accept by procuration. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, because the defendant had in effect made the representation to each party to the bill individually, and the giving credit to such representation, was, according to the ordinary course of business and dealing, and was a natural and necessary result. If in the case before the Court, the insurers had express ly represented to the plaintiffs in particular that the goods were on board, and if the giving credit to the statement had been a matter within the ordinary course of dealing in the commercial world, the case would not have been distinguishable from Polhill v. Walter, and 1st Question. Whether, according to Mahommedan our judgment must have been for the plaintiffs. But we do not in the least degree interfere with the principle law, an endowment to charitable uses is valid, when established by the cases adverted to. Our decision pro-qualified by a reservation of the rents and profits to the ceeds upon the principle that a man can only be liable donor himself during his life? for the natural and necessary results, and not for the remote and indirect consequences of his acts.
(Before Sir E. Ryan and Sir J. P. Grant.)
DOE ON DEMISE OF JAUN BEBEE versus ABDOOLAH, BARBer.
Sir Edward Ryan intimated to the counsel in this ejectment case that the court found some difficulty in deciding the points which had arisen on Mahommedan law, and that they purposed, therefore, before giving judgment, to refer five questions for the opinion of the Moulavie, who would be directed to cite authorities for each position.
Sir John Grant fully concurred with the Chief Justice: His Lordship went over the facts, and stated at considerable length, the reasons upon which he grounded his judgment.
The Advocate-General Mr. Prinsep, and Mr. Clarke, for the plaintiffs.
Mr. Leith and Mr. Grant, for the defendants.
No cause was shewn.
JUGGUTCHUNDER MOOKERJEE V. RAJAH BURRO DICAUNT
In this case a demurrer had been filed by the defen-
Mr. Clarke and Mr. Leith for the defendant.
2d Question. Whether delivery of the property is essential, to render an endowment valid, according to the rule which governs other gifts?
3d Question.-Whether the endower can lawfully constitute himself Mutawallee or trustee?
DOE v. PRESTON,
The Advocate-General for the lessor of the plaintiff had obtained a rule nisi upon affidavits, for dispauper ing the parties who had entered into the rule to be made defendants in the place of the casual ejection, and who had been admitted to defend in formâ pauperis.
4th Question.-Whether a female can lawfully be Mutawallee?
BRODEAH BEBEE versus RUSSUM TUNDELL.
Mr. Prinsep stated the case for the plaintiff. This was
Mr. Marnell shewed cause upon affidavits that the property of the defendants was altogether worth a sum below the limited amount.
5th Question. Whether the instrument in question is a will, or a deed of endowment?
CUBBIN v. CURRIE.
Mr. Leith moved to make a rule absolute for an attachment on non-performance of an award, which had
Two sepoys having been examined in support of the plaintiff's case, it appeared from their testimony that the box had been broken open by the defendant, and the money abstracted. The court then interrupted the examination, and enquired how the case could be proceeded with when it appeared from the plaintiff's own witnesses that (if trust at all) the alleged cause of action amounted to a felony.
The plaintiff's counsel admitted that they could not get over the objection,
The Advocate General for the defence.
RAMDHYAL BUCKET V. RAMHET BUCKET AND OTHERS,
The particulars of this case are reported in the Hurkaru of February 7th. The action was brought to recover the sum of 1,000 rupees for money lent. Judg ment had been obtained by default against some of the defendants, and the case was heard ex-parte against the others, last term. A verdict was then obtained for the amount claimed and judgment entered up, but no notice of assessment of damages having been given to those of the defendants who had allowed judgment to pass by default, the court intimated the next day that the plain tiff could take nothing by his judgment.
Mr. Clarke stated the case. clerk in the Calcutta Lottery office, and the defendant is The plaintiff is the head a partner in the firm of Messrs. Moore and Hickey, auctioneers. Some time since, the plaintiff purchased a lot of shawls by auction, and gave them in custody to the sircar at the auction room, to be put aside until removed. On inquring for them subsequently, he discovered that one of the most valuable was missing, and an inferior shawl substituted. This matter he represented to the defendant, requesting that the shawl might be restored, or The Advocate-General and Mr. Cochrane for the plain- both alternatives, saying that no exchange of shawls bad the purchase cancelled altogether. defendant declined tiff.
taken place, and that he would sooner trust the word of his sircar than of the plaintiff. Upon this, the plaintif being irritated replied, that the auctioneers seemed to keep sircars for the express purpose of cheating their cus tomers! Defendant thereupon struck plaintiff a violent blow over the eye, insomuch that he was unable to attend to his business for some time, and was obliged to call in medical aid! The learned counsel said that the case was one of importance to the public. Tradesmea customers, by insinuations against the truth of the asserwere not to be permitted with impunity to insult their and then follow up insolence by committing an
The case was again heard ex-parte to-day, and the damages were now assessed upon due notice.
ROBERT WALKER V. THOMAS REEVES.
Mr. Prinsep opened the pleadings. This was an action in trespass, for pulling down and destroying plaintiff's wall, and throwing the bricks upon his premises, and committing other violence. The defendant had pleaded the general issue to all the trespasses except the demolition of the wall, which he justified upon the ground that his windows were ancient windows, and the plaintiff by building the wall had obstructed the light. The replications,
tion traversed the averment that the wall obstructed the light, and also that the windows were ancient.
WILLIAM BARRETT V. WILLIAM TULLOH FRASER.
Mr. Grant opened the pleading. This was an action for an assult, and the defendant had pleaded the general issue.
The Advocate-General stated the case.
Mr. Darling, of Messrs. Moore and Hickey's estab lishment; called as a witness. Defendant was standing at his desk at the time. There was a rail between him and plaintiff. The latter used abusive expressions, and found fault with the smallness of the establishment and of the bad management. The shawl in question had been
These parties lived in adjacent dwelling-houses. From the windows in question, which overlooked plaintiff's premises, defendant's servants had been in the habit of throwing rubbish, against which nuisance plaintiff had remonstrated in vain. He accordingly built this wall for his own pro-knocked down for forty rupees; the difference be tection and defendant, with the aid of his servants, had tween the two shawls was that one was a native shawl, taken upon himself forcibly to distroy it, and to throw the other a company's ; can swear that he saw no blow the bricks about on the plaintiff's premises, by which the struck, and that the defendant's fist was not clenched servants of the latter had been materially injured. It The defendant motioned the plaintiff away with his hand. would be for the other side to prove that the windows and, in doing so, he might have patted him on the face. were ancient, and if they succeeded, the question would still remain whether the wall was built high enough to obstrust the light. The learned counsel submitted that it would be necessary for the defendant to shew also some ownership in the house, in order to give him a right to abate the alleged nuisance.
From the cross examination of the witnesses called for the plaintiff himself, it appeared that the windows were ancient windows, i. e. existing more than twenty years, and that the wall was of such a height, and placed in such a position, as to cause an obstruction to the light.
This was of course sufficient to establish the defendant's justification; but the pleas having unnecessarily taken issue on certain allegations on which the plaintiff would be entitled to a nominal verdict. The court suggested that it appeared a fit case to be referred to the arbitration of some gentleman at the bar. After some discussion this was agreed to. The hesitation on the part of the defendant arose from the circumstance that there were other parties not on the record, who were interested as partners of the defendant. These parties had commenced actions on the case against the present plaintiff for obstructing the ancient lights, and the decision of the court could only bind those whose names appear as parties on the record.
The Advocate-General and Mr. Prinsep, for the plaintiff.
Mr. Clarke and Mr. Leith for the defendant.
Verdict for the plaintiff for nominal damages, subject to reference of all matters of dispute between the parties. Costs of the action, and of the award to be within the
Mr. H. S. Mercer attended the plaintiff. His eye was slightly ed, and he complained of a head-ache.
flickey were called, and deposed that the defendant did Two natives in the employment of Messrs. Moore, and strike the plaintiff, but it was with his hand open, while waving him back, and saying to the durwan, "turn this
Two er parte cases, and one defended cause,still remain on the common law board. There are no causes remain