Smith & Crittenden v. Wheeler. There can be no question that the two acts to be done by the parties are dependent upon each other. By the language of the instrument the defendant was "to receive certificates of stock when the note is paid." That means at the time the note is paid and not afterwards. See Courtright v. Deeds, supra. That the two instruments, being connected together and parts of the same transaction, are admissible in evidence as parts of the same contract, see Parsons on Notes and Bills, Vol. 2, p. 534, et seq. We think the court did not err in directing the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. AFFIRMED. SMITH & CRITTENDEN V. WHEELER ET AL. 1. Equity: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: RELIEF AGAINST. A court of equity will not extend a statute of limitations or relieve from its operation, in favor of a creditor, who relied implicitly upon the mail for the transmission of his claim, and who did not discover that it had miscarried, until several months after the time for filing claims had expired. Appeal from Crawford District Court. MONDAY, JUNE 12. ACTION in equity to obtain relief against an accident, alleged to have occurred, whereby the plaintiffs failed to file a claim with the assignee of their debtor, the defendant Wheeler. The question presented arises upon demurrer to the plaintiffs' petition. They averred in substance that their debtor, Wheeler, made an assingment for the benefit of his creditors, to the defendant, Richards; that the other defendants are creditors, who filed their verified claims with the assignee within the period of three months, as provided by statute; that plaintiffs intended to file their verified claim Smith & Crittenden v. Wheeler. also within that period; that they mailed the same in clue time to the assignee at his place of residence, with postage prepaid, but the same was lost in transmission; that they had no knowledge of the loss, but supposed that the same had been duly received by the assignee and filed, until sev. eral months after the period of three months had expired. They further averred that the assignee had sufficient funds in his hands to pay them their full pro rata dividend. The defendants demurred to the petition, and the demurrer was sustained. The plaintiffs appeal. Clinton, Hart & Brewer, for appellants. Conor & Shaw and Garrison & Roberts, for appellees. ADAMS, J.-It is not the province of a court of equity, ordinarily, to extend a statute of limitations, or relieve from its operation, so as to enable a creditor to enforce a claim which, has become barred at law, except relief against. where the statute itself so provides. Sugg v. Thrasher, 30 Miss., 135. 1. EQUITY : statute of limitations: The time allowed should be sufficient for careful and diligent creditors, notwithstanding the accidents and mistakes which are liable to occur and cause delay. We think we must conclusively presume that it is. The plaintiffs' fault was in relying implicitly upon the mail, when it is not to be implicitly relied upon. They should have called for an acknowledgment of the receipt of their claim. Had they done so, their failure to get such acknowledgment would have indicated that it had not been recieved. We think that the demurrer was rightly sustained. AFFIRMED. Wheaton v. Foster. WHEATON V. FOSTER. 1. Appeal: WHEN DISMISSED: CERTIFICATE: SPECIFIC QUESTION OF LAW. Where the certificate of the trial judge does not point out, with the requisite precision, the specific question of law upon which the decision of the Supreme Court is sought the appeal must be dismissed. L. T. Genung and E. B. Woodruff, for appellee. 1. APPEAL: sed: certifi question of law. ADAMS, J.-The case comes to this court upon a certificate which is in these words: "It is certified that the question, whether this court has jurisdiction, is one on when dismis- which it is desirable to have the opinion of the cate: specific Supreme Court." But the question certified does not, we think, point out, with the requsite precision, the question at law upon which the decision of this court is sought. The defendant questions the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court upon two distinct grounds. One is the want of jurisdiction of the justice of the peace by reason of the amount involved, and the other is the fact that the transcript of the justice filed in the Circuit Court did not show the rendition of a judgment against the defendant, although it appears that it was the defendant who took the appeal to the Circuit Court. It is not proper to certify to us a general question which cannot be fully determined without a search of the entire record, and the determination of two or more Stamy v. Laning. questions. In so doing we might, and oftentimes probably would, determine questions of no general interest or importance, and upon which the court below did not think it desirable to have the opinion of this court, and which it never intended to certify to us. In our opinion the appeal must be. DISMISSED. 58 662 91 638 58 662 115 52 58 662 117 703 STAMY V. LANING ET AL. 1. Conveyance: SECURITY FOR DEBT: FRAUD: HUSBAND AND WIFE. A conveyance by a husband to his wife, she knowing he was largely indebted at the time, will be treated as a security for the amount of her husband's bona fide indebtedness to her, and sustained to that extent; and, subject thereto, creditors may enforce their judgment against the property so conveyed. Appeal from Linn District Court. MONDAY, JUNE 12. THE plaintiff brings this action to set aside, as in fraud of his rights, a conveyance of certain property by the defendant, Martin A. Laning, to his wife Laura A. Laning. In the petition the plaintiff prays for general relief. The court dismissed the plaintiff's petition. The plaintiff appeals. The material facts are stated in the opinion. Stoneman, Rickel & Eastman, for appellant. J. D. Giffin, for appellees. 1. CONVEY DAY, J.-The plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant, Martin A. Laning, on the 11th day of October, 1880, and on the 4th day of November, 1880, reANCE: Sec covered a judgment for $286.38. On the 21st day of October, 1880, the defendant, for the express consideration of $100, conveyed to his wife, rity for debt: wife. Stamy v. Laning. Laura A. Laning, all of his real estate, consisting of 235 acres. On the same day Martin Laning executed to his wife for the expressed consideration of $1,458.38, a bill of sale for all his personal property, consisting of horses, cattle, farming utensils, blacksmith's tools, oats in the bin, corn in the field, etc. The defendant Laura was married to the defendant Martin in 1875, and is his second wife. She was introduced as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff and testified the personal property was sold to her in payment of $1,000, which she let her husband have about the time they were married, which at the time of the conveyance amounted to about the sum named in the bill of sale. She further testifies that the land was conveyed to her in consideration of her assuming to pay her father $100, owing to him by her husband, amounting, at the time of the conveyance, to about $126. She estimated the land at $25 per acre, amounting to $5,975, which is shown by other testimony to be about its value, and testified that it was incumbered by mortgages, including interest, to the extent of $5,600. She estimates the personal property at $1,949.30, which is shown to, be incumbered by a chattel mortgage for $140. There is nothing in the direct testimony, nor in the circumstances of the case, to impeach this testimony of Mrs. Laning. It does appear, however, that she knew her husband was indebted to the plaintiff, but it is not shown that she knew he had been sued thereon. Under the holding of this court in Keeder and Orvis & Co. v. Murphy, 43 Iowa, 413, the conveyances to the defendant, Mrs. Laning, should be treated as a security for the amount of her husband's indebtedness to her, and sustained to that extent. See, also, Strong v. Lawrence, ante, p. 55, and cases cited. The plaintiff's judgment may be enforced as a lien upon the real estate, subject to the payment to Mrs. Laning of the sum of $126, with interest at six per cent from the date of the conveyance. The plaintiff may also enforce his judgment against the personal property included in the bill of sale, subject to the chattel mortgage thereon, and sub |