INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Continued.

5. Remonstrance. — Parties. - Procedure. - Burden of Proof.—
Where a general remonstrance against the granting of a liquor
license is filed with the county auditor, the remonstrators be-
come adverse parties to subsequent applicants, and each side
is entitled to a hearing thereon, the burden being upon the re-
monstrators to show that a majority of the voters have signed.
Cain v. Allen, 8, 20 (7).
6. License. Application.-Denial.—Remonstrance. The denial
of an application for license to sell liquor, because of a remon-
strance, precludes another application by the same party for a
period of two years from the filing of the remonstrance.
Cain v. Allen, 8, 21 (8).

8.

-

7. Remonstrance.-Contest of.-An applicant for a license to sell
intoxicating liquors may contest the validity of a prior remon-
strance filed and adjudged by the board to be sufficient.
Cain v. Allen, 8, 22 (9).
Remonstrance.-Action of Board.-Boards of commissioners
have no jurisdiction, except where an application for license to
sell liquors is filed, to determine the sufficiency of a remon-
strance filed under $7283i Burns 1905, Acts 1905, p. 7.
Cain v. Allen, 8, 23 (11).
Remonstrance.-Execution.-Power of Attorney.-The voters
of a township or ward may by a written instrument authorize
an agent or attorney to sign for them a general liquor remon-
strance provided for by $7283i Burns 1905, Acts 1905, p. 7.
Cain v. Allen, 8, 24 (13).
10. Property.-Regulation. While the law recognizes a prop-
erty right in intoxicating liquors, still such ownership is subject
to legislative regulation under the police power.

9.

Cain v. Allen, 8, 24 (16).
11. General Remonstrance.-Withdrawals.-Voters have no right
to withdraw from general remonstrances, filed under the act of
1905 (Acts 1905, p. 7, $7283i Burns 1905), after the beginning
of the three-day period prior to the commencement of the regu-
lar session of the board.

Cain v. Allen, 8, 25 (18), 26 (18), 28 (18).
12. Remonstrance.-Form.-A liquor remonstrance substantially
in the form prescribed by statute ($7283i Burns 1905, Acts
1905, p. 7) is sufficient.
Cain v. Allen, 8, 26 (19).
13. General Remonstrance.-Time for Filing.-A general remon-
strance against the granting of a liquor license may be filed
three days before any regular session of the board of commis-
sioners.
Cain v. Allen, 8, 28 (20).
14. Remonstrance.-Right of Withdrawal.-Where a general re-
monstrance against the grant of a liquor license in a certain
township was filed three days before the October term of com-
missioners' court, the remonstrators thereon have no right to
withdraw their names at the November term, such signatures
being effective for two years from such October term.

Regadanz v. Haines, 140, 144 (2).
15. "Blanket" Remonstrances.-The filing of a "blanket" remon-
strance containing a majority of the legal voters of a township
deprives the circuit court, on appeal from the board of commis-
sioners, of the right to grant a license in such township.

Regadanz v. Haines, 140, 144 (3).

INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Continued.

16. Remonstrances. - Appeal. — Subsequent Remonstrances.
Where a remonstrance, under $7283i Burns 1901, Acts 1895,
p. 248, 89, was filed against an applicant for license to retail
intoxicating liquors, and he appealed from the order of the
board of commissioners refusing such license, the remonstrants
cannot defend in the circuit court on the ground that a remon-
strance, under $7283i Burns 1905, Acts 1905, p. 7, against the
traffic within such territory, was subsequently filed with such
board and sustained.
Sanasack v. Ader, 559, 561 (1).
17. Remonstrants. Substituting on Appeal.-Where a sole re-
monstrant contested, before the board of commissioners, an ap-
plication for license to retail intoxicating liquors, another
remonstrant cannot be substituted on appeal.

Sanasack v. Ader, 559, 562 (3).
18. Remonstrances Against Traffic. - Effect. A remonstrance,
under 72831 Burns 1905, Acts 1905, p. 7, constitutes a defense
against an application for license; and each applicant may con-
test the validity of same. Sanasack v. Ader, 559, 563 (4).
19. Police Power. The liquor traffic being necessarily dangerous
and destructive, is a fit subject for the exercise of the police
power; and the legislature may license, regulate or prohibit
Schmidt v. City of Indianapolis, 631, 638 (6).
20. License. Excessive.-Municipal Corporations.-A city ordi-
nance imposing a license fee of $1,000 upon breweries, distiller-
ies and depots of same is not invalid because excessive, since
the license fee may be regulated so as to discourage the busi-
Schmidt v. City of Indianapolis, 631, 640 (8).
21. Legislative Powers.-The legislature, except where restricted
by the Constitution, has the exclusive control over the sales of
intoxicating liquors.

same.

ness.

City of Greencastle v. Thompson, 493, 501 (2).
22. Municipal Corporations. Delegation of Power to.-In the
absence of constitutional inhibition, the legislature may delegate
to municipal corporations the power to control, regulate and
prohibit the liquor traffic.

JUDGES-

City of Greencastle v. Thompson, 493, 502 (3).

Salaries of, for newly-created courts, see CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
17; Board, etc., v. Albright, 564, 576 (15).

Misconduct of, as ground for a new trial, see NEW TRIAL, 10;
Pittsburgh, etc., Ř. Co. v. Collins, 467, 479 (20).

JUDGMENT-

As to appeals from, see APPEAL, 43-48.

Motion in arrest of, part of record proper, see APPEAL, 47; Ma-
lott v. Central Trust Co., 428, 432 (3).

As to law of the case, see APPEAL, 48; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v.
Collins, 467, 472 (2).

Entered, on appeal, as of date of submission, where death inter-
venes, see APPEAL, 51; Walters v. Walters, 45, 51 (10).

JUDGMENT-Continued.

Sentences run concurrently, see CRIMINAL LAW, 10; Peed v.
Brewster, 51.

Certificate of election, not subject to a collateral attack, see ELEC-
TIONS, 1; Hoy v. State, ex rel., 506, 515 (2).

Condition precedent to supplementary proceedings, see EXECU-
TION; West v. State, ex rel., 77, 81 (3).

Of sister state cannot be collaterally attacked in action founded
thereon, see HABEAS CORPUS, 2; Hardin v. Hardin, 352, 359 (6).
Personal judgment may be rendered against railroad company for
street assessment, see MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 35; Pittsburgh,
etc., R. Co. v. Taber, 419, 421 (1).

Street assessments, made by the front-foot rule, not subject to
collateral attack, see MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 40; Pittsburgh,
etc., R. Co. v. Taber, 419, 425 (7).

As to collateral attack on sewer assessment, see MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS, 48; Edwards v. Cooper, 54, 65 (8).

Order appointing appraisers, in eminent domain, conclusive on
right to condemn, unless appealed from, see PLEADING, 9; Van-
dalia Coal Co. v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 144, 147 (3).
Complaint on, see PLEADING, 21-23; Hardin v. Hardin, 352.
Motion in arrest of, should be sustained, where no jurisdiction,
see TRIAL, 60; Ernsperger v. City of Mishawaka, 253, 258 (10).
1. Final.-What Is.-A judgment disposing of the whole contro-
versy as to all of the parties, is final, regardless of the particu-
lar form of words used. State, ex rel., v. Lung, 553, 555 (1).
2. Final. Sustaining Demurrer.-Refusal to Plead.-A judg-
ment showing merely that the court sustained a demurrer to the
complaint and that plaintiff refused to plead further, does not
show a final judgment. State, ex rel., v. Lung, 553, 555 (2).
3. Final.-Refusal to Plead.-Costs.-A judgment showing that
the demurrer to plaintiff's complaint was sustained and that
plaintiff refused to plead further, and concluding: "It is there-
fore considered and adjudged by the court that the defendants
do have and recover of and from the plaintiff the costs of this
action herein made, taxed at dollars," is final.

State, ex rel., v. Lung, 553, 555 (3).
4. Final.-Defects.-Curing of.-Statutes.-The failure to in-
sert in a judgment, evidently intended to end the case, that
plaintiff take nothing by reason of the complaint, or that de-
fendants go hence without day, is cured by $670 Burns 1901,
$658 R. S. 1881, providing that defects, variances and imper-
fections which might be amended in the trial court, shall be so
considered.
State, ex rel., v. Lung, 553, 556 (4).
5. Divorce.-Binding Force, in Sister State.-A decree divorcing
the parents and providing for the custody of the children, ren-
dered by a sister-state court, having jurisdiction of the subject-
matter and of the parties, will be given full force and effect in
the courts of this State.

Hardin v. Hardin, 352, 356 (2), 359 (2).

JUDGMENT-Continued.

6. Motion to Modify.-Where the form or details of a decree are
objectionable, a motion to modify same is the proper practice.
Southern Ind. R. Co. v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 360,
377 (20).

7. Interlocutory. Subsequent Modification.-Interlocutory orders
are subject to subsequent modifications.

Southern Ind. R. Co. v. Indianapolis, etc., R. Co., 360,
377 (21).

8. Jurisdiction.-Collateral Attack.-Where attorneys appeared
for heirs in a suit to sell lands for the payment of the an-
cestor's debts, and such heirs later moved to set aside the decree
entered, on the ground that they were not parties thereto and
that such attorneys were unauthorized to appear for them, and
the court, after hearing the evidence thereon, overruled such
motion, they cannot afterwards in a separate suit question the
validity of such decree of sale.

9.

Griffis v. First Nat. Bank, 546, 553 (8).
Collateral Attack.-Cities.-Sewers.-Mere irregularities by
the board of public works in the construction of a sewer, even
though in obtaining jurisdiction, do not render the proceedings
subject to collateral attack. Edwards v. Cooper, 54, 70 (19).
10. Void.-Annexation of Territory.-Cities.-An order of the
city council for the annexation of unplatted land contiguous to
such city, made without the consent of the owner of such land, is
void for want of jurisdiction.

Ernsperger v. City of Mishawaka, 253, 256 (4).
11. What Is.-A judgment imports the final sentence or decision
of a court of law, wherein the rights of the parties therein are
judicially determined.
West v. State, ex rel., 77, 81 (4).
12. Collateral Attack.-Supplementary Proceedings.-Defendant,
in supplementary proceedings, cannot question the judgment on
which such proceedings are founded.

JUDICIAL SALES-

See PARTITION.

West v. State, ex rel., 77, 81 (5).

As to wife's rights on sale of husband's land, see CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 39; Green v. Estabrook, 123, 131 (12).

Statutory rights of wife, see STATUTES, 17; Green v. Estabrook,
123, 129 (7).

Wife's Rights. Subsequent Deed from Husband to Wife's Third.
-Purpose of Statute.-A subsequent deed, the wife not joining,
to the wife's one-third of land of the husband, two-thirds of
which was first ordered sold at judicial sale, conveys nothing,
the statute ($2669 Burns 1901, $2508 R. S. 1881) vesting title
to same in her, the purpose of the statute being to secure the
wife against the husband's misfortune as well as his improvi-
dence.
Green v. Estabrook, 123, 130 (9).

JURISDICTION-

See JUDGMENT.

Question of, presentable at any time, see APPEAL, 18; Sanasack v.
Ader, 559, 562 (2).

VOL. 168-48

JURISDICTION-Continued.

Of Supreme and Appellate Courts, in case of judgment for
$2,945, where validity of statute, repeatedly sustained, is again
questioned, see APPEAL, 42; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Rogers,
483, 485 (2).

Of Supreme Court, where judgment is less than $50 and the con-
struction of a statute is involved, see APPEAL, 43-46; Stults v.
Board, etc., 539.

As to parties on appeal, see APPEAL, 52, 53; Brown v. Brown,
654.

Of courts, see CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11-13; Board, etc., v. Al-
bright, 564.

Board has none, where majority has remonstrated against grant-
ing liquor license, see INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 3; Cain v. Allen,
8, 18 (5).

Over annexation proceedings by cities, see MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS, 2.

Not lost by city's change of plans of sewer construction, see Mu-
NICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 47; Edwards v. Cooper, 54, 64 (7).
Allegations of, in complaint on sister-state judgment, see PLEAD-
ING, 21-23; Hardin v. Hardin, 352.

Railroads.-Killing Stock.-The circuit court has original juris-
diction of an action against a railroad company for killing two
steers of the value of $90, though they were struck 200 feet
apart, one being instantly killed and the other mortally wounded.
Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Ramsey, 390, 392 (1).

JURY-

Juror, remotely related to accused's deceased husband, not subject
to peremptory challenge, see CRIMINAL LAW, 9; Gillespie v.
State, 298, 318 (5).

Opinion evidence not admissible, where jury is as capable of form-
ing an opinion as witness is, see EVIDENCE, 13; New Jersey, etc.,
R. Co. v. Tutt, 205, 216 (12).

Reasonable time for appraisement, question for, see INSURANCE,
6, 7; Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Wolf, 690.

Contributory negligence, question for, see MASTER AND SERVANT,
16; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Lightheiser, 438, 457 (19).
Proximate cause and contributory negligence, questions for, see
NEGLIGENCE, 21, 22; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Pritchard, 398.

Misconduct of, how shown, see NEW TRIAL, 9; Pittsburgh, etc., R.
Co. v. Collins, 467, 479 (21).

Whether employes of train should anticipate danger ahead, ordi-
narily question for, see RAILROADS, 17; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v.
Pritchard, 398, 416 (18).

Whether a railroad company impliedly invites persons to cross its
tracks, question for, see RAILROADS, 21; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co.
v. Simons, 333, 342 (5).

Negligence in backing train, question for, see RAILROADS, 25;
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Simons, 333, 346 (10).