ed to glorify his justice in the condemnation of some, as well as his mercy in the salvation of others; and to that end decreed to permit the fall of man, by which an occasion would be furnished for the display of both. We will here subjoin the account of Supralapsarianism as given by Dr. Gill, in his body of divinity, vol. i. p. 299. The question which he proposes to discuss is, "Whether men were considered in the mind of God in the decree of election, as fallen or unfallen; as in the corrupt mass through the fall, or in the pure mass of creatureship previous to it, and as to be created? There are some who think that the latter, so considered, were the objects of election in the divine mind. These are called Supralapsa rians, though of these some are of opinion that man was considered as to be created, or creatable; and others as created, but not fallen. The former seems best; that of the vast number of individuals which came up in the divine mind, whom his power could create, those whom he meant to bring into being he designed to glorify himself by them in (some way or other. The decree of election respecting any part of them may be distinguished into the decree of the end, and the decree of the means. The decree of the end respecting some is either subordinate to their eternal happiness, or ultimate; which is more properly the end, the glory of God; and if both are put together, it is a state of everlasting communion with God, for the glorifying of the riches of his sovereign grace and goodness. (Ephes. i. 5, 6.) The decree of the means includes the decree to create men, to permit them to fall, to recover them out of it through redemption by Christ, to sanctify them by the grace of the Spirit, and completely save them; and which are not to be reckoned as materially many decrees, but as making one formal decree; or they are not to be considered as subordinate, but as co-ordinate means, and as making up one entire complete medium: for it is not to be supposed that God decreed to create man that he might permit him to fall, in order to redeem, sanctify and save him; but he decreed all this that he might glorify his grace, mercy and justice. And in this way of considering the decrees of God they think that they suf ficiently obviate and remove the slanderous calumny cast upon them with respect to the other branch of predestination, which leaves men in the same state when others are chosen, and that for the glory of God. Which calumny 15, that according to them, God made man to damn him; whereas, according to their real sentiments, God decreed to make man, and made man neither to damn him nor save him, but for his own glory; which end is answered in them some way or other.-Again: They argue that the end is first in view before the means; and the decrce of the end is, in order of nature, before the decree of the means; and what is first in intention is last in execution. Now as the glory of God is the last in execution it must be first in intention; wherefore men must be considered in the decree of the end as not yet created and fallen; since the creation and permission of sin belong to the decree of the means, which, in order of nature, is after the decree of the end. And they add to this, that if God first decreed to create man, and suffer him to fall, and then out of the fall chose some to grace and glory, he must decree to create man without an end, which is to make God to do what no wise man would: for when a man is about to do any thing he proposes an end, and then contrives and fixes on ways and means to bring about that end; and it cannot be thought that the all-wise and only-wise God should act otherwise, who does all his works in wisdom, and has wisely designed them for his own glory. (Prov. xvi. 4.) They think also that this way of conceiving and speaking of these things best expresses the sovereignty of God in them, as declared in Rom. ix., where he is said to will such and such things, for no other reason but because he wills them: and hence the objector to the sovereign decrees of God is brought in, saying, 66 Why doth he yet find fault; who hath resisted his will?" And the answer to it is taken from the sovereign power of the potter over his clay; to which is added : "What if God willing," &c. to do this or that, who has any thing to say against it? He is accountable to none. (v. 15-22.) And this way of reasoning is thought to suit better with the instance of Jacob and Esau ! "The children being not yet born, and having done neither good nor evil, that the purpose of God, according to election, might stand,” (v. 10.) than with supposing persons, considered in predestination, as already created, and în the corrupt mass; and particu larly it best suits with the unformed clay of the potter, out of which he makes one vessel to honour and another to dishonour on which Beza remarks, that if the apostle had considered mankind as corrupted, he would not have said that some vessels were made to honour and some to dishonour; but rather that, seeing all the vessels would be fit for dishonour, some were left in that dishonour, and others translated from dishonour to honour. They further observe, that elect angels could not be considered in the corrupt mass when chosen, since they never fell; and therefore it is most reasonable that as they, so those angels that were not chosen were considered in the same pure mass of creatureship; and so in like manner men: to which they add, the human nature of Christ, which is the object of election to a greater dignity than that of angels and men, could not be considered in the corrupt mass, since it fell not in Adam, nor never came into any corrupt state; and yet it was chosen out of the people: (Psal. Ixxxix. 19.) and consequently the people out of whom it was chosen must be considered as yet not fallen and corrupt, and who also were chosen in him, and therefore not so considered. These are hints of some of the arguments used on this side of the question. 66 who are called Sublapsarians, and are for men beingconsidered as created and fallen in the decree of election, urge John xv. 19: I have chosen you out of the world. Now the world is full of wickedness, it lies in it, is under the power of the wicked one, the inhabitants of it live in sin, and all of them are corrupt and abomin able; and therefore they who are chosen out of them must be so too. But this text is not to be understood of eternal election, but of effectual vocation, by which men are called and separated from the world, among whom they have had their conversation before conversion, and have lived accórding to the course of it. They further observe, that the elect are called vessels of mercy, which supposes them to have been miserable, and sinful, and to stand in need of mercy, and must be so considered in their election: but though through various means the elect are brought to happiness, which are owing to the mercy of God; such as the mission of Christ to save them, the forgiveness of their sins, their regeneration and salvation, and so fitly called vessels of mercy; yet it follows not that they were considered as in need of mercy in their choice to happiness.-It is On the other hand, those also said that men are chosen in Christ as Mediator, Redeemer, and Saviour; which implies that an offence is given and taken, and reconciliation is to be made, and redemption from sin, and the curse of the law broken, and compleat salvation to be effected by Christ: all which supposes men to be sinful, as it does. But then men are chosen in Christ, not as the meritorious cause of election, but as the mean or medium of bringing them to the happiness they are chosen to.--It is moreover taken notice of that the transitus in scripture is not from election to creation, but to vocation, justification, adoption, sanctification, and salvation. But, for instance, can vocation be supposed without creation? It is thought that this way of considering men as fallen in the decree of election, is more mild and gentle than the other, and best accounts for the justice of God; that since all are in the corrupt mass, it cannot be unjust in him to chuse some out of it to undeserved happiness, and to leave others in it, who perish justly in it for their sins; or that since all are deserving of the wrath of God for sin, where is the injustice of appointing some not unto the wrath they deserve, but unto salvation by Christ, when others are fore-ordained to just condemnation and wrath for their sins? But on the other hand, what reason also can there be to charge God with injustice, that in as much as all are considered in the pure mass of creatureship, that some should be chosen in it, and others be passed by in it, and both for his own glory? These are some of the principal arguments used on both sides. The difference is not so great as may be thought at first sight: for both agree in the main and material things in the doctrine of election; as,-(1.) That it is personal, and particular; is of persons by name, whose names are written in the Lamb's book of life.-(2.) That it is absolute and unconditional, not depending on the will of men, nor on any thing to be done by the creature.—(3.) That it is wholly owing to the will and pleasure of God, and not to the faith, holiness, obedience, and good works of men ; nor to a foresight of all or any of these.-(4.) That both elect and non-elect are considered alike, and are upon an equal foot in the decree of predestination; as those that are for the corrupt mass they suppose that they were both considered in it equally alike, so that there was nothing in the one that was not in the other; which was a reason why the one should be chosen and the other left so those that are for the pure mass suppose both to be considered in the same, and as not yet born, and having done neither good nor evil. (5.) That it is an eternal act in God, and not temporal, or which commenced not in time, but from all eternity for it is not the opinion of the Sublapsarians that God passed the decree of election after men were actually created and fallen, only that they were considered in the divine mind from all eternity in the decree of election as if they were created and fallen. Wherefore, though they differ in the consideration of the object of election, as thus and thus diversified, yet they agree in the thing, and agree to differ, as they should, and not charge one another with unsoundness and heterodoxy, for which there is no reason. "Calvin was for the corrupt mass; Beza, who was co-pastor with him in the church at Geneva, and his successor, was for the pure mass; and yet they lived in great peace, love, and harmony. The Contra-remonstrants in Holland, when Arminianism first appeared among them, were not agreed in this point; some took one side of the question, and some the other; but they both united against the com mon adversary, the Arminians. Dr. Twiss, who was as great a Supralapsarian as perhaps ever was, and carried things as high as any man ever did, and as closely studied the point, and as well understood it, and perhaps better than any one did; and yet he confesses that it was only apex logicus, a point in logic; and that the difference only lay in the ordering and ranging the decrees of God: and, for my own part, I think both may be taken in ; that in the decree of the end, the ultimate end, the glory of God, for which he does all things, men might be considered in the divine mind as creatable, not yet created and fallen; and that in the decree of the means, which, among other things, takes in the mediation of Christ, redemption by him, and the sanctification of the Spirit, they might be considered as created, fallen, and sinful, which these things imply. Nor does this suppose separate acts and decrees in God, or any priority and posteriority in them, which in God are but one and together; but our finite minds are obliged to consider them one after another, not being able to take them in together and at once."] SWEDENBORGIANS, so called from the late Hon. Emanuel Swedenborg, son of |