§ 1275. Duress May Be Ground for Setting Aside a Deed -But a conveyance although it may have been obtained by duress, still it is not absolutely void, but only voidable, and if ratified after the removal of the coercing influence, it cannot thereafter be avoided." 54 Duress is defined to be a condition which exists where one by an unlawful act of another is induced to make a contract or perform or forego some act under circumstances which deprive him of the exercise of free will. There must be such compulsion affecting the mind as shows that the execution of the contract or other instrument is not the voluntary act of the maker. 55 To justify the setting aside a deed on the ground of duress the grantor must, at the time of its execution, have been in such fear of his life or of bodily harm in case of refusal, as to so affect the mind that the execution of the deed was not his free and voluntary act. Mere vexation, annoyance and threats of personal injury, or imprisonment for which there is no ground, or threats of criminal prosecution, do not constitute duress where no proceedings have been commenced and no warrant issued. Exhibiting a pistol to and slapping the grantor, to induce him to sign a deed, when the acts take place some time before the signing of the deed, do not constitute duress, where it appears that the grantor did not conclude to sign the instrument until after deliberation and taking advice. Threats, abuse and assaults which do not compel the grantor to make the conveyance, in law, do not amount to duress.56 § 1276. Corporation as Grantor-When it appears from the minutes of the board of directors of a corporation that a resolution was adopted directing the president of the company to sell a tract of land and to execute the necessary deed therefor, under the corporate seal, and the president subsequently refuses to act as president, and the vice presi 54-Bogue v. Franks, 199 Ill. 411. 55 Harris v. Flack, 289 Ill. 222. 2 R. P.-8 Citing a large number of authorities. 56-Hintz v. Hintz, 222 Ill. 248. dent assumed to discharge the duties of the president, and, in strict conformity with the resolution, conveyed the land by deed, under the corporate seal, signing as vice president, and acting president, but the deed was not countersigned by the secretary, as required by the by-laws of the company, it was held that the deed was well executed, and was amply sufficient to convey the title of the company. While it is usual for the secretaries of such companies to attest the execution of such instruments, as the keeper of the seal, yet, if the charter of the company does not require such attestation, the deed will be good without it; strangers dealing with the company are not bound to know the provisions of the by-laws, and are not bound by them. They can only be expected to see that such instruments are executed in the usual form by the head of the company.5 The following form has been approved as a proper execution of a deed by a corporation: "In witness whereof the said Mississippi and Atlantic Railroad Company has caused these presents to be signed by its vice president, acting as president by reason of a vacancy in the presidency, and their corporate seal to be thereto affixed the day and year first above written. John Brough, (SEAL) Vice-Pres., and Acting Pres., M. & A. R. R. Co.'' 58 But it is suggested that the following is a better form: "In witness whereof the said Mississippi and Atlantic Railroad Company has caused its name to be subscribed to these presents by its Vice President, acting as President by reason of a vacancy in the office of President, and its corporate seal to be hereto affixed, attested by its Secretary, the day and year first above written. ATTEST: (SEAL) Mississippi and Atlantic Railroad Company, by John Brough, its Vice President, acting President of said Company. John Jones, Secretary of said Company." 58-Smith v. Smith, 62 Ill. 493. 57-Smith v. Smith, 62 Ill. 493. § 1278. Quasi Corporations as Grantors-It is a familiar doctrine, of general recognition by the courts, the counties and political divisions of the state for governmental purposes, only possess a low order of corporate existence, and for this reason are generally designated "Quasi corporations," and are conceded to possess no powers except such as are expressly conferred or exist by reason of necessary implication. In conformity with this well recognized principle it was settled in an early period in our judicial history and the rule has been steadily adhered to ever since, that a county has no power to give away or otherwise dispose of its funds or property for a purpose not authorized by law. So unless the facts come within the law authorizing counties to act and convey their lands, a trust deed executed to secure the bonds of a county issued in payment of its subscription to the stock of a railroad company, will be held to be illegal. And the foreclosure of such a trust deed in a United States court will have no binding force upon persons not made parties thereto. And where such persons acquire their title in a lawful manner from the county, they may maintain a bill to remove a deed procured under such foreclosure proceedings, as a cloud upon their title.59 § 1279. Forged Deed-It may be remarked here that a forged deed is absolutely void and of no effect whatever, however innocent the party claiming under it may be. A party obtaining title to land under a forged instrument acquires no title to the land which can prevail over the true title.60 § 1280. Name of Grantee Essential in Deed-It is a principle generally received that an instrument, purporting to be a deed, without the name of the grantee inserted in it, at the time of its execution, is no deed, and conveys no interest to the party whose name is afterwards inserted 59-Scates v. King, 110 Ill. 456. therein as grantee. And such a deed cannot be available as a monument of title.61 Equity will disarm a party of such a title as against the true owner, who has himself been guilty of no wrong. 62 It was urged that a deed without the name of the grantee in it, to be placed therein when a grantee was found, is no more than the execution of a power of attorney to make a deed out and out. But the court replied that the law was the other way, citing Blackstone .to the effect that in every grant there must be a grantor, a grantee, and a thing granted. That if any of these were omitted the deed was void: It might be very convenient, and probably produce no injury to any interest of society, that a party, wishing to sell a tract of land, should be permitted to execute and deliver a deed to an agent, with a blank for the name of the grantee, to be filled in when a purchaser was found, but the law does not permit it. The courts are organized to administer the law, not to make it. One of the most valuable principles pervading our jurisprudence is, that system of law is best which confides as little as possible to the discretion of the judge,-that judge the best, who relies as little as possible on his own opinion.63 Although the name of the grantee may be omitted from the granting clause in the deed, yet if it can be gathered from the instrument who the grantee was intended to be, the instrument will not be held to be invalid on account of such omission.64 If the grantor disclaims any interest in the land such disclaimer amounts to a ratification of the acts of the agent of the grantor.65 § 1280a. Deed to Grantee by Description-The object of names being merely to distinguish one person from an 61-Chase v. Palmer, 29 Ill. 306; Winchester F. I. Co. v. Jennings, 70 Ill. App. 359; Mackey v. Barton, 194 Ill. 446. 62-Whitaker v. Miller, 83 Ill. 381. 63-Chase v. Palmer, 29 Ill. 306. 64—Richey v. Sinclair, 167 Ill. 184. 65-Donason v. Barbero, 230 Ill. 138. other, it seems to be sufficient for this purpose though the true name of the party be not used, or even no name at all. The general principle of law is, id certum est quod certum reddi potest, and a man may be described by his office, or his relationship to a known person. So where a deed was made to a corporation in which the name of the corporation was fully or correctly stated, and it appeared that there was no other corporation organized for a like purpose, it was held that the deed conveyed a good title to the corporation, sufficient to enable it to recover in ejectment." § 1281. Deed to the Heirs of a Living Person—It is a well settled rule that a conveyance of a present estate to the heir or heirs of the body of a living person is void for uncertainty, because those who will take as heirs cannot be known until the person's death. A grant to the heirs of a living person has been construed as meaning children where such has plainly appeared to be the intention of the grantor. In cases where expressions are used in connection with the technical words which clearly indicate that such technical words are not used in accordance with their technical signification, they will not be so construed.67 § 1282. Presumption of Law as to the Grantee-In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption of law is that the grantee in a deed is a bona fide purchaser from the grantor.68 § 1283. Grantee Must Be in Being A grantee must be in esse at the time the deed is executed, otherwise no title will pass by the deed. The common law did not treat children en ventre sa mere as persons in esse for the purpose of holding or acquiring property. This capacity only attached upon their birth alive. Consequently by the old 66-Preachers Aid Society v. England, 106 Ill. 125. 67-Etna L. I. Co. v. Hoppin, 249, IL 406; Dubois v. Judy, 291 Ill. 340. 68 Pickett v. Hartsock, 15 Ill. 279. |