with the statute in regard to the subdivision and platting of property, this fact destroys the validity of such a plat as a statutory subdivision. The plat is an entirety, and it cannot be partly statutory, and partly not statutory.92 § 1464. Dedication of Lands to the Public-A public highway, or alley, may be established in three ways: (1) By condemnation in the mode prescribed by the statute; (2) By grant, which may be established by producing the deed making the grant, or by long continued user for twenty years or more, implying a previous grant; (3) By dedication, either expressed or implied, to the public use by the owner of the soil. Where it does not appear that either of these methods have been adopted it cannot be held that the public have acquired any right or interest in the alleged highway. In order to establish a dedication at common law, it is essential (1) that an intention on the part of the proprietor of the land to donate the same to the public use, and (2) an acceptance thereof by the public to be established by the evidence, and (3) that the proof as to these facts must be clear, satisfactory and unequivocal. The vital and controlling principle in a common law dedication is the animus donandi, and where there is no manifestation on the part of the proprietor of the soil, either by formal dedication, or by such acts as would equitably estop him from denying such intention, to donate land to the use of the public, it cannot be said there is a valid dedication. The mere nonassertion of a right does not establish a dedication of lands to the public. A dedication is not the act of omission to assert a right, but it is the affirmative act of the donor, resulting from an active, and not a passive, condition of the owner. The making of a plat by a public officer for the purpose of 92-Goodwilly Co. v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 241 Ill. 42. taxation, which shows a strip of land which is to be regarded as an alley is not binding on the owner. He does not represent the public and could not by any act of his create a highway. And the fact that the property has been assessed according to the plat is immaterial as to the rights of the owner or as indication of acceptance thereof by the public.93 The case of the Union Coal Co. v. City of LaSalle, 136 Ill. 119, is an interesting case in regard to the platting and dedication of lands to the public for public use. It appeared that the territory within the city of LaSalle was originally platted by the Canal Trustees, the holders of the legal title, in accordance with the provisions of the statute, so as to vest, under the statute, the title in fee simple in the city; that the coal company, without any title or authority, mined coal under the streets of the city, and the city had sued the company in trespass therefor. The proper question submitted to the court was one of law, whether the court properly found the defendant guilty on the facts established. In this regard the court says: "By our statute the acknowledgment and recording of a plat by the owner of lands within the city, by which such lands are subdivided into blocks, lots, streets, alleys, public squares, etc., is declared to operate, both at law and in equity, to a conveyance in fee by the owner of the city of such portions of the lands platted as are embraced in the streets, alleys and other grounds dedicated to the use of the public, and it is provided that the lands embraced in such streets, alleys and other public places shall be held by the city in its corporate name in trust for the uses and purposes set forth and intended by the plat. It results from this provision of the statute, that the legal title to the streets and alleys in question in this suit is vested in the city of LaSalle, in trust for the use of the public for the purposes of streets and alleys. 93-Chicago v. Borden, 190 Ill. 430. The trust thus vested in the city is not a mere naked trust, but one in the execution of which the city has and holds the possession, control, management and supervision of the trust property. It is the duty of the trustee to defend and protect the title to the trust estate and as the legal title is in him he alone can sue and be sued in a court at law. That the entry of the defendant upon the strata of coal underlying the streets of LaSalle and mining coal therefrom was a trespass cannot admit of a doubt."' 94 From this decision it is to be gathered that where a plat and subdivision of land is made and recorded in pursuance with the statute in that regard the fee of the streets and public grounds which passes thereby to the municipality is a fee simple absolute, for all purposes, and the common law in regard thereto, that the ownership of the surface of the ground includes therein the ownership from the center of the earth to the heavens above, prevails completely and absolutely, although the conveyance may be for a particular purpose, or upon a particular trust. § 1465. Heir or Devisee Liable for Debts of AncestorStatute "When any lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any rents or profits out of the same, shall descend to any heir, or be devised to any devisee, and the personal estate of the ancestor of such heir or devisor of such devisee shall be insufficient to discharge the just demands against such ancestor, or devisor's estate, such heir or devisee shall be liable to the creditor of their ancestor or devisor to the full amount of the lands, tenements or hereditaments, or rents and profits out of the same, as may descend or be devised to said heir or devisee; and in all cases where any heir or devisee shall be liable to pay the debts of his executor or devisor, in regard to any lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any rents or profits arising out of the same, descending or being devised to him, and shall sell, alien or make over 94-Union Coal Co. v. LaSalle, 136 Ill. 119. the same before any action brought, or process sued out against him, such heir at law or devisee shall be answerable for such debt to the value of the said lands, tenements and hereditaments, rents or profits so by him aliened or made over; and executions may be taken out on any judgment so obtained against such heir or devisee, to the value of said lands, tenements and hereditaments, rents and profits, out of the same, as if the same were his own proper debts, saving and excepting that the lands and tenements, rents and profits, by him bóna fide aliened, before action brought, shall not be liable to such execution."' 95 § 1466. Liability of Heir or Devisee at Common Law-At common law a devisee was not liable for the debts of the testator even in respect to the land devised. Nor was an heir liable for the debts of his ancestor, in respect to lands descended, except in particular cases; such as debts due on specialties, in which the ancestor expressly bound the heir, and on judgments recovered against the ancestor and recognizances acknowledged by him. And where the heir alienated the lands before suit brought, the creditor was without remedy against him. But under our statute the devisee has no just claim to the land until the debts of the testator are fully paid. Nor has the heir any superior rights to the lands of the ancestor. They both acquire the land subject to the payment of the debts of the former owner. They are only entitled to the surplus that remains after the debts are discharged. If the creditor cannot obtain satisfaction of his debt from the personalty he may resort to the real estate in the hands of the heirs or devisees, and in case of a bona fide alienation of the same, suit may be brought and he may charge them personally with its value.96 § 1467. Statutory Liability of Heir or Devisee, a Cumulative Remedy-In the case of Crocker v. Smith, 10 Ill. App. 95 Sec. 12, Ch. 59 (Frauds & Perjuries) R. S. 96-Ryan v. Jones, 15 Ill. 1. 376, it was contended that the plaintiff had not brought himself within the provisions of the Statute on Frauds and Perjuries, and that the statute worked a repeal of the common law. To which the court replies: "We do not so understand the law. The remedies against heirs and devisees furnished by the statute, are cumulative in their character, and afford not only a means for the collection of many debts and demands against deceased persons, for the collection of which no provision existed prior thereto. but also additional means for the collection of such debts as were already at common law a charge upon the heir. The purpose of the statute was not to change the common law remedy then existing for specialty creditors, when the ancestor had expressly bound the heir, but to give additional remedies, not only to them, but to all creditors of the deceased." 97 This is usually done, however, by a proceeding by the administrator or executor against the heirs and others for an order to sell the lands of the deceased to pay his debts, on it being ascertained that the personal property is insufficient to do so. The statute provides that all demands against the estate of a deceased person not exhibited in the county court within two (now one) years from the granting of letters of administration shall be forever barred, except as to subsequently discovered assets, not inventoried or accounted for by the executor or administrator. But the heirs and devisees of a deceased person are liable to the amount of property received by them from the estate of the deceased where the cause of action against the deceased did not fully arise until after the closing of the estate.9 98 But a creditor cannot maintain an action against heirs, on the debt of a deceased ancestor, without also joining the personal representative of the deceased as a co-defendant, except in two cases, first, where a judgment has already 97-Crocker v. Smith, 10 Ill. App. 98-Dugger v. Oglesby, 99 Ill. 405. |