title thereto after he has parted with all his interest in the land.48 It is a familiar rule that the statements of a grantor, made after the execution of the deed, are inadmissible for the purpose of invalidating the deed. No parol declaration made by such grantor is admissible for that purpose. 49 A partner, declaring at the time the mortgage was made by his co-partner, that his co-partner was the owner of the property and that he had no interest in it, is estopped from claiming the property as partnership property, and a judgment creditor, having notice thereof, is bound by such estoppel.50 It is not necessary to the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, that there should be a fraudulent intent on the part of the party making the statement or representation. It is enough if there would be a fraudulent effect from the evidence attempted to be set up. The doctrine of equitable estoppel arises and is applied when that which would perpetuate a gross fraud and injustice is sought to be brought forward. The rule in regard to equitable estoppel applies where the land owner has been active and encouraged and induced the other party to act to his disadvantage.5 51 § 1484. Estoppels in Their Nature of Three Kinds It is to be observed that estoppels are of three kinds in regard to their nature, viz.: They are (1) by matter of record; (2) by matter in writing (deed) and (3) by matter in pais. Estoppels by matter of record are such as arise from the adjudication of a competent court. Judgments of courts of record and decrees and other final determinations of ecclesiastical, marine, and military courts work an estoppel. Estoppel by deed are such as arise from the provisions of a deed. It is a general rule that a party to a deed is 51-Hill v. Blackwelder, 113 Ill. 48-Holton v. Dunker, 198 Ill. 407. 49-Shea v. Murphy, 164 Ill. 614. 50-Cross v. Weare Com. Co., 153 Ill. 499. 283. estopped from denying anything stated therein, which has operated upon the other party, as the inducement to accept and act under the deed. To constitute an estoppel, the deed must be good and valid in its form and execution. It is said that an estoppel of this kind must convey no title which the warranty of title can operate in case of covenant, they affect only the parties and privies in blood, law or estate, and they must be reciprocal. The doctrine of estoppel as applied to the administration of justice is that one may have what, according to the understanding of the parties, he bought and paid for.52 In relation to the title to land, an estoppel by deed arises where there is in the deed an express or implied representation that the grantor, at the time of his conveyance, was possessed of the title which his deed purports to convey. If there is such a representation, and it is false, whether he has committed a fraud, or is acting under an honest belief, he is estopped from denying that he has title; he could not, by setting it up, defeat his own grant. It is unimportant to notice the difference of opinion in the books, as to whether the covenants operate to convey or transfer the after acquired title or whether the title remains in the grantor by estopping him from asserting title contrary to his deed. Nor whether it is important that section 7, chapter 30, of the revised statutes is declaratory of the common law, or changes the same in any respect. This statute applies only to deeds which purport to convey an estate in fee. A conveyance warranty deed by one not having title is made as valid to pass an after acquired title as if the grantor had the legal title at the time of the conveyance.53 Where a party conveys land by a deed with full covenants of warranty, and before action is brought on the covenant, the owner of the outstanding title conveys it to 52-Bennett v. Waller, 23 Ill. 97; Holbrook v. Debo, 99 Ill. 372. 53-Guertin v. Mombleau, 144 Ill. 32; Hill v. Blackwelder, 113 Ill. 283. the grantor, the effect of the latter conveyance is to vest, by virtue of the statute and by way of estoppel, the legal title in such grantee.54 § 1485. Estoppels in Pais are such as arise from the acts and declarations of a person by which he induces another to alter his position, injuriously to himself. This principle has been applied to cases of dedication of lands to a public use, and where the owner stands by and sees land improved and sold without making known his claim.55 § 1486. Estoppel Applicable to Municipalities-While the statutes of limitation may not be invoked against a municipality in regard to the public property, yet the doctrine of equitable estoppel is sometimes applied to them. But in order to estop the city authorities from reclaiming a portion of a street which has been enclosed by an abutting owner with his lot, it must appear not only that the city authorities have ceased, for a long time, to exercise control over such portion, and that by reason thereof the owner has been induced to believe the strip to have been abandoned, and he has erected expensive structures and improvements thereon. § 1487. Liens on Lands-It might not be out of place here also to slightly refer to the general subject of liens on lands. The law provides, in a number of cases, for liens on lands, such as judgments, mechanics, indebtedness, vendors and others. But these are so vast and important that many able volumes on each of them have been written, and it would not be in harmony with the intention of this work to refer to them other than in a cursory manner. § 1488. Judgment Liens-Under the statute a judgment of a court of record is a lien on the real estate of the person against whom it is obtained situated within the county for which the court rendering the judgment is held, from the 54-Wadhams v. Swan, 109 Ill. 47; Lewis v. Pleasants, 143 Ill. 271; Owen v. Brookport, 208 Ill. 35. 55-Douvier's Dic. 541. time the same is rendered or revived for the period of seven years and no longer. And upon the filing in the office of the clerk of any court of record in any county in this state, of a transcript of a judgment or decree rendered in any other county of this state, such judgment shall have the like force and effect, and shall be a lien upon the real estate of the party against whom the same may be obtained in said county where filed. But unless execution is issued on such judgments within one year from the time the same became a lien it shall thereafter cease to be a lien.56 And when it shall appear by the return of an execution issued by a justice of the peace that the defendant has not personal property sufficient to satisfy the judgment and it is desired by the plaintiff to have satisfied out of real property it shall be lawful for the justice of the peace to certify to the clerk of the circuit court of the county a transcript of his judgment and thereupon the same shall have the same force and effect of a judgment of the circuit court.57 All persons are required to take notice of the judgments of courts of record, and when dealing with property subject to the liens of such judgments they are bound thereby whether in fact they have such knowledge or not.58 The rule is a familiar one, that judgments become liens on the real estate of the defendant in the order in which they are rendered.59 § 1489. Judgment on Constructive Notice-Where a defendant is brought into court by constructive notice, and has received no notice in writing of the existence of a decree against him, as authorized by the statute, such decree is, for the period of three years, simply provisional, and subject to be set aside on petition, and as of course. 56 Sec. 1, Ch. 77, R. S. 57-Sec. 1, Art. 12, Ch. 134, R. S. 58-Calif. v. Parsons, 48 Ill. App. 59-Hallorn v. Trum, 125 Ill. 247. In form, it is a final decree, but it does not become so in fact, and does not conclude the parties until the lapse of three years; from the time it thus becomes final, the defendant, having received no notice, has five years (now three years-Sec. 117, Ch. 110, R. S.) within which to prosecute his writ of error or file his bill of review. During the three years the parties are still in court, and at the end of that period the statute provides that the court may make such further order in the premises as may be just. "We are the more inclined to the view we have taken, because this statute by which the parties are brought into court upon constructive notice, though undoubtedly necessary for the administration of justice, may be made the means of perpetrating very great wrongs. 60 § 1490. Liens of Creditor's Bills Creditor's bills, with proper and distinct averments as to the property attempted to be reached, will become liens upon the filing of the bill and acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant. A junior creditor may obtain a prior lien by exhausting his remedy at law in first invoking the aid of a court of equity, by filing his bill and the due service of process. The commencement of a suit in equity does not constitute lis pendens until summons or subpoena has been served or jurisdiction over the defendant otherwise obtained. It must be shown, however, that the judgment debtor had some interest in the property conveyed by him, in order to sustain a creditor's bill to have such conveyance set aside as fraudulent as to creditors.61 § 1491. Priority of Lien on Land of Debtor Fraudulently Conveyed-In a contest between creditors of a common debtor who had fraudulently conveyed his property with the intent of defrauding them, it appeared that one party had secured a judgment and levied an execution on prop 60-Lyon v. Robbins, 46 Ill. 276. 61-Hallorn v. Trum, 125 Ill. 247; Clark v. Wilson, 127 Ill. 449. |