life of the tenant, supposing the condition remain unbroken. Where, however, the estate at its utmost is a chattel interest, and must determine at a certain time, it is not ranked among estates of freehold. § 1208. Validity or Invalidity of Conditions-If the expressed conditions be conditions subsequent, and be impossible at the time of their creation, or afterwards become impossible by the act of God or the act of the freeholder himself, or if they be contrary to law, or repugnant to the nature of the estate, they are void. In any of which cases, if they be conditions subsequent, that is, to be performed after the estate is vested, the estate becomes absolute in the tenant. For he has the grant of the estate vested in him, which shall not be defeated afterwards by a condition either impossible, illegal, or repug nant. But if the condition be precedent, or to be performed before the estate vests, the estate which depends thereon is also void, and the grantee shall take nothing by the grant; for he has no estate until the condition is performed.70 These provisions of the common law prevail to a great extent in Illinois and affect our system of conveyancing, and a review of the Illinois authorities on this subject will be profitable. And while we are on this subject the law in regard to conditions may with propriety be fully examined. Where the condition in a deed is contrary to good morals, or in antagonism with a statute or the common law, or against public policy, it will be held to be invalid, and the estate will be relieved from it. It is not the interest of the parties alone which is to be considered the true test, but in each particular case, under the facts, the judicial inquiry is, will the enforcement of the condition be inimical to the public interest. Whatever tends to injustice or oppression, restraint of liberty, re 70-2 Black, Com., 153-7. straint of legal right, to the obstruction of justice, violation of statutes, the obstruction or perversion of the administration of the law; whatever tends to interfere with the control or administration of the law as to executive, legislative or other official action, whenever embodied in and made the subject of a contract, the contract is against public policy and therefore void, and not susceptible of enforcement; as for instance, an agreement to withdraw an election petition in consideration of money, an agreement to obtain a pardon, contracts for services known as lobby services, an agreement to resign a public office in favor of another and using influence to appoint the latter as his successor, conditions in general restraint of marriage, procuring a nolle proseque from the governor, to prevent competition in a bidding for government contracts, these have all been held contrary to public policy and void. But when the condition is made in good faith and stipulates for nothing that is malum in se or malum prohibitum, before the court should determine the condition to be void, as contravening public policy, it should be satisfied that the advantage to accrue to the public for so holding is certain and substantial, and not theoretical and problematical. So it has been universally held that conditions in deeds restraining the grantee from selling intoxicating liquors on the premises, and an agreement not to run a stage coach on a certain road, and a condition that the party would not at any time thereafter, own, run or be interested in any line of packet boats on the Erie canal, a condition that a school house should not be erected on the premises or a distillery, or a machine shop for iron manufactory, or a cemetery or that the premises conveyed should not be used as a hotel, or for the manufacturing of resin oil, and a condition that the grantee should have the exclusive right to sell beer to any public house erected on the land, and that the premises should not be used as a public house, and in a deed to a county on the express condition that the county would erect thereon within five years, 2 R. P.-4 a court house for the use of said county have all been held valid conditions. And so it was held that a condition in a deed that no building shall be erected on any part of the land conveyed in which to handle grain that no grain shall ever be handled on said land by the grantee therein his grantee, administrator, executor, assigns or lessees, or by any one holding by, through or under him; and if the agreement is broken, said land shall revert to the grantor, on a breach of the condition it was held that the grantor might recover in ejectment."1 The validity of a condition subsequent depends upon its being such as the law will allow to divest an estate, for, if the law deems the condition void as against public policy, then the estate will be absolutely free from the condition. And the rule is not different if it should be regarded that the proceeding were one to require the re-conveyance of the property, on account of a want or failure of consideration. A court of equity will not lend its aid to enforce the performance of a contract which appears to have been entered into by both the contracting parties for the express purpose of doing that which is illegal; and when such a contract has been executed by one of the parties by conveying real estate, a court of equity will not, in general, interfere, but will leave the title of the property where the parties have placed it. Where a party to an illegal or immoral contract comes himself to be relieved from the contract, or its obligations, he must distinctly and exclusively state such grounds of relief as the court can legally attend to, and he must not accompany his claim to relief, which may be legitimate, with other claims and complaints which are contaminated with the original immoral purpose for if he sets up, as a ground for relief, the non-fulfilment of the illegal contract on the other side, and thereby he is released from his 71-Wakefield v. Van Tassell, 202 Ill. 41. obligation to perform it, that shows that he still relies upon the immoral contract and its terms of relief, and therefore the court will refuse it. So where there was a conveyance of property to the trustees of a railroad in which there was a condition that no depot should be erected within three miles of a certain village, it was held that such a condition was contrary to public policy, and a bill by the grantors to forfeit the property on account of the violation of the condition was dismissed.72 In case of Lyman v. The Suburban Railroad Co., 190 Ill. 320, a bill in equity was filed praying that all rights, privileges and easements heretofore granted by the trustees of the Grant Land Association of Chicago to the Chicago and Southwestern Railway Co. and now claimed by the defendants in certain premises therein described be decreed to be terminated and that the same be vested in the complainant as trustee of said association, and that the said complainant as such trustee be decreed to hold the same free and clear of any and all claim thereto by the defendants and that all personal property placed thereon be removed and that the defendants be restrained and enjoined from in any way interfering with the complainant in the exercise and use of said premises. To this bill a general demurrer was filed and sustained by the court. The condition in the grant to the railroad company was that it was made upon the express agreement and understanding that the company would construct, operate and maintain the railroad and perform all the conditions and provisions contained in the grant on its part to be performed as therein granted and that a failure so to do it should forfeit all its rights thereunder. And one of the conditions was that the company should erect two depots at certain designated localities. 72-St. Louis, J. & C. R. R. Co. v. Mathers, 71 Ill. 592. The breaches assigned were that the company had not maintained its railroad nor erected the depots as designated. It was argued that the stipulation to erect and maintain the depots was void. In this regard it is said, that agreements of the character mentioned are of three classes. Where those in which stipulations are contained providing for the location of stations or depots at particular places and prohibiting the location or erection of any others within certain limits. Concerning all such agreements, they are uniformly held to be void, as against public policy. Another class of cases are those in which some officer or other person, supposed to be influential with the railroad company, undertakes, for a consideration moving to them, to secure the location of stations, depots at a particular place. All such contracts are void, as against public policy. Still another class is that to which the case under consideration is allied. Such are the cases in which an agreement has been made between an individual and a railroad corporation for the location of a station or depot at a particular place, in consideration of the donation of money or property to the corporation, without any restriction or prohibition against any other location. It has been held that an agreement to pay a railroad company a stipulated sum in consideration that it would locate its route at a particular place is valid and may be enforced. Such an agreement is not in contravention for public policy. The construction and operation of the railroad for a short term of years does not fulfill the conditions of the agreement.73 § 1209. Doubtful Conditions Construed as Covenants—If from the language employed it is doubtful whether the clause is a condition or a covenant it will be construed as a covenant. The rule that where a clause is susceptible of different constructions, that construction will be adopted 73-Lyman v. Suburban R. R. Co. 190 Ill. 320. |