which would endanger, and might wreck, the dam. The bear-trap dam itself was an old and well-known structure, long in practical and successful use. The plaintiff and his main witness testified, in substance, that to accomplish the beneficial result obtained by this relieving device without its use would require constant manual service,the employment of a skilled watchman day and night at each dam,-the plaintiff estimating the cost of this manual labor at $1,500 a year for each dam; and upon that basis it was claimed that the defendant was chargeable with profits. No other evidence of profits or gains was offered. But it seems to me from the proofs that the plaintiff and his witness lacked practical knowledge of the working of bear-trap dams, at least as the same are used in the defendant's business. Their expressed views on this subject were largely conjectural and speculative, and I agree with the master that they are inadmissible as the basis for an accounting in this case. Mayor, etc., v. Ransom, 23 How. 487. It is a familiar and well-settled principle that an infringer is liable only for profits or savings actually realized by him from the use of the patented invention, and shown by clear and definite proof. Dean v. Mason, 20 How. 198; Philp v. Nock, 17 Wall. 460; Garretson v. Clark, 111 U. S. 120, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291; Rude v. Westcott, 130 U. S. 152, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 463. Now, the defendant's infringing dams were small bear-trap dams, erected and maintained in a small private and unnavigable stream, and were used exclusively for raising artificial floods for log-driving purposes, except two dams at the saw-mill, where a pool was maintained for floating and handling the logs. The height of the dams was but from 4 to 5 feet; the cost of construction of each dam only about $500; and the cost of replacing the lower leaf, if swept away, but from $25 to $30. In fact, the defendant's dams were provided each with side stops or cleats, fastened on the sides of the dam or leaf chamber, which was an old protecting device; and the proofs are direct and clear that these side stops, as used on the dams of the defendant, were sufficient to withstand all pressure to which the gates of the dam were subjected, and that the side stops, when used alone, afford as adequate protection to the defendant's dams as the plaintiff's automatic relieving device could do. Such, in substance, is the master's finding on this branch of the case, and it is fully justified by the proofs. The plaintiff's theory that the use of his automatic relieving device effected a saving to the defendant in the matter of manual service was completely overthrown by proved facts, and the evidence is strong and persuasive that the defendant realized no profits or saving whatever from its use. There are other special findings of fact by the master, going to sustain his general conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled only to nominal damages, which I will not discuss nor recite. It is enough for me to say that I am not convinced that there is any error in any of his findings. In the result reached by the master I fully concur. Upon the subject of costs little need be said. I do not agree with the defendant's counsel that by virtue of section 973 of the Revised Statutes costs are to be denied the plaintiff for want of a partial disclaimer. The words found in the body of the specification, "If de sired, the discharge opening may be controlled by a valve operated by a float," do not import that the patentee was the inventor of the float, or its application to operate a valve; and certainly no such matter is embraced in any claim of the patent. The master, who was perfectly familiar with the course of the litigation as conducted before him, has included in his finding the allowance of full costs to the plaintiff, and I am disposed to adopt his recommendation in that regard. Let a final decree be drawn in accordance with the master's report. VERMONT FARM MACH. Co. v. GIBSON. (Circuit Court, D. Vermont. May 22, 1891.) 1. PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS-ANTICIPATION-PROCESS FOR RAISING CREAM. Letters patent No. 187,516, issued February 30, 1877, to William Cooley for a "process of treating milk for raising cream by sealing with water and air the cover applied directly to the vessel containing the milk," was not anticipated by earlier patents for coolers for preserving milk by a similar process, since the latter process was not designed and never used for raising cream." 2. SAME-INFRINGEMENT. A purchase of a creamery from the patentee, with cans for raising cream by his process, gives the purchaser no right to practice the process by water-sealing other cans purchased from a different manufacturer. In Equity. William Edgar Simonds, for orator. G. G. Frelinghuysen, for defendant. WHEELER, J. This suit is brought upon the first claim of patent No. 187,516, dated February 30, 1877, and granted to William Cooley for an improvement in obtaining cream from milk, which covers "the process of treating milk for raising cream by sealing with water and air the cover applied directly to the vessel containing the milk, substantially as set forth," and has now been heard upon a motion for a preliminary injunction. This claim has been sustained by an elaborate opinion from Judge MCCRARY, (Boyd v. Cherry, 4 McCrary, 70.) Some patents said not to have been shown in that case have been produced here. They are all for apparatus, and none for this process. One, No. 59,993, dated November 27, 1866, and granted to William Garrard for a cooler for preserving, among other things, milk, describes sealing with water the cover applied directly to the vessel containing the milk. That cream would rise from milk so held in this apparatus is said; and that therefore this patent shows this process is said. But, if cream would be so raised, the patent does not show that this result was intended or understood, but rather the contrary, for the apparatus was for preserving milk, not for raising cream from it. No use of this apparatus, and consequently no observation of any raising of cream by it, is shown. This patent did not give this process to the public, and is not in any sense an anticipa tion. Under the reasoning of Judge MCCRARY, this, and the other patents now shown, would have fallen with those which were before him. The defendant appears to have purchased from the orator a creamery, with four cans for raising cream by this process. The Barden Cream Separator Company refitted it for him with six new cans of their make. These cans, as placed in this creamery, operated in raising cream by sealing with water the cover applied directly to the vessel containing the milk, although since then the water has been lowered, so as not to so operate. The defendant insists that the purchase of the creamery from the orator brought with it the right to practice that process with the cans bought with it, and with any others, more or less in number, that might be put into it. This process is practiced by water-sealing the cans, which might be done as well by placing them in water elsewhere as in water in the creamery. The sale of the creamery without cans would have carried no right to practice the process; the sale of the cans without the creamery would carry the right to use them as fully as the vendor could, which would include the right to practice the patented process with them. This right was carried by operation of law with the cans, and attached to them. They could be repaired, and their identity and that right would remain. When replaced by others, their identity was gone, and the right to use the process was gone with them. Wilson v. Simpson, 9 How. 109; Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U. S. 89, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 52. No right to use the process apart from the things sold follows from the sale merely of the things. The Barden cans are not in themselves infringements of this claim, but their use by the defendant when water-sealed, as he has used them, appears to be an infringement, against which the orator appears to be entitled to an injunction. The motion is granted as to further use of the process with any of the six cans. THE VEENDAM.1 AMERICAN PETROLEUM Co. v. The Veendam. (District Court, S. D. New York. June 5, 1891.) SALVAGE-BROKEN SHAFT-TOWAGE-FOG-SERVICE ENDED BEFORE REACHING PORT. The steam-ship V., with cargo and freight worth $375,000, and 600 passengers, on a voyage from Rotterdam to New York broke her shaft 900 miles east of Halifax. La F., in answer to signals of danger, took her in tow for 3 days, when the V., having repaired her shaft, steamed ahead, outran La F., and became lost in the fog about 9:30 P. M., not renewing signals, or seeking to keep La F.'s company. The next morning La F., not being able to find the V., and supposing her to have gone ahead, resumed her voyage. A half hour after the V. disappeared in the fog her shaft again gave way, and after 24 hours delay it was again repaired, so as to enable her to steam into port. La F. was worth $200.000. The towage was in part through fog, and in circumstances of special danger. Held, (1) that the service 'Reported by Edward G. Benedict, Esq., of the New York bar. rendered was of a salvage nature; (2) that the acts of the V. amounted to a termination by her of the salvage service before reaching port; that La F. fulfilled her duties; that there was no abandonment by her of the salvage service; and $8,500 was awarded her. In Admiralty. Wheeler, Curtis & Godkin, for claimant. BROWN, J. The above libel was filed to obtain compensation for salvage services rendered by the libelant's steam-ship La Flandre, a threemasted tank steam-ship of about 1,509 tons net register, valued at $200,000, to the respondent's mail and passenger steam-ship Veendam, on a voyage from Rotterdam to New York in May, 1891. The Veendam is a large steamer, 432 feet long by 40 feet beam, and of 2,209 tons net register. Her value, with cargo, freight, and passenger money, was $375,000. On this voyage she had 600 passengers, besides officers and crew about 100. At about 2:30 P. M. of May 15th her shaft broke, when she was about 1,350 miles from New York, and about 900 miles due east from Halifax. Preparations were made to attempt to repair the shaft, and signals for help were given. On the morning of May 16th, the lights of La Flandre being reported, additional signals of distress by rockets and by flags asking assistance were displayed. In answer to these signals, La Flandre went along-side of the Veendam, and was requested to take her in tow. One end of the Veendam's hawser of about 90 fathoms was drawn to La Flandre, and the other end was shackled to the Veendam's anchor cable. The compressor of the Veendam's windlass broke, causing 150 fathoms of the anchor chain to run out before it could be stopped, and the outboard weight was too great for the Veendam's windlass to heave it in again. At 9:30 A. M. on the 16th La Flandre commenced to tow, making about 4 knots per hour, her speed being impeded by the great drag of the anchor chain. The weather was hazy, the sea favorable. The towing continued until half past 10 o'clock P. M. of Sunday, May 17th, when, it appearing by soundings that they had reached the Grand Bank, they stopped, and the Veendam took in 100 fathoms of chain. After an hour's delay the towing was resumed. There was then thick fog, which grew more dense towards morning. Fog-horns on fishing vessels were heard, sometimes close aboard, and the most careful watch was necessary. At 5 A. M. on Monday, the 18th, a fishing vessel was so close under La Flandre's port bow as to require her to port her helm. The Veendam also ported hard, and before they came into line again the towing hawser parted. The fog was then so thick, and the danger of going on so great, that both vessels anchored, about three lengths apart. The distance towed during the previous 48 hours was about 191 miles. During all this time endeavors to repair the Veendam's shaft had been going on, and at half past 11 on the 18th it was reported to La Flandre that the temporary repairs would soon be complete, and that an attempt would be made by the Veendam to start under her own steam, which was done at 3:30 o'clock that afternoon. Captain Roggeveen, of the Veendam, signaled La Flandre to follow him, which she did, making about one knot per hour less speed than the Veendam. At 6 P. M. the latter, to avoid stopping her engine, returned towards La Flandre, and signaled that her engine worked well. A 9:30 P. M. a light fog coming on, the Veendam was lost sight of. No other signals for assistance being seen or heard, La Flandre continued during the night on a course W. by S., as directed by the Veendam's master. At daylight the Veendam was not to be seen, and, after steaming about for over an hour, the master of La Flandre, concluding that the Veendam required no further assistance, and had gone ahead of him, resumed her course to Philadelphia, where she arrived on May 24th, having lost a little over two days' time in the performance of these services. In fact, however, about 10 P. M. of the 18th, half an hour after the Veendam was lost sight of in the fog, one of the repair couplings gave way, compelling another stop of about 24 hours, when, the couplings being again repaired, and secured by additional chains, the Veendam resunied her course, and, making about 8 knots per hour, arrived without further difficulty in New York at 10 A. M. of May 25th. 1. I cannot doubt that the services rendered in this case were of a salvage nature, as distinguished from ordinary towage. That subject has been several times considered in this court. Such services are treated as salvage when rendered to a disabled ship with the obvious purpose of relieving her from circumstances of danger, either present or reasonably to be apprehended, and not merely to expedite her passage. The Saragossa, 1 Ben. 552; The Emily B. Souder, 15 Blatchf. 185; McConnochie v. Kerr, 9 Fed. Rep. 50, 53; The Plymouth Rock, Id. 413, 416. The sails of the Veendam were not sufficient for safe navigation in her situation. She was 900 miles from the nearest port, and during the 12 hours before La Flandre was sighted she made only about 14 knots per hour under sail. Her ability to make repairs to her shaft secure enough to proceed under her own steam-power was evidently uncertain, and could only be determined by trial, and she had 600 passengers on board. The situation was, therefore, manifestly one of reasonable apprehension of danger. A disabled steamer in mid-ocean is not in a safe. place, or in a safe condition. The signals of distress and the call for help so imported, and I cannot doubt that the service which the one party asked and the other gave was understood by both to be of that salvage nature which ordinarily belongs to a towage service rendered in answer to signals of distress to disabled steamers at sea. 2. It is objected that La Flandre did not tow the Veendam into port, or to a place of safety, and that when her shaft gave out the second time she was in as much danger as at first; so that La Flandre is not legally entitled to salvage compensation, because not successful. The Edam, 13 Fed. Rep. 135; The Algitha, 17 Fed. Rep. 551; The Aberdeen, 27 Fed. Rep. 479. The principle invoked is elementary. It is applied when the ship is lost, or when the attempt to rescue her is abandoned. In the cases cited, the salvors voluntarily abandoned the service. Here the |