cases arose, only to add to the embarrassment instead of furnishing the means of extrication from it. Money for a particular purpose may be raised by tax, it is said in one case, if there be the least possibility that it will be promotive in any degree of the public welfare.' "A tax law," it is said in another case, "must be considered valid unless it be for a purpose in which the community taxed has no interest; when it is apparent that the burden is imposed for the benefit of others, and where it would be so pronounced at first blush." And still another presents the same idea in language but little different: "To justify the court in arresting the proceedings and in declaring the tax void, the absence of all possible public interest in the purpose for which the funds are raised must be clear and palpable; so clear and palpable as to be perceptible by every mind at first blush." These are very strong and sweeping assertions, but they are supported by many others equally emphatic and comprehensive, which are to be met with in the adjudications of courts. The very emphasis, however, with which the principle is declared renders it peculiarly liable to mislead, unless it is examined in the light of the adjudicated cases in which it

1 Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn., 118, 128, per Butler, J. A statement so strong in terms as to be very liable to convey to others a meaning not present in the judicial mind.

2 Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa. St., 147, 174, following Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr., 330, 345. And see Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango, 13 N. Y., 143, 149; English v. Oliver, 28 Ark., 317.

3 Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis., 624, 652, per Dixon, Ch. J. And see Speer v. School Directors, 50 Pa. St., 150.

"The exercise of the taxing power must become wanton and unjust — be so grossly perverted as to lose the character of a legislative function — before the judiciary will feel themselves entitled to interpose on constitutional grounds. To arrest the legislation of a free people, especially in reference to burdens self-imposed for the common good, is to restrain the popular sovereignty, and should have clear warrant in the letter of the fundamental law." Schenley v. Allegheny City, 25 Pa. St., 128, 130, per Woodward, J.

When county commissioners have legislative power in respect to taxes for local purposes, their discretion in deciding how much of the revenue shall be devoted to one purpose, and how much to others, will not be controlled. Long v. Com'rs of Richmond, 76 N. C., 273. And even though the purpose in view in levying the tax was an improper one, yet this will not preclude the collection of the tax, and its appropriation to proper objects. Ibid.

has been applied, generally with explanations, and often with necessary qualifications.1

Grade of the government which taxes. In considering the legality of the purpose of any particular tax, a question of first importance must always concern the grade of the government which assumes to levy it. The "public" that is concerned in a legal sense in any matter of government is the public the particular government has been provided for; and the "public purpose " for which that government may tax is one which concerns its own people, and not some other people having a government of its own, for whose wants taxes are laid. There may, therefore, be a public purpose as regards the federal Union, which would not be such as a basis for state taxation, and there may be a public purpose which would uphold state taxation, but not the taxation which its municipalities would be at liberty to vote and collect. The purpose must in every instance pertain to the sovereignty with which the tax originates; it must be something within its jurisdiction so as to justify its making provision for it. The rule is applicable to all the subordinate municipalities; they are clothed with powers to accomplish certain objects, and for those objects they may tax, but not for others, however interesting or important, which are the proper concern of any other government or jurisdiction. State expenses are not to be provided for by federal taxation, nor federal expenses by state taxation, because in neither case would the taxation be levied by the government upon whose public the burden of the expenses properly rests. To provide for such expenses would consequently not be a purpose in which the

1 This is forcibly put by Dixon, Ch. J., in Whiting v. Sheboygan, etc., R. R. Co., 25 Wis., 167, 180. If a tax is laid for a public and also for a private purpose, it is void for excess in legislative authority. In a drainage law provision was made for the ostensible purpose of the act, and also for the storage of debris from mines. The court says: "The storage of debris is, in its nature, a private enterprise, in which the few only are interested. The drainage of a state is a public purpose, in which the public may be interested. To promote a public purpose by a tax levy upon the property in the state is within the power of the legislature; but the legislature has no power to impose taxes for the benefit of individuals connected with a private enterprise, even though the private enterprise might benefit the local public in a remote or collateral way." People v. Parks, 58 Cal., 624, 639.

people taxed would in a legal sense be concerned. This is the general rule; some apparent exceptions there unquestionably are, where the nation and the state have common interests and a common duty, such as may require the action of both, and would justify the levy of a tax by either or both to accomplish the one object. An illustration would be the case of a tax for the common defense against the public enemies, which might be levied by each, because the purpose would, in a strict sense, be public as to both.

The grade of the government is also important for another reason. A municipal government is one of delegated and limited powers, whose authority will receive a somewhat strict construction, rendering it necessary that it shall find the purposes for which it may tax clearly and unmistakably confided to its charge by the state. It is not sufficient that a purpose may seem to belong properly to its jurisdiction, or that the court may believe the municipality ought to have had authority over it; but it must be seen that the authority has been conferred in fact. It is otherwise with the state, which has all the power of taxation not withheld from exercise in the making of the state and federal constitutions, and in support of whose action, consequently, the most liberal intendments are to be made. It is otherwise with the federal Union also; for though its powers are not general like those of the state, but are limited and defined by the federal constitution, yet as they concern the most important matters of government, and relate to subjects not of domestic concern merely, but of international intercourse, and to other matters which sometimes call for broad and comprehensive views, and make a policy of liberal expenditures wise and statesmanlike, it would be neither reasonable nor prudent to subject its action in the matter of taxation to critical rules. That which it decides to be an object of public expenditure must generally be so accepted, and error in its action must be corrected by discussion and through public opinion and the elections.

General expenses of government. Every government must provide for its general expenses by taxation; and in these are to be included the cost of making provision for those public needs or conveniences for which, by express law or by general

usage, it devolves upon the particular government to supply. As regards the federal government, a general outline of these is to be found in the federal constitution. That government is charged with the common defense of the Union, and for that defense it may raise and support armies, create and maintain a navy, build forts and arsenals, construct military roads, etc. It has a like power over the general subject of postoffices and post-roads, and over other subjects enumerated in the federal constitution and subjected to its authority. It may contract debts, and it must provide for their payment. For all national purposes it may levy taxes, and its power in so doing to select the subjects of taxation and to determine the rate and the methods is as full and complete as can exist in any sovereignty whatsoever, with the exceptions which are prescribed by the constitution itself.

These exceptions are the following:

1. That duties, imposts and excises must be uniform throughout the United States.'

2. A capitation or other direct tax must be laid in proportion to the federal census or enumeration, according to which the representation of the states in the popular branch of congress is determined.?

3. No tax or duty can be laid on articles exported from any state.3

To these express restrictions is to be added the following, which is always implied:

4. No tax can be laid on a state, or its agencies of government, nor any which can tend to impair the sovereign powers of the states, or impede the exercise of their essential functions.1

Some taxes levied by the federal government are directly calculated and intended to benefit private individuals. For an illustration, it gives bounty land or pensions to those who have

1 Const. of U. S., art. I, § 8, par. 1; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533, 541, per Chase, Ch. J.

2 Const. of U. S., art. I, § 9, par. 4; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533, 541, per Chase, Ch. J.

3 Const. of U. S., art. I, § 9, par. 5. A tonnage duty laid on foreign vessels is not a tax on exports, and congress may lay such a duty on foreign vessels. Aguirre v. Maxwell, 3 Blatch., 140.

Ante, pp. 82-90, and cases cited.

performed military or naval services for the country, notwithstanding it has made no promise, and is consequently under neither a legal nor a moral obligation to do so. But the primary object in all such bounties is not the private but the public interest. To show gratitude for meritorious public services in the army and navy by liberal provision for those who have performed them is not only proper in itself, but it may reasonably be expected to have a powerful influence in inciting others to self-denying, faithful and courageous services in the future, when the government, which is so ready to be generous as well as just, shall have need of their assistance. The same may be said of a like recognition of valuable public services rendered by other persons: the question in every case is not one of power, but of prudence and public policy.1

Imposts laid on any other consideration than the production of revenue have been often objected to as being only colorable taxation, and therefore not warranted by the taxing power. But where the impost produces revenue, it is a tax, and it cannot be invalid merely because, if laid in some other way or at some other rate, the revenue would have been greater. Nor

1 Taxation for the benefit of firemen who have performed duty until they have earned exemption is lawful, though by the constitution the state is prohibited from giving the money of the state "to or in aid of any association, corporation or private undertaking," it being paid in discharge of a moral obligation resting upon the state. Trustees of Firemen's Fund v. Roome, 93 N. Y., 313.

2" No doubt all taxation should be general and as far as practicable, equal. Legislation either to benefit or burden particular classes, under the idea that it is for the good of the state at large, infringes upon the natural and guarantied right of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, subject to fair and equal contributions to the just and necessary expenses of government in the exercise of its proper and legitimate functions. A government which assumes the office of controlling and directing the lawful industry of the citizens into the channels which it may choose to deem best assumes what does not legitimately belong to it. Some states in modern times, in undertaking to find work for the people, have discovered that it was a sure way to make work for themselves. But we cannot sit in judgment upon the wisdom or expediency of laws. An act of the legislature must clearly transcend the limits of the power confided to that department of government, or, more properly speaking, it must violate some prohibition, either express or necessarily implied, either of the federal or state constitution, before it can be pronounced by the judicial department to be unconstitutional and void." Sharswood, J., in Durach's Appeal, 62 Pa. St., 491, 495. As to the general right of congress to tax, see United States v. McKinley, 4 Brewst., 246.