such a public purpose as we have been considering. If it be said that a benefit results to the local public of a town by establishing manufactures, the same may be said of any other business or pursuit which employs capital or labor. The merchant, the mechanic, the innkeeper, the banker, the builder, the steamboat owner are equally promoters of the public good, and equally deserving the aid of the citizens by forced contributions. No line can be drawn in favor of the manufacturer which would not open the coffers of the public treasury to the importunities of two-thirds the business men of the city or town." 1

Further authorities in support of the position that there is a distinction in the meaning of public use, as employed in the law of eminent domain and of taxation, would seem unnecessary. Custom must have great influence in determining the proper limit of either power; but it is manifest that the adjudications recognize certain incidental benefits to the public as constituting such a public interest as will justify an exercise of the eminent domain which, in the case of the power of taxation, are not admitted as constituting any basis whatever for its employment. Few cases have undertaken to point out the distinction, but the courts have acted upon it in many cases.

An enumeration of the purposes which are recognized as justifying taxation is not needful, and is scarcely practicable. The most of them pass unchallenged. To preserve the public order; to provide for the enforcement of civil rights and the punishment of crime; to make compensation to public officers

1 Per Miller, J., in Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall., 655, 661. See also, Allen v. Jay, 60 Me., 124; S. C., 11 Am. Rep., 185. Taxation in aid of private enterprises is properly characterized by Dickenson, J., in Opinions of Justices, 58 Me., 590-603, as taxation "to load the tables of the few with bounty that the many may partake of the crumbs that fall therefrom."

It is not competent for a city to levy taxes to loan to persons who have suffered from a fire (Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass., 454; S. C., 15 Am. Rep., 39); or for a town to supply farmers, whose crops have been destroyed, with provisions and seed grain (State v. Osawkee, 14 Kan., 418); or to pay a subscription to a private corporation, not for a public purpose (Weismer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y., 91; S. C., 21 Am. Rep., 586); or to erect a dam with the privilege afterwards at discretion to devote it to either a public or a private purpose. Attorney-General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis., 400.

2 See, however, Whiting v. Sheboygan, etc., R. Co., 25 Wis., 167, 190; People v. Township Board, 20 Mich., 452, 477.

and to others who perform services for the public; to protect public property; to erect and keep in repair the necessary public buildings; to pay the expenses of legislation and of administering the laws,- all these are purposes which, in a consideration of the law of taxation, call for no comment, as each and all are absolutely indispensable in orderly government. All these may therefore be passed by while attention is directed, to cases not so clear, the determination of which will sufficiently indicate the bounds which usage in representative government has prescribed as the proper limit to a lawful expenditure of the public moneys.

Religious instruction. This to individuals is an object of the very highest moment, and formerly it was thought to be the duty of government to provide for it. The more enlightened opinion of the present day denies the duty, and affirms that any step in that direction is in greater or less degree a species of persecution of those whose views are not favored, and therefore incompetent in any country whose political institutions are based upon the principles of equality before the law. Religious instruction is, therefore, by common consent referred exclusively to the voluntary action of the people. It is expressly forbidden by many of the state constitutions that public moneys shall be appropriated to religious worship. It is true that in selecting the objects of taxation, buildings and

1 Cooley, Const. Lim., ch. 13, and cases referred to in the notes. Dr. Wayland justly observes that "The only ground on which taxes for the support of religion can be defended is that its existence is necessary for the support of civil government, and that it can be sustained in no other manner than by compulsion. The first assertion we grant to be true; the second we utterly deny. Hence we do not believe that any taxation for this purpose is necessary. All that religious societies have a right to ask of the civil government is, the same privileges for transacting their own affairs which societies of every other sort possess. This they have a right to demand, not because they are religious societies, but because the exercise of religion is an innocent mode of pursuing happiness. If these be not granted, religious men are oppressed, and the country where such oppression prevails, let it call itself what it may, is not free." Wayland, Pol. Econ., b. 4, ch. 3, § 2. It has been held not incompetent to permit a public school-house to be made use of for religious purposes when it is not wanted for school. Nichols v. School Directors, 93 Ill., 61; S. C., 34 Am. Rep., 160; Davis v. Boget, 50 Ia., 11. Compare Dorton v. Hearn, 67 Mo., 301; People v. McAdams, 82 Ill., 356.

other property made use of for that purpose are generally exempted from the lists. This is done without discrimination between sects, and is generally defended upon the ground that public worship is a public benefit which may properly be encouraged in this indirect way. The discrimination is opposed by some persons, but whether or not it is proper or politic, it cannot be declared unwarranted by the general principles of government. As already observed, the question what taxes shall be levied, and upon what classes of persons or property, is always one of public policy which the legislature must solve. But another view is not entirely without plausibility. Whoever contributes to the support of churches also contributes to pay the taxes, if any, which are imposed upon them. But as most persons who pay taxes at all do, in some form, and with some regard to their ability, contribute to the support of churches, it is of little importance to the general public whether taxes are levied on church property or not, as whatever is collected from such property, while it goes to diminish what will be collected from individual property, will at the same time increase to the same extent what the individuals pay for the support of religious instruction, so that the burden in the one case will be substantially the same as in the other. We do not say that this view is strictly correct, but it is perhaps safe to say that the inequality occasioned by the exemption of church property from taxation is not so great as without reflection one would be likely to suppose.

Secular instruction. It may be safely declared that to bring a sound education within reach of all the inhabitants has been a prime object of American government from the

1 For the most part public education in the United States is in charge of corporations created for the purpose, the most of which are invested with power of taxation. But this power is limited strictly to the educational purpose. People v. Trustees of Schools, 78 Ill., 136, and cases referred to. Also Weightman v. Clark, 103 U. S., 256.

The fact that a state constitution expressly mentions only a state university and common schools as educational institutions to be provided for does not preclude the establishment and support of state normal schools. Briggs v. Johnson County, 4 Dill., 148.

Taxation in support of a high school, when duly authorized, will not be held incompetent by reason of the course of study prescribed being differ

very first. It was declared by colonial legislation, and has been reiterated in constitutional provisions to the present day. It has been regarded as an imperative duty of the government; and when question has been made concerning it, the question has related not to the existence of the duty, but to its extent. But the question of extent is one of public policy, and addresses itself to the legislature and the people, not to the courts.' And the tendency on the part of the people has been steadily in the direction of taking upon themselves larger burdens in order to provide more spacious, elegant and con

ent from that contemplated by law. Richards v. Raymond, 92 Ill., 612; S. C., 34 Am. Rep., 151. See Stuart v. Kalamazoo, 30 Mich., 69.

In Florida it has been decided that a statutory provision that commissioners may levy a tax for school purposes is mandatory. Jones v. Board of Public Instruction, 17 Fla., 411.

1 Commonwealth v. Hartman, 17 Pa. St., 118; Powell v. Board of Education, 97 Ill., 375; Bellmeyer v. School District, 44 Ia., 564. See the very interesting case of Cushing v. Inhabitants of Newburyport, 10 Met., 508. Also Bull v. Read, 13 Grat., 78; Stuart v. Kalamazoo, 30 Mich., 69. That a tax for the support of free schools is within a general grant of the power to tax for "municipal purposes," see Horton v. School Commissioners, 43 Ala., 598; Opinions of Justices, 67 Me., 582. Dr. Wayland, in speaking of the liberality of construction in determining the purposes of taxation, says: "It must not, of course, always be expected that the product created by consumption (in public expenditure) will be a visible, tangible, material substance. Thus we see no physical, tangible product as the result of taxes for the support of civil government. But we receive the benefit in security of person, property and reputation; or in that condition of society which, though it be incapable of being weighed and measured, is absolutely essential both in individual happiness and individual accumulation. The same may be said in substance concerning the taxes paid for general education. Here, whether the tax payer receives his remuneration in instruction given to his own children or not, he yet receives it in the improvement of the intellectual and social character of his neighbors, by which his property is rendered more secure, the labor for which he pays is better performed, and the demand for whatever he produces is more universal and more constant. The same may be said of the public expenditure by which the moral and social character of a community is elevated, the taste of a nation refined, and an impulse given to efforts for the benefit of man. With this view, no one could oppose the expense incurred in bestowing upon public edifices elegance, or even, in some cases, magnificence of structure, in the public celebration of remarkable eras, and in the rewards bestowed upon those who have by their discoveries enlarged the boundaries of human knowledge, or by their inventions signally improved the useful arts." Pol. Econ., pt. 4, ch. 3, § 1.

venient houses of instruction, and to place within the reach of all a more generous and useful education. And this is usually done by the direct action of the public; the state or its munic ipalities constructing and owning the edifices, and supporting the schools, academies, colleges and universities.1

But to justify taxation for the purposes of education, the rules under which the people shall be admitted to the privileges given must not be invidious and partial, but must place all parties on a plane of practical equality. The rule is substantially the same here that applies in the apportionment of taxes: equality must be the aim of the law, and it must be assumed the state has no special favors to bestow upon privileged classes. But if the rules are impartial it is not a legal objection to them that they fail to provide for every one. Elementary instruction, for example, is commonly offered by the state to children between certain ages only; and if the offer is impartial to these, no just exception can be taken to it. Neither can one complain that he is required to attend the schools in his own neighborhood. But it would not be competent to single out some one class of the community and exclude them from the benefits of the public schools on arbitrary grounds. This has been frequently held in the case of the freedmen and other colored citizens.2

1 When public funds are provided for education under definite regulations or restrictions, these must be observed. People v. Board of Education, 13 Barb., 400; People v. Allen, 42 N. Y., 404; Halbert v. Sparks, 9 Bush, 259; Collins v. Henderson, 11 Bush, 74; State v. Graham, 25 La. An., 440; State v. Board of Liquidation, 29 La. An., 77; Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Board of Liquidation, 31 La. An., 175; Littlewort v. Davis, 50 Miss., 403; Weir v. Day, 35 Ohio St., 143; Otken v. Lamkin, 56 Miss., 758. As to power of the state to control school expenditures, see Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn., 1; Bancroft v. Thayer, 5 Sawy., 502; People v. Board of Education, 55 Cal., 331; Kinney v. Zimpleman, 36 Tex., 554.

? Whether it is the constitutional right of colored children to attend the same schools with others when the law makes equal provision for them elsewhere is a question discussed in the following cases. State v. Duffy, 7 Nev., 342; S. C., 8 Am. Rep., 713; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind., 327; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal., 36; State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St., 198; Bertonneau v. School Directors, 3 Woods, 177. In several of the states it is expressly prohibited by law that any distinction shall be made. Where the law contemplates separate schools, colored children may nevertheless attend the regular schools if no others are provided for them. State v. Duffy, 7 Nev., 342; S. C., 8 Am. Rep., 713. In Kentucky the law provides for devoting school