ance to them a question purely of policy and not at all one of power.

The question concerns first, the power of the state, and second, the power of the municipal bodies. So far as the state at large is concerned, a large preponderance of decisions is in support of the authority to aid these corporations by an exercise of the power to tax, and this by taking stock in such corporations, or by making to them loans or donations. As to the municipal bodies, it is conceded that they have no such power unless it is specially conferred by the legislature; the general authority to construct streets, road and bridges not comprehending such a case. It is also conceded that any special authority must be strictly pursued, or the action of the municipality under it will be invalid. But when the legislature has thought proper to confer the power, and care has been observed to keep strictly within it, in the municipal action, the same cases already referred to sustain the action as standing on the same ground, and as being supported by the same rea

1"Improvement of coasts and harbors, and all that is necessary for the security of external commerce, must be done by the public. Internal improvements, such as roads, canals, railroads, etc., may, in general, be safely left to individual enterprise. If they would be a profitable investment of capital, individuals will be willing to undertake them. If they would be an unprofitable investment, both parties had better let them alone. The only case in which a government should assume such works is that in which their magnitude is too great to be intrusted to private corporations. Whenever they are undertaken, the principles on which the expenditure should be made are the same as those which govern the expenditure of individuals.” Wayland's Pol. Econ., b. 4, ch. 3, § 2. There are probably not many now who doubt the soundness of this as a rule of public policy, but the rule of policy is not necessarily the rule of constitutional law.

2 Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.), 171; Stokes v. Scott County, 10 Ia., 166, 173; State v. Wapello County, 13 Ia., 388; La Fayette v. Cox, 5 Ind., 38. A long list of cases might be cited to the same effect, but the principle is disputed by no one.

3 See among other cases to this effect, Commissioners v. Thayer, 94 U. S., 641; People v. Cline, 63 Ill., 394; Harding v. Railroad Co., 65 Ill., 90; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Coyer, 79 Ill., 373; People v. Oldstown, 88 Ill., 202; Portland, etc., R. Co. v. Standish, 65 Me., 63; Gray v. Mount, 45 Ia., 591; Packard v. Jefferson Co., 2 Col., 338; Leavenworth, etc., R. Co. v. Platte Co., 42 Mo., 171; Horton v. Thompson, 71 N. Y., 513. It is no objection to a vote of railroad aid that the corporation to be aided is to construct and operate both a railroad and a telegraph line. Snell v. Leonard, 55 Ia..

sons which would support the like action when taken by the state itself.1

It has been decided that an assessment for making and opening a road where no road has in fact been laid out, and where, consequently, the land is the subject of private ownership, and no highway would exist when the money was expended, would be illegal and void. It has also been held that a city has no authority to assess on abutters upon a street the expense of a bridge over a mill-race running through the center of the street, and owned by private parties. The duty of the owners of the race to restore the street which they occupied to a pass

1 Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Monr., 526; M'Clenachan v. Curwen, 3 Yeates, 363; Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 11 Pa. St., 61; Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh, 120; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend., 65, and cases collected in Cooley's Const. Lim. (5th ed.), 142, note.

Where aid is voted to a railroad on condition of the road being constructed to a specified point, it is not a compliance with the condition to purchase an existing road to that point. Lamb v. Anderson, 54 Ia., 190; Meeker v. Ashley, 56 La., 188; Railroad Co. v. Schenck, 56 Ia., 628. For a discussion of sundry questions arising under the Iowa railroad and tax law, see Merrill v. Welsher, 50 Ia., 61. A railroad aid tax will not be enjoined because a narrow gauge is adopted; the subscription not specifying the gauge. Meader v. Lowry, 45 Ia., 684. But no part of the tax voted is collectible until it is earned. Casady v. Lowry, 49 Ia., 523. The validity of a tax is not affected by the fact that the route of the road is changed after the vote, if the route was not a condition of the vote. Shontz v. Evans, 40 Ia., 139. A condition to an aid vote that a depot shall be located within the town is competent. Bittinger v. Bell, 65 Ind., 445. See Blanchard v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 31 Mich., 43.

Where railroad aid has been voted the vote is not defeated by subsequent legislation which directs that the certificates of stock issued therefor shall be issued to individual tax payers. Commissioners v. Lucas, 93 U. S., 108. There is no doubt of the right of the legislature to enact laws for the levy of taxes for the construction of gravel roads. Ricketts v. Spraker, 77 Ind., 371.

2 Philbrook v. Kennebeck, 17 Me., 196. And see People v. Supervisors of Saginaw, 26 Mich., 22. The same reasons would render void all subscriptions to internal improvements which are made without any precautions to secure the construction of the works, and which contemplate the payment of the money or the delivery of the securities subscribed in reliance only on the good faith and business prudence of the corporators. In some cases, large sums thus subscribed and paid have been wholly misappropriated.

If a bridge rests in part on private property an assessment for building it is void. Pacific Bridge Co. v. Kirkham, 54 Cal., 558.

able condition could not thus be transferred to the public, or to any portion of the public.1

Municipal water and gas works. The propriety and necessity of provision by taxation for a supply of water for the extinguishment of fires, and for the general use of the inhabitants of large towns, is not disputed. Costly expenditures are sometimes made in the construction of public works for these purposes, and large sums are in some instances paid to corporations or individuals who furnish or contribute to furnish the public supply. Cities may also be authorized to construct gas

1 People v. Rochester, 54 N. Y., 507.

2 Mayor of New York v. Bailey, 2 Denio, 433; West v. Bancroft, 32 Vt., 367; Rome v. Cabot, 28 Ga., 50; Wells v. Atlanta, 43 Ga., 67; Dillon's Mun. Corp., $$ 97, 371, note, 438, note. In Van Sicklen v. Burlington, 27 Vt., 70, 75, in which it was held competent for a town in its corporate capacity to vote money for procuring apparatus for the extinguishment of fires, and to aid fire companies formed for the purpose, the following remarks are made by Isham, J.: "There is no doubt that towns or municipal corporations, as well as private corporations, are limited to the exercise of such powers as are expressly given them; that is, the inhabitants of a town cannot by a vote impose a tax, or appropriate their funds, for objects entirely foreign to their political or municipal duties such as to build a county jail (10 Vt., 506); to repel the public enemies of the country (13 Mass., 272); or to build a county road. 11 Pick., 396. But when the object is within their duty and jurisdiction as a municipal corporation, they may exercise such powers as will enable them fully to discharge the duties devolving upon them. Our statute on this subject is nearly a transcript of that of Massachusetts. In that state it is provided by statute, that towns may vote money as they shall judge necessary for the support of the ministry, schools, the poor and other necessary charges arising within the same town.' On the question whether this latter and general clause is limited to the objects previously specified, Ch. J. Shaw, in the case of Willard v. Newburyport, 12 Pick., 230, observed, ‘that it seems very clear that this statement was not intended to be an enumeration of objects and purposes for which towns may raise money, but the expression of a few prominent objects by way of instance, and a general reference to others, under the term of other necessary charges.' On the same construction, the general words in our act, that money may be voted 'for the prosecution and defense of their common rights and interests, and for all other necessary and incidental charges,' must not be limited to the objects specially mentioned in that act, but will be extended to other matters that fall within their rights and duties. It has always been found difficult to define the limits within which towns may act, or give any definite rules by which we may ascertain when their votes will be deemed illegal. Ch. J. Shaw observed, 'that perhaps no better approximation to an exact

works in order to furnish their citizens with light, as well as to supply the corporate needs,' or they may be empowered to contract for the corporate wants with private corporations or persons. The more common objects for which towns and cities customarily levy taxes we pass over as not requiring enumeration."

description can be made, than to say that it embraces that large class of miscellaneous subjects affecting the accommodation and convenience of the inhabitants, which have been placed under the municipal jurisdiction of towns by statute or usage.'

That it is competent by legislation to provide a special water precinct in a city for water works, and levy a tax within the same, see Brown v. Concord, 56 N. H., 375.

1 See Western Saving Fund Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St., 175; Same v. Same, 31 Pa. St., 185.

See Nelson v. La Porte, 33 Ind., 258.

3 A tax to repair a meeting house, and to pay the sexton for ringing the bell, is prima facie not a town purpose, but it may be shown by the vote to levy it to be such by showing that it is to be done as compensation for the use of the meeting house for town purposes. Woodbury v. Hamilton, 6 Pick., 101. A town may appropriate money for the repair of a fire engine used by the town but owned by individuals. Allen v. Taunton, 19 Pick., 485. And for the repair and regulation of clocks used for the benefit of the citizens of the town generally. Willard v. Newburyport, 12 Pick., 227.

To what extent municipal corporations may be legally justified by their general grant of power in levying taxes to defray the expense of procuring legislation for their benefit, has in some cases been made a question. The bounds of such authority must, it is conceived, be very much restricted. Probably no case which comes within the principle of the early Rhode Island tax to raise for Mr. Roger Williams £100, to remunerate him for obtaining the colonial charter (Arnold's Rhode Island, vol. 1, p. 205), would be questioned. Some attention to the interests of a local community at the state capital is frequently essential, and no reason is apparent why the expense may not be considered a proper municipal charge. See Bachelder v. Epping, 8 Fost., 354. Compare Frankfort v. Winterport, 54 Me., 250. But lobby services are services a municipality has no right to employ and no power to pay. The practice is immoral and corrupting, and will not be tolerated in the law. The subject is fully and satisfactorily considered and discussed by Chapman, J., in Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen, 152, who, in denying the right of a town to pay for lobby services in procuring its charter, cites with approval the cases of Pingrey v. Washburn, 1 Aiken, 264; Gulick v. Ward, 10 N. J., 87; Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana, 366; Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 W. & S., 315; Harris v. Roof, 10 Barb., 489; Sedgwick v. Stanton, 14 N. Y., 289; Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick., 472. And see Hatzfield v. Golden, 7 Watts, 152.

Military and other bounties. The general government having authority to declare war and conduct warlike operations, no question can exist of its right to levy taxes in order to pay bounties for military services performed or promised. The several states may with as little question do the same. But it is no part of the duty of a township, city or county, as such, to raise men or money for warlike operations; and under the general grant of municipal powers, they are without authority to impose upon their people any burden by way of taxation for any such purpose. No reason is perceived, however, which should preclude them, under the proper legislative sanction, from devoting their funds to this purpose to any extent that may be necessary to enable them to secure a voluntary performance of any duty which may rest upon their inhabitants to contribute their proportion to the public defense. And so are the authorities. The several municipal divisions of the state, under proper enabling legislation, may promise and pay bounties to those who will volunteer to fill any call made upon their people for their proportionate contribution to the public armies in time of actual or threatened hostilities. They may

1 Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass., 272; Gove v. Epping, 41 N. H., 539, 545; Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H., 9; Baldwin v. North Brandford, 32 Conn., 47; Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn., 131; Cover v. Baytown, 12 Minn., 124; Petersburg v. Noss, 52 Pa. St., 448; Meek v. Bayard, 53 Pa. St., 217; Fiske v. Hazard, 7 R. I., 438; People v. Supervisors of Columbia, 43 N. Y., 130; Alley v. Edgecombe, 53 Me., 446; Wahlschlager v. Liberty, 23 Wis., 362; Wilson v. Buckman, 13 Minn., 441; Dillon on Mun. Corp., 103. Furnishing a uniform for a voluntary military company is not within the compass of "town charges." Claflin v. Hopkinton, 4 Gray, 502.

2 Speer v. School Directors, 50 Pa. St., 150, 159; Waldo v. Portland, 33 Conn., 363; Bartholomew v. Harwinton, 33 Conn., 408; Fowler v. Danvers, 8 Allen, 80; Lowell v. Oliver, 8 Allen, 247; Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio St., 38; Opinions of Justices, 52 Me., 590, 595; Washington County v. Berwick, 56 Pa. St., 466. Where the municipality has taken action for the payment of such bounties in advance of legislative authority, it may be conferred retrospectively. Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn., 118; Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H., 9; Shackford v. Newington, 46 N. H., 415; Ahl v. Gleim, 52 Pa. St., 432; Weister v. Hade, 52 Pa. St., 474; Grim v. School District, 57 Pa. St., 433; Coffman v. Keightly, 24 Ind., 509; Board of Commissioners v. Bearss, 25 Ind., 110; Comer v. Folsom, 13 Minn., 219; State v. Demorest, 32 N. J., 528; Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill., 9; Barbour v. Camden, 51 Me., 608; Hart v. Holden, 55 Me., 572; Burnham v. Chelsea, 43 Vt., 69; Butler v. Putney, 43 Vt., 481 Lowell v. Oliver, 8 Allen, 247.