constitutional idea of taxation. This conclusion seems to impose restraints on the constitutional power of the legislature to establish taxing districts, which can hardly be justified in reason, or by the decisions in analogous cases. Legislation, such as was thus condemned, has not been uncommon in other states, and in some cases has passed the test of judicial scru tiny, being sustained on the ground that it is only an equitable apportionment of the burdens of municipal government between those who receive a part of its benefits only, and those who participate in them all.3

A different case has been presented in some other states. City boundaries having been extended so as to embrace the lands of parties who insisted that their premises were agricultural lands merely, and would receive no benefit from the city government, such parties sought the protection of the courts, and prayed for injunction to restrain the imposition upon them of any tax in excess of what they would have been chargeable with had the boundaries not been extended to embrace them. It is to be observed of such cases that the legislature, which alone had authority to determine and fix the proper bounds of the municipal divisions of the state, and also to establish the taxing districts, had proceeded to do so, and in fixing the city boundaries without any provision for a discrimination in the taxation of property within them, had in effect determined that no such discrimination should or ought to be made. The whole subject was one committed by the constitution exclusively to the judgment and discretion of the

1 Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock Co., 9 Wis., 410; New Orleans v. Cazelar, 27 La. An., 156. Perhaps the Wisconsin case should now be regarded as overruled. See Wis. Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor Co., 52 Wis., 37, 69. The Louisiana case seems to rely for the doctrine laid down upon a passage from a text book, where cases were cited, but without approval.

2 Serrill v. Philadelphia, 38 Pa. St., 355, 358; Henderson v. Lambert, 8 Bush, 607; Benoist v. St. Louis, 19 Mo., 179; Lee v. Thomas, 49 Mo., 112. And see Zanesville v. Richards, 5 Ohio St., 590; Gillette v. Hartford, 31 Conn., 351; Norris v. Waco, 57 Tex., 635.

3 In Gillette v. Hartford, 31 Conn., 351, 357, Butler, J., delivering the opinion of the court, assumes as probable that the persons within the city limits whose lands have been brought in by an extension of city lines had been so brought in on the application of the old corporation and against their own desire, and that the discrimination in taxation in their favor was only a just protection against inequality and unfairness.

legislature, whose members, as in other cases of legislation, would make inquiry into the facts in their own way, and act upon their own reasons. No question could be made of the complete legislative jurisdiction over the case, and if the action was unfair, and led to unequal and unjust consequences, it seems difficult to suggest any ground upon which it could be successfully assailed in the courts that would not warrant a judicial review of legislative action in every case in which parties complain of injustice and inequality. Nevertheless in some cases the courts have considered themselves warranted in inquiring into the facts, in order to determine whether in their judgment the extension of municipal boundaries was fairly warranted; and having reached the conclusion that it was not, and that the extension was made for the purpose of subjecting to taxation adjacent property that would not receive the benefits of municipal government, and was not in fact urban property, they have undertaken to protect the owners of property thus unfairly brought in, against the unequal taxation to which the legislation would expose them. In doing this they have not assumed to nullify the legislative action in extending the municipal limits, but they have undertaken to modify and relieve against its consequences, and to do this upon the express ground that the motive which has influenced the legislation was not legitimate.' As the point is stated in one case, it is the palpable perversion of the power to tax which justifies the judicial interference.2

Some of these decisions are made by very able judges, whose opinions are always entitled to the highest respect; but it seems difficult to harmonize them with the conceded principles governing the law of taxation. For, 1. They do not question legislation as being in excess of legislative authority, as might be done where taxes are voted for a purpose not public; but they leave the legislation to stand, and only interfere to qualify

1 Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr., 330; Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Monr., 491; Sharp's Executor v. Dunavan, 17 B. Monr., 223; Arbegust v. Louisville, 2 Bush, 271; Courtney v. Louisville, 12 Bush, 419; Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush, 37; Morford v. Unger, 8 Ia., 82; Langworthy v. Dubuque, 13 Ia., 86; Fulton v. Davenport, 17 Ia., 404; Buell v. Ball, 20 Ia., 282; Deeds v. Sanborn, 26 Ia., 419; Davis v. Dubuque, 20 Ia., 458; Deiman v. Fort Madison, 30 Ia., 542; Durant v. Kauffman, 34 Ia., 194.

2 Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush, 37, 40.

its effect, on the ground that it has been adopted on improper grounds and will operate unequally. 2. This is done on an inquiry into the facts, and a substitution of the judicial conclusion for the legislative on a subject not at all judicial; a subject, too the proper limits of city extension - upon which persons are certain to differ widely, and where an inquiry into the facts after the judicial method of an examination of witnesses is usually much less satisfactory than that personal knowledge and investigation which legislators are supposed to possess or to make. This is certainly laying down a rule which cannot be applied generally; it being admitted that the judiciary has no general authority to correct the injustice of legislative action in matters of taxation; and the weight of authority clearly is that, as regards these cases, the determination of the legislature is conclusive? But the legislature has no authority to bring into a municipality territory not contiguous to it, and the attempt to do so for the purpose of increasing the local revenues may be treated as void.3

Extraterritorial taxation. Those cases in which it has been held incompetent for a state or municipality to levy taxes on persons or property not within its limits have generally indicated the want of jurisdiction over the subject of the tax as the ground of invalidity. But such a burden would be inadmissible, also, for the further reason that, as to any property or person outside the district in which the tax was levied, the want of legal interest in the tax would preclude its being subjected to the burden. A state can no more subject to its power a single person or a single article of property whose residence or legal situs is in another state, than it can subject all the citizens or all the property of such other state to its

1 See Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St., 258, 261; Logansport v. Seybold, 59 Ind., 225; Waco v. Texas, 57 Tex., 635.

2 Stilz v. Indianapolis, 55 Ind., 515; Logansport v. Seybold, 59 Ind., 225; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss., 53; Giboney v. Cape Girardeau, 58 Mo., 141; Linton v. Athens, 53 Ga., 588; New Orleans v. Cazelar, 27 La. An., 156; Stoner v. Flournoy, 28 La. An., 850; Kelly v. Pittsburg, 85 Pa. St., 170; Same Case in error, 104 U. S., 78; Hewitt's Appeal, 88 Pa. St., 55; Cary v. Pekin, 88 Ill., 154; Oliver v. Omaha, 3 Dill., 368; Washburn v. Oshkosh, 60 Wis.,

Smith v. Sherry, 50 Wis., 210.

power. The accidental circumstance that it may happen to have the means of reaching one and not the rest can make no difference; there must be an interest in the subject-matter of the tax; there must be between the state and the tax payer a reciprocity of duty and obligation; and these in contemplation of law would be wholly wanting in the case supposed.' A territory, therefore,- or indeed a state-has no authority to exercise the power to tax within the limits reserved to an Indian tribe. And it has been held in Missouri to be incompetent for the legislature to empower a city to tax for city purposes the land outside the city but adjacent to it, and therefore receiving, possibly, some of the benefits of the city government and expenditure. The benefits, it is obvious, would be altogether indirect and incidental, since the city could have no authority to make expenditures outside of its limits for the benefit of people there residing. But in Indiana a statutory provision authorizing a town to tax all property within two hundred yards of the corporate limits was sustained, though not argued by either counsel or court; and in Virginia, a railroad aid law was held constitutional which extended the power of a city to tax lands for half a mile outside. These, however, may well be deemed doubtful cases. It is

1 State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall., 300. See, also, Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S., 432. Where a town had for more than twenty years exercised jurisdiction over part of another with its acquiescence, a tax levied within this part by such first mentioned town was nevertheless held void. Ham v. Sawyer, 38 Me., 37, 39. And see Hughey's Lessee v. Horrel, 2 Ohio, 231. Whether, when it is doubtful in which of two counties a district lies, it is not competent to provide for its taxation in either, see People v. Wilkerson, 1 Idaho, N. S., 619.

2 Moore v. Sweetwater, 2 Wy. Ter., 8.

3 Wells v. Weston, 22 Mo., 384, approved in St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo., 122.

4 See Wilkey v. Pekin, 19 Ill., 159.

5 Conwell v. Connersville, 8 Ind., 358.

6 In In re Flatbush, 60 N. Y., 398, an assessment in Flatbush for a part of the cost of extending Prospect Park, which had previously been incurred by the city of Brooklyn, was held void for want of legislative power. Compare Brooks v. Baltimore, 48 Md., 265. In that case the mayor and council of Baltimore had been authorized to open streets and provide for ascertaining the damage or benefit thereby accruing to the owners of ground within or adjacent to the city, for which such owners ought to be compensated or to pay compensation, and to provide for assessing and levying either gener

certainly difficult to understand how the taxation of a district can be defended whose people have no voice in voting it, in selecting the purposes, or in expending it. Where a license fee is levied for police purposes, there may be excellent reason for allowing a town specially interested in it to require its payment of any persons in or near the town itself; and as the purpose is one of general interest, the state would have a larger discretion in providing for it than it could possibly possess in the case of ordinary taxation.'

It is provided by general law in some states that where a farm or plantation lies partly in two taxing districts, it may all be taxed in the one in which the mansion house is situate. Such a general rule varies the district to meet the particular case, and it has generally been sustained.2

ally upon the city or specially upon the persons benefited, the damages, etc. The court, dwelling upon the distinctions between a general tax and a special assessment upon the persons benefited, held that it made no difference whether the property lay upon one side or the other of the city line, if the reason for the exercise of the power was applicable; and further, that under the power to assess and levy, the council could sell the property for failure to pay an assessment.

1 See Falmouth v. Watson, 5 Bush, 661, in which license fees imposed by a town on those selling intoxicating drinks outside its limits, but near it, were sustained as being imposed, partly at least, for police purposes. A town cannot give its ordinance such extraterritorial effect without express authority by statute. Strauss v. Pontiac, 40 Ill., 301.

2 Saunders v. Springsteen, 4 Wend., 429; Hairston v. Stinson, 13 Ired., 479; Ellis v. Hall, 19 Pa. St., 292; Bausman v. Lancaster, 50 Pa. St., 208; State v. Metz, 29 N. J., 122; State v. Hoffman, 30 N. J., 346; State v. Hay, 31 N. J., 275; State v. Britton, 42 N. J., 103; State v. Abbott, 42 N. J., 111; Judkins v. Reed, 48 Me., 386. If a farm lying in two townships is assessed in the one in which the owner does not reside, the assessment is without jurisdiction and the assessors are liable for making it. Dorn v. Backer, 61 N. Y., 261, reversing 61 Barb., 597. It is held in Pennsylvania that this mode of assessment cannot be claimed as a right by the owner. And assessment of the separate parts in the counties, etc., in which they lie, is not bad as to either for want of jurisdiction. Patton v. Long, 68 Pa. St., 260. In New Jersey, if land owned by a corporation is situated in two towns, it may be taxed in the town where the office is. State v. Warford, 37 N. J., 397. In New Hampshire it is said that real estate must be taxed in the town where it lies. Where on a division of a town it was provided that each tract through which the divisional line passed should be taxed where the owner lived, this was held not competent as a permanent provision, and long acquiescence did not estop from questioning it. Weeks v. Gilmanton, 60 N. H., 501. Towns cannot even by agreement establish the rule that