may be possessed of, are to be looked upon rather as in the nature of limitations of the general rule, than as exceptions from it; the taxation being only of all that is possessed over and beyond what has been left out as absolutely needful to the owner's support. Property made use of for educational purposes though in the hands of private individuals, the property of charitable associations, of cemetery companies, and the like, are excluded from tax rolls for similar reasons; these being supported by contributions collected alike from rich and poor, and having strong claims to public encouragement.

Implied exemptions. Before noticing the exemptions expressly made by law, it will be convenient to speak of some which rest upon implication. Some things are always presumptively exempted from the operation of general tax laws, because it is reasonable to suppose they were not within the intent of the legislature in adopting them. Such is the case with property belonging to the state and its municipalities, and which is held by them for governmental purposes. All such property is taxable, if the state shall see fit to tax it; but to levy a tax upon it would render necessary new taxes to meet the demand of this tax, and thus the public would be taxing itself in order to raise money to pay over to itself, and no one would be benefited but the officers employed, whose compensation would go to increase the useless levy. It cannot be supposed that the legislature would ever purposely lay such a burden upon public property, and it is therefore a reasonable conclusion that, however general may be the enumeration of property for taxation, the property held by the state and by all its municipalities for governmental purposes was intended to be excluded, and the law will be administered as excluding it in fact. The grant, therefore, in general terms to a city of

1 Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv., 295; Wayland v. Commissioners, 4 Gray, 500; Durkee v. Commissioners, 29 Kan., 697; Trustees of Schools v. Trenton, 30 N. J. Eq., 667.

2 Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv., 295; People v. Salomon, 51 Ill., 37; Directors of the Poor v. School Directors, 42 Pa. St., 21, 25 (case of poorhouse); State v. Gaffney, 34 N. J., 133; West Hartford v. Water Commissioners, 44 Conn., 360; Rochester v. Rush, 80 N. Y., 302 (cases of city waterworks and land acquired therefor); Industrial University v. Champaign County, 76 Ill., 283 (case of property held in trust for a state educational in

the power to tax will not be held to confer power to tax stato or county property,' and the rule applies to the property of public educational and charitable institutions which perform public functions under state control, and to any other corporation of which the state is substantially the corporator, and which exists for governmental purposes.3

But a municipal corporation may hold property not for governmental purposes, but for the mere convenience of its people, or to supply some need which is commonly supplied by a private corporation; such as water or gas works; and the presumption of an intention to exclude such property from taxation would be very slight, and perhaps could not arise at all on the language of the law. Such property is deemed to be held by the corporation, as is expressed in one case, in its social or commercial capacity as a private corporation, and for its own profit; and therefore it was held that vacant lots owned by a city, market houses, fire engines, etc., were not presumptively

stitution). And see King v. Commissioners, etc., 4 T. R., 730; King v. Inhab. of Liverpool, 7 B. & C., 61; King v. Terrott, 3 East, 506; Queen v. Shee, 4 Q. B., 2; Queen v. Exminster, 12 A. & E., 2; People v. Doe, 36 Cal., 220; People v. Austin, 47 Cal., 353; Worcester Co. v. Worcester, 116 Mass., 193; Inhab. of Wayland v. Commissioners, 4 Gray, 500; Gibson v. Howe, 37 Ia., 168; Moore v. Morledge, 42 Ia., 26; State v. Gaffney, 34 N. J., 133; Directors of Poor v. School Directors, 42 Pa. St., 21.

Piper v. Singer, 4 S. & R., 354; Nashville v. Bank of Tennessee, 1 Swan, 269; People v. McCreery, 34 Cal., 432, 456; People v. Doe, 36 Cal., 220; People v. Austin, 47 Cal., 353; Reid v. State, 74 Ind., 252; Townsen v. Wilson, 9 Pa. St., 270.

2 Trustees of University v. Champaign Co., 76 Ill., 184; Board of Regents v. Hamilton, 28 Kan., 376.

3 Nashville v. Bank of Tennessee, 1 Swan, 269. But the mere fact that a city controls the rates of a water company or other company created to supply a public need will not create an implied exemption in its favor, the stock being held by individuals. Appeal of Des Moines, etc., Co., 48 Ia., 324. A municipal corporation cannot hold private property —e. g., a park — in trust for the owners of lots fronting on it so as to exempt it from taxes and assessments under general laws. McChesney v. People, 99 Ill., 216.

4 Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv., 295. See West Hartford v. Water Com'rs, 44 Conn., 360. This private side to a public corporation has often been recognized in other than tax cases. Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill, 531; 2 Denio, 433; Lloyd v. New York, 5 N. Y., 369; Storrs v. Utica, 17 N. Y., 104; Western Fund Savings Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St., 175; Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 Md., 468; Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich., 165; post, ch. XXI.

excluded from taxation; but this, unless restricted to the case of special assessments, would seem to be limiting the implied exemption unreasonably, and certainly more than other cases limit it.2

Allowance for debts. Revenue laws sometimes permit tax payers to deduct from the property to be taxed the debts owing by them. Sometimes the deduction is from credits only; sometimes from mortgages; sometimes from the aggregate of personal estate. Reference is made in the note to decisions as to these allowances. The allowance is not in any proper sense an exemption, but is made by way of reaching the just amount. of taxable property.

1 Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv., 295. Compare Appeal of Des Moines, etc., Co., 48 Ia., 324. County property, it seems, may be subject to a water tax in Illinois, unless expressly exempted. Cook County v. Chicago, 103 Ill., 646.

2 The following public property held not taxable: A city hall, Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv., 295. A city slip, Low v. Lewis, 46 Cal., 550. Court-house and jail, Worcester Co. v. Worcester, 116 Mass., 193. Waterworks, reservoirs, etc., West Hartford v. Water Com'rs, 44 Conn., 360; State v. Gaffney, 34 N. J., 131; Rochester v. Rush, 80 N. Y., 302. Cemetery, People v. Doe, 36 Cal., 220; Louisville v. Nevin, 10 Bush, 549. Poor-house, Directors of Poor v. School Directors, 42 Pa. St., 21. Park or common, St. Louis v. Gorman, 29 Mo., 593. School fund property is not taxable in Illinois (Chicago v. People, 80 Ill., 384). and probably not in any state.

3 A note given by a tax payer and outstanding is to be allowed as a debt, though it is payable on demand, given for United States securities, and may have been given as a device to escape taxation. People v. Ryan, 88 N. Y., 142; citing Stilwell v. Corwin, 55 Ind., 433; Smale v. Burr, L. R., 8 C. P., 64. The amounts an insurance company would be required to return on surrender of policies are not to be deducted as debts. People v. Davenport, 91 N. Y., 574. Neither is the reinsurance item in the report of the company to be deemed a debt. Insurance Co. v. Cappellar, 38 Ohio St., 560. As to what is "indebtedness within the state" under an Oregon statute allowing such indebtedness to be deducted, see Ankenny v. Multnomah Co., 4 Or., 271. It is held in the same state that a debt contracted for the mere purpose of evading taxation is not to be regarded. Poppleton v. Yamhill Co., 8 Or., 337. See Waller v. Yaeger, 39 Ia., 228. As to deduction of indebtedness in Indiana, see Matter v. Campbell, 71 Ind., 512. Money on hand or on deposit is not a solvent credit within the meaning of a statute allowing indebtedness to be deducted from the amount of solvent credits. Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Commissioners, 84 N. C., 504. Corporate stocks are not solvent credits. Raleigh, etc., R. Co. v. Commissioners, 87 N. C., 414. The allowance of credits and deductions, if the law operates alike on all persons and property like situated, does not establish a want of uniformity. Edwards

Constitutional restrictions. Before considering the express exemptions from general taxation which it has been customary to make in state revenue laws, it will be convenient to examine briefly the constitutional provisions which have been adopted in the several states with the purpose of securing uniformity in taxation, and to make the rule of uniformity compulsory upon the legislature. The differences in these provisions are very considerable, but enough of them have been the subject of judicial consideration to make the decisions upon them a sufficient guide to the meaning of all.

Alabama. The constitution provided that "No man or set of men are entitled to exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." The legislature granted a charter to an insurance company, and provided therein that "as a full commutation for all taxes, impositions or assessments on the capital stock of said company or on any of its property or effects," the company should annually pay into the state treasury a specified sum of money; and the charter was declared unalterable, except with the consent of its trustees, for the term of twenty years. The commutation being contested, it was held that it must be deemed to have been granted in consideration of advantages to be derived by the public from the establishment of the corporation and the performance of its corporate functions and duties, and that the commutation was not therefore violative of the constitutional provision.1

v. People, 88 Ill., 340. As to what are solvent debts in case of an insurance company, see Alabama, etc., Ins. Co. v. Lott, 54 Ala., 499.

For a case of allowance to a shareholder in a corporation of his proportion of the tax paid by the corporation on its property, see Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 87 N. C., 414. Under a statute providing for exempting from taxation " so much of the debts due or to become due to any person as shall equal the amount of bona fide and unconditional debts by him owing," held, a shareholder in a national bank was entitled to the set-off against the amount of his shares. Ruggles v. Fond du Lac, 53 Wis., 436, citing People v. Weaver, 100 U. S., 539; Pelton v. Nat. Bank, 101 U. S., 143: Cummings v. Nat. Bank, 101 U. S., 153; Evansville Nat. Bank v. Britton, 8 Fed. Rep., 867.

1 Daughdrill v. Insurance Co., 31 Ala., 91. See Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. McLean Co., 17 Ill., 291; Ide v. Finneran, 29 Kan., 654; Louisiana Lottery Co. v. New Orleans, 24 La. An., 86. Compare Louisiana Cotton Manuf. Co. v. New Orleans, 31 La. An., 440, and cases cited. Contra, Home Ins. Co. v. Sweigert, 104 Ill., 653.

Equality of taxation being a constitutional requirement, it is not competent to discriminate against a foreign insurance company to make the tax upon it correspond to the tax imposed upon home corporations in the state where such foreign corporation has its situs.'

The constitution as revised afterwards contains a provision that "the property of corporations now existing, or hereafter created, shall forever be subject to taxation the same as property of individuals," etc. Under this provision it is not competent to provide by law that the taxation of the property of corporations, or of any class thereof, shall not exceed a certain percentage which is below the limit to which the taxation of other property is restricted.2

Another provision is that "all taxes levied on property in this state shall be assessed in exact proportion to the value of such property." It is not competent for the legislature under this provision to prescribe or declare an arbitrary or artificial value to the property of individuals or corporations, and assess taxes on such valuation, and statutes to that effect are void.' But a license tax on attorneys and physicians does not violate the constitutional requirement of taxation by value.*

Arkansas.

The constitution provided that "all property shall be taxed according to its value; the manner of ascertaining which to be as the general assembly shall direct, making the same equal and uniform throughout the state." Where the legislature, by a city charter, undertook to exempt the property of the inhabitants from taxation for the construction

1 Clark v. Mobile, 67 Ala., 217. Tax laws are to be construed so as to avoid double taxation where practicable. Board of Revenue v. Gas Light Co., 64 Ala., 269.

2 Mobile v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 53 Ala., 570; Perry Co. v. Railroad Co., 65. Ala., 391; State Auditor v. Jackson Co., 65 Ala., 142.

3 The statute in question provided for the assessment of railroad property like other property, but added that "in no case, where the data of such an estimate shall be in the possession of the board, shall such property be esti mated at a sum less than that which, at an interest of eight per cent., would yield the sum shown by such data to constitute the net earnings of such property; such net earnings to consist of the whole earnings, deducting the running expenses of such road; but in no case nor to any extent is any allowance or deduction to be made on any other account." Held void. Board of Assessment v. Alabama Cent. R. R. Co., 59 Ala., 551.

McCaskell v. State, 53 Ala., 510.